

THE RELIGION OF ALL GOOD MEN

THE
RELIGION OF ALL GOOD MEN

AND OTHER STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

BY

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"Habet testimonia Deus, totum hoc quod sumus et in quo sumus."

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TO

THOMAS WILLIAM DUNN

TO HAVE KNOWN WHOM IS

A KIND OF RELIGION

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PREFACE

It is constantly said that the historical criticism of Christianity has for the present generation lost its interest. It is a wave that has spent its force. In a sense this is true. Historical criticism no longer greatly interests those classes whom formerly it did interest. It has begun, I fancy, to appeal to other classes, to whom the force of its appeal constitutes (since they are but ill trained in critical habits) a lively peril. With this I am not concerned. I am here concerned to call attention to the fact that the classes who formerly busied themselves with the criticism of Christianity on its historical side are now interesting themselves in the criticism of it from another side. A generation is growing up which is calling *ethical* Christianity into question, just as the two preceding generations called in question *historical* Christianity. Standing myself nearer to this

generation than to any other, and being, from the nature of my profession, in contact on all hands with young men of many types belonging to the educated classes, I say, with some confidence, that never, I believe, was the hold of Religion upon the minds of the youth of this country stronger, nor the hold of Christianity weaker. And, with still greater confidence, I would affirm that the difficulty which young men to-day have in accepting Christianity is not intellectual but moral. I speak that which I know.

The significance of this situation does not need to be emphasized once the situation is made clear. The object of the pages which follow is to induce religious men generally to consider this situation in all its bearings and to excogitate ways and means of dealing with it. This object runs, I think, through all the essays in this volume, and gives to the volume such unity as it possesses. I am aware that it does to some extent lack method and unity. I am aware that in much which I have said there is a want of precision, and that at some points I may perhaps seem exposed to the accusation of superficiality. There are some additions and alterations which I should like to have been able to make. In particular, there is a certain

apparent one-sidedness of which I could have wished by amplification to dispel the impression. Yet, even so, I have elected to publish what I have written as it stands. If I tried to say differently what I want to say, I fear that I might never say it at all. What I want to say needs, I think, at this time to be said by somebody; and it is better that I should say it imperfectly than that nobody should say it at all. It needs to be said, because it is what many people are thinking, and not I alone. I have, of course, had to run counter to a good many "received" opinions. But I hope I have not laid temerarious and unfeeling hands upon anything that should be truly sacred. I hope also that I have not forgotten my responsibilities toward those who will differ from me. I have not written as the adherent of any religious party, but as one studying ethics historically: and I have written for students of similar interests and not for the "man in the street": I have written, that is, for an audience where difference of opinion should be not merely conceded, but welcomed. And I have written, lastly, as not forgetting that I may one day differ from myself. And here let me say this: there is a danger that I may change my opinions. But there is also a danger that I may lose the courage of them.

Ten years hence I may have the courage only of other people's opinions. My environment is one where the "shades of the prison-house" too early close in upon youthful enthusiasm. Sooner than elsewhere one ceases to be "on one's way attended by the Vision Splendid," and begins to think and feel and speak conventionally and academically. Everywhere around me I hear the praise of the "middle course," of compromise, of suspended judgment: and I see the love of truth corrupted into the sophistic passion for believing both sides of a contradiction. I see the folks of my little world the victims, all of them, of one or two diseases—the disease of having no opinions ("the balanced mind") or the disease of not expressing them ("moderation"). Yet we all know that the just balance is motionless: nor have we ever seen in history intellectual progress born of an elegant *laissez-faire.*

Reflecting upon these things, I have thought it well to say here and now what I had to say upon subjects which the ordinary routine of my duties will perhaps in the future leave me but little time to study: subjects which, strictly speaking, are not my business, but which, speaking more strictly still, are every man's business: subjects upon which, if I do not speak now, I shall probably speak later (if I

speak at all) with that unworthy reticence born of the

" Years which bring the philoscphic mind."

I am indebted to the editor of the *Hibbert Journal* for permission to republish (with some slight alterations) the essay entitled " Christian, Greek, or Goth? " which first appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* of April, 1905. The essay entitled " The Religion of all Good Men " was first printed in the *Independent Review* of October, 1905. By the courtesy of the editorial committee of that journal it is here reprinted in a different and considerably enlarged form.

I have to thank my friend, Mr. J. L. Stocks, for assistance in seeing this book through the Press, as well as for constant advice while I was writing it—advice to which I owe more than I care to say.

H. W. G.

Oxford, 1905.

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STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

I

CHRISTIAN, GREEK, OR GOTH?

"Love thou the gods and withstand them, lest thy fame should fail at the end,
And thou be but their thrall and bondsman, who wast born for their very friend."

—*W. Morris.*

A great English novelist once made at the beginning of one of his novels a tripartite division of the inhabitants of the globe, distinguishing the highest mammals as men, women, and Italians. A great German philosopher speaks somewhere of "cows, women, sheep, Christians, dogs, Englishmen, and other democrats," making of these a single class which may be supposed, for moral and intellectual purposes, not to "count." In both these seemingly paradoxical deliverances we have an attempt to classify the types of morality. I say "paradoxical"; for classifications like these do, I think, appear overhasty. The

principle underlying them seems somehow not truly scientific. But I am not sure that it is really more capricious than the principle upon which many ethical treatises, commonly regarded as scientific, endeavor to reduce moral ideas to a certain definite number of types. The moral universe, like the physical universe, is commonly supposed to consist of two hemispheres. There is the Christian world, and there is the pagan world. The pagan world, again, is, for the purposes of ethical science, subdivided into Greeks and Barbarians. The really important world is supposed to be the Christian world. Nothing else really counts very much. The Greek world is allowed to count a little, partly because there still are a few Christians who obstinately insist on combining Christianity with common-sense, and even with knowledge, but chiefly, perhaps, because the conscience of Christianity is uneasy when it reflects that it owes to Hellenism a debt which it is unwilling openly to acknowledge. But the pagan world as a whole—some indulgence being allowed to Hellenism—is treated as morally not significant. Whatever in morality is not either Greek or Christian, the good Christian who knows a little Greek regards as without value. The moral systems east of Suez may have *interest* for the Western European, but they have not *value*. They

must not be allowed to enter into, they only confuse, the moral calculations of persons living on what may be called the respectable side of Suez—the side which acknowledges the eleven commandments.

This attitude of Europeans toward non-European morals is perhaps inevitable. A different attitude might very well end in a disaster to Western society of incalculable magnitude. I pass over, therefore, a certain moral snobbery in it, and will not even arraign its want of scientific method. I will accept this division of moral humanity into the two classes of Christians who know Greek, and non-Christians who probably do not, and who may, therefore, all of them be regarded as a single sort of persons, and cognate, one may conjecture, with "cows, women, sheep, dogs, and other democrats." The question I am here concerned to raise is this: "Is not our classification of the moral ideas of the Western world quite as inexact and unscientific as our separation of Western from Eastern morality?" We recognize in Europe two kinds of morality—the Greek and the Christian. Every man, in so far as he is moral, is either a Christian or a Hellenist, or a little of both. Christ or Apollo—there is no third alternative. In the whole code of European morals there is not a single idea which is not either Jewish or Hellenic in its origin.

This is the ordinary classification of Western ethical ideas; and this classification I venture to call both inadequate and false. It omits a class of ideas which I believe to have been, and to be, forces more potent in Western society, more impelling and more sustaining, than either Christianity or Hellenism. We are debtors both to the Greek and to the Jew: and that the debt which we owe to both these peoples is considerable I am far from denying. But that we owe to these peoples the whole of our morality, or the best of it, I do deny. I believe that in the best and most effective lives that are lived by men to-day there are operative certain moral principles, of which those who live by them are, perhaps, only imperfectly conscious, but which, none the less, are more powerful in holding society together than those furnished by the morality either of Greece or of Palestine.

What I mean I may best express something after this fashion. No one sitting down to write a history of architecture would dream of confining his treatment of the subject to, let us say, the Greek and Byzantine styles. A professedly comprehensive treatise upon architecture which omitted all mention of Gothic would be thought to be the work of a lunatic —of a lunatic in æsthetics. In just the same way it seems to me to be a kind of ethical lunacy to write

a treatise upon morals in which nothing is said of the influence upon the conduct of life of the ideas of the peoples of Northern Europe. Yet this is what our professors of ethical theory one and all consistently do. They discourse to the full extent of their knowledge upon Greek morality; they discourse, beyond the extent of their own or any man's knowledge, and abandoning experience completely, upon Christian morality. But they leave out of account altogether what I may venture, for want of a better name, to call Gothic morality. They imagine the peoples of the North to have come southward in an "entire forgetfulness" of all social tradition, and an "utter nakedness" of moral ideas. In this ethical nudity these northern peoples would have perished, it is supposed, of exposure to a world demanding rules of life and conduct, had they not betimes clothed themselves in a warm flannel of Christianity, and shod themselves with a second-hand Hellenism. The movements of these northern people are regarded as more or less on a par with the brute forces of Nature, and as not attaining to moral significance until informed by the spirit of Christianity, and, later, by that of Hellenism.

I believe that a truer analysis than is usually attempted of the moral ideas which lie at the root of

European progress will exhibit the falsity of these conceptions.

Morality may be said to be an attempt to realize certain types of men. Each one of us endeavors to be a particular kind of man. Each has, as we say, an ideal of what he ought to be. To be moral is to live, if not up to, yet toward, that ideal. The ideal of Christianity is what we may call holiness. The ideal of Hellenism may be said to be understanding or intelligence, under which word I would include a delighted coöperative energy of both senses and intellect. Or I may express this, perhaps—for I am not concerned, or obliged, to be precise—I may express this by saying that the ideal Christian type of man is the saint, the ideal Hellenic type, the φρόνιμος.

How far are either, or both, of these two ideals the motive powers of life as it is lived, and of life in so far as it progresses? As far as progress—which I will here define simply as going forward without slipping back again—as far as progress is concerned, I do not think it can be said, if we keep closely to the great facts of human history, that the Greek or the Christian ideal has been, or that both in conjunction have been, in a true sense, progressive. Hellenism indeed went forward, but the very rapidity

of its forward movement wrought its fall. It fell, and it failed. It failed, it is true, from the excess of its own ideals, like the craftsmen of whom Shakespeare says that "striving to do better than best, they do confound their skill in covetousness." But none the less it failed. Its failure is sufficiently proved by the fact that Christianity was able to supersede it. Christianity conquered it, because Christianity stood firmer on its feet. Yet it only stood firm on its feet because it stood still. The golden period of Christianity, in the strict sense, was that in which humanity was more stationary than in any other—the period covering those centuries which, despite the sedulous whitewashing of fashionable historians to-day, are still rightly spoken of as the Dark Ages—and which might even more appropriately, I think, be called the Black Ages. The attempt, again, inaugurated by the Renascence to combine Hellenism and Christianity—spirited and gallant though it was, and much as it did for the deliverance of the human intelligence—that attempt cannot, I think, be shown to have resulted *by itself* in any real progress.[1] In

[1] When I say that the Renascence did not in itself result in any real progress for the human race, I mean this: The fruits of the Renascence *in itself* are to be seen in Italy, and consist in every kind of moral corruption. The *Renascence in itself* failed: what succeeded was the *Renascence plus the Teutonic*

saying this I must not be understood to mean that from the Renascence down to the present time the human race has been standing still, much less to mean that for the five-and-twenty centuries which have elapsed since Hellenism first became a power in the world there has been no progress. Clearly and beyond dispute there has been progress. But what I maintain is, that this progress has been almost as much in spite of, as because of, Hellenism or Christianity or both. Moreover, there still is progress. But the motive power underlying it comes, I believe,

spirit. "Fugitive and exiled Greece," in the memorable language used of Reuchlin by Argyropolus—"fugitive and exiled Greece found a refuge beyond the Alps"; and it was this alliance of Hellenism and Teutonism which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saved Europe. Nor must we forget the great contribution of Chivalry (in the institutional sense) to the Reformation. The issue of the Reformation, in its initial stages, was Knighthood *versus* Priesthood. Hütten and Sickingen are hardly less important than Luther himself. Indeed, from one point of view they are more important. Enthusiasts for the Gospel as they were, they yet could not help feeling at many points its unreality, and detected in themselves, often enough, a preference for the ideal of manhood or knighthood rather than for that of saintliness. Of the company of knights that gathered round Hütten at Ebenburg, the pious D'Aubigné relates: "The warriors who were there assembled at last grew weary of hearing so much said about *the meek virtues of Christianity* . . . so that Œcolampadius used to exclaim: 'Alas! the word of God is sown here upon stony places'" (D'Aubigné, *Hist. of Reformation*, i. ch. 9).

neither from Athens nor from Jerusalem. I do not believe that the best men to-day, the men who make progress, who carry the race forward, are really and truly, if they could analyze justly their moral sentiments, much influenced by the ideal of either the saint or the φρόνιμος. They were born Christians, and therefore they honestly believe that they desire to be saints. They were taught Greek, and therefore they honestly believe that they bear an affection toward "sweetness and light," and that they desire to be men of fine intelligence and vivid sensibility. Nevertheless, we only believe, as Emerson says, we only believe as deep as we live. And how do these men live? They do not in general deserve the name of saints, and would be mortified, I fancy, if it were applied to them. Neither are they, in general, subtle in their perceptions nor of an impassioned sensuosity. You will perhaps say, "They have these ideals: it is only that they fell short of them." That may be so. Personally, I think they imagine rather than possess these ideals. But, in any case, I would go on to make this observation. The kind of men whom in real life these men genuinely admire, with whom they associate most gladly, is neither the saint nor the φρόνιμος. They are perhaps distantly patronizing of such, but they do not ask them to dinner. Look, further, not

only at what they approve, but at what they disapprove. They are easily tolerant of a great many sins which Christianity regards as deadly—the sins of the flesh, for example, the sin of wealth, the sin of pride, the sins of hatred and revenge. In church they acquiesce, indeed, in calling these things sins; but out of church they take the world, as they are fond of saying, they "take the world as it comes" and men for what they are worth; they have a distaste for a man of strict living; they say "best men are molded out of faults," and they are prone to carry their pity for human frailty to a point at which it passes into admiration. But even out of Church they do recognize one deadly sin. All sins save one they will forgive their neighbor until seventy times seven. But one sin hath no forgiveness. Its nature I shall best indicate by an illustration drawn from a story familiar to us all. There was a certain king named David who lay with his neighbor's wife, whose name was Bathsheba. The husband of this Bathsheba was one Uriah, who, under the circumstances, was an inconvenience to King David; who, therefore, betraying him by the way of his noblest ambitions,[2] stationed him in the forefront of a fight from which

[2] Yet it was a Jewish ordinance that forbade to "seethe the kid in the mother's milk."

he was not likely to return home alive. Nor did he. We are told that David was a man after the Lord's heart. That is probably the witness of a partisan historian. David is not after the heart of most decent-minded human beings. But why? Because he was an adulterer? I think not. Because he was a murderer? I do not believe that either. David is not after the hearts of most of us because, to employ a familiar phrase, he was not a gentleman. That is the sin which hath no forgiveness. By this sin of not being a gentleman I do not mean the sin of being badly dressed, the sin of having a provincial accent, the sin of being what is called an impossible person. These sins men will often condone, often of course they will not. But by the sin of not being a gentleman I mean something different. By not being a gentleman I understand failure in two ideals—the ideal of chivalry[8] and the ideal of honor. I believe that anyone who seriously interrogates his conscience will, if he continues the process for a sufficient time, come to admit that these two ideals are more really and truly than any others the regulating principles of what

[8] By "chivalry" I mean throughout not, of course, the *institution* (which came from the south of France *circa* 1000 A.D.), but the spirit which finally issued in the institution.

he calls his moral life. What we ultimately believe in, every one of us, cook's son and duke's son alike, is these two things—the spirit of chivalry and the spirit of honor. These are the out-of-Church morality of all of us, and the men we like—or love—are the men who govern their lives by this morality, however defective in other respects their ethical creed may be, whatever their frailties, and however dark, I will even add, however dark their sins. So long as a man possesses these two qualities of chivalry and honor he may always be sure of finding friends who will stand by him in the hour of disgrace and moral disaster. The love of women has passed into a proverb for constancy. We marvel at the kind of men to which women remain constant—

"Wronged women with wan hearts and starving eyes,
Waiting for those they love to come again."

The objects of their devotions are as often as not, to all appearance, men of wasted and worthless lives. There is no man, it is said, too bad but for some woman to love him. Yet what they love, I think, is not the man, not a dissolute life, but the rags and tatters of honor and chivalry which still cling often to those whose moral corruption, in the ordinary sense of the word moral, seems complete.

These two ideals, chivalry and honor, are neither Greek nor Christian. I take them to be the peculiar property and creation of the northern races. I may call them the cardinal virtues of Gothic morality. That they do not belong in their essence to the ethical systems of Greece will, I fancy, not be disputed. The ideal type of man which the ordinary Greek set himself to emulate was, I suppose, the Odysseus type. He would be a bold man who should maintain that the character of Odysseus is either chivalrous or honorable. Most of us, I fancy, regard him in the light of a cunning rogue, who had gloriously exciting adventures, but whom not all the gods and goddesses of the Olympian hierarchy could have turned into a gentleman. In popular accounts of the social life of Greece one frequently comes across the phrase a "Greek gentleman." I cannot speak for others, but I myself, whenever I encounter that phrase, am unable to rid myself of the feeling that it imparts false associations into the history of the Greek world, and that there were no Greek gentlemen in our sense. The nearest approach to a portrait of a gentleman in Greek literature is the picture of the μεγαλόψυχος offered by Aristotle in the *Ethics*. I do not think I shall encounter serious opposition when I say that the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle may have been a cox-

comb, but he was not a gentleman. He resembles a gentleman in a novel of Disraeli, but no other kind of gentleman.

It may, with a greater show of reason, I think, be contended that the ideals of chivalry and honor in their noblest form (for they have, of course, like everything else, their corruptions) are a product of Christianity. There is a sense in which this may justly be maintained, but as it is not the sense in which it generally is maintained, I will try and make clear my own view of the relation of the Christian ideal to the ideals of chivalry and honor.

The northern nations had not sufficient fineness of perception readily to embrace, or deeply to feel, the attraction of Hellenism. And, in general, the approach to Hellenism was only possible to them through Christianity. They readily embraced Christianity, because the North, like Christianity, and in contradistinction to Hellenism, is deep and earnest and somber. But none the less the Christian ideal of the "spiritual" man was one in accordance with which the northern nations were as little able, ultimately, to govern their lives as the peoples of the South. I say "to govern their lives" advisedly; for North and South alike accepted, and accept, Christianity with their lips: but they do not, as I said,

live as deep as the supposed, or official, depth of their faith. For I am convinced that the ideal which all healthy nations and all healthy individual men (if they could impartially analyze their ideals) set before themselves, is not the spiritual man, but what I may call the best kind of natural man. The morality of the North accepted with its lips the spiritual man, but in its life it soon began to make, in all directions, a return upon the natural man. Chivalry and honor I take to be the two main directions in which it essayed, at first perhaps unconsciously, this regress upon the natural man. Chivalry and honor, in other words, are the product of Christianity, in so far as they are an undefined and instinctive protest against it. Christianity was the stimulus which produced these two ideals: but this reaction upon stimulus no more resembles the instrument of the stimulus than the reaction upon a pin-prick resembles the point of a pin.[4]

I shall perhaps make this clearer if I speak for a moment of the distinction between those two ideals. Chivalry and honor are, both of them, in their first conception, associated with the profession of arms.

[4] I should add, perhaps, that even this matter of pin-pricks is debated among philosophers; see, *e.g.*, *Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind,* chh. v.-vii.

It is thus inevitable that at many points the two ideals should run into one another. None the less they do admit of distinction. I may express what I conceive to be the distinction between them thus—Chivalry is to honor as the flesh is to the world. Christianity has said, "In my flesh dwelleth no good thing"; it had represented the body as the enemy of the spirit; it had discountenanced marriage and had hinted a not obscure approval of "some that were made eunuchs for the Kingdom of God's sake." Against that, chivalry is a brilliant and powerful, though erratic, protest. It had also proclaimed, with a complacency akin to exultation, that "the fashion of this world passeth away"; it had made an ideal of what St. Paul calls the "fool for Christ's sake," and accounted those alone blessed who, in the cause of Christ, had made themselves "as the filth of the world and the offscourings of all things unto this day." "Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being defamed, we entreat" (1 Cor., iv. 12). Against all that, so unnatural, so pusillanimous, so impossible, the ideal of honor is a righteous and necessary and enduring protest. "I am a man of peace," says Clough's *Dipsychus:*

"I am a man of peace,
And the old Adam of the gentleman
Dares seldom in my bosom stir against
The mild plebeian Christian seated there."

But it is to the motions in the blood of this old Adam that European society, as I believe, owes, and has always owed, its salvation. The world and the flesh are two things which mankind will never consent to do without. The essence of life is that it should be lived naturally. The instincts of the average man are healthy, I will even say holy. No religious or moral organization which sets itself in opposition to these can hope ultimately to succeed. Behind the religious or moral, or, indeed, any other kind of lawgiver, stands, not, as has been said, the "armed conscience of the community," but the great, unarmed, irresistible body of healthy human instinct. Its cry is ever still *Panem et Circenses,* "Give us the world and the flesh, or we will smash every window in your palace of painted superstition."

At this point I will pause to anticipate two objections.

In the first place, it may possibly be objected—I may even say it will probably be objected—that the ideals of chivalry and honor have, beyond doubt,

in certain ages, and in certain societies, been the source of all kinds of evils. I will not retort, as I fairly might, that the same is true of Christianity itself. Nor will I call in question the correctness of the objection. In regard, indeed, to the former of these two ideals, it is, I think, undeniable that the so-called "ages of chivalry" were in many ways anything but respectable. I will even consent to call them in many ways disreputable. The ideal, again, of the man of honor has been prolific, among certain nations, of great abuses. What I would say in this connection is this: "You cannot have the world and the flesh if you are not willing to pay the price of them." Chivalry and honor are two great principles which it is to the interest of mankind to keep always alive at whatever cost. Though I should see these two principles, employing as their instruments lust and bloodshed, destroy a whole nation of men, I could none the less say, "Let us go forward; that is the price we must expect to pay for these two precious things."

But I would notice also that these two ideals are progressive. Take, for example, honor. This ideal is undoubtedly responsible for the practice of dueling —a practice, I may notice in passing, which, while it still obtains among most European nations, is neither

Jewish nor Greek. That we in this country are well rid of this strange practice I do not doubt. But that it has served in the past a useful purpose, and that it still does so in many highly-civilized countries, this I do not doubt either. I will offer one illustration. If we read a speech of any of the great ancient orators, a speech, let us say, of Demosthenes or Cicero, what is it in any such speech that, after the eloquence, chiefly excites our astonishment? I imagine it is the evidence of a principle which, though nowhere exactly formulated, seems to have been accepted by the ancient world generally, and which might be expressed in words thus: "If A differs from B on a question of politics, A to be at liberty to call B by all the indecent names he can think of, and to attribute to him all the vices; and B to be allowed a like freedom in respect of A." Why was that sort of thing possible in Greece and Rome? It was possible, I cannot doubt, because the Greeks and Romans were strangers to the practice of dueling—because their sense of honor was, in comparison with ours, somewhat blunt.

The second objection which I wish to anticipate is this: "How," it will be asked, "does it come about that, if these two ideals are, as you say, the real bonds of European society, men are so deceived as

to live by them without being conscious of them? The explanation is, I think, this: Chivalry and honor are not so much principles as instincts. Indeed, it is because they are instincts that they are so fundamental in our moral life. Instinct is to principle as poetry is to prose. Chivalry and honor dwell in the same element of mystery as that with which poetry is surrounded. We speak of poetry as existing in the mind of a poet. It would be more correct to say that the mind of a poet is poetry. And just so chivalry and honor are not ideas in the mind of their possessor, they are themselves his mind. It is the same with religion. The religious mind and its religion are one. And here I would even venture on an overbold speculation. What religion is in its ultimate nature, I do not know. But take from religion these two ideals, chivalry and honor, and what do you leave?[5] Huxley said that he learned from being in love that there was such a thing as religion. From such a man that

[5] These two ideals, I may notice in passing, have not been without effect on the development of the *doctrine,* as well as of the ethics, of Christianity. Their influence may be clearly seen, for example, in the theory of the Atonement sketched by Ansem in the *Cur Deus Homo?* I may refer in this connection to the interesting remarks of Sabatier (*Doctrine of Atonement,* E. T., pp. 68, sqq.), who calls attention to the manner in which the conception of Feudalism generally affected the dogma of the Atonement.

is an unexpected and surely impartial testimony. Nor is this experience of Huxley, I imagine, unique. I would even suggest that it is general—would suggest that the passion of love is the nearest approach to "pure religion and undefiled" which it is granted to the majority to attain. That it is

> *"The angel woman faces we have seen*
> *And angel woman spirits we have guessed,"*

which are the source of the deepest thoughts about God and the universe which the ordinary man ever comes to entertain. And do we not owe this, when all is said and done, to chivalry? It is certainly not to be found in Greece, and in Hebrew literature the ideal women are not inspiring figures. There is something wanting in a literature which asks us to admire Rahab the harlot and Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite.

It cannot, again, be denied that the ideal of honor fills a large space in the life of religion. This ideal may be both public and private—that is, a patriotic or a personal ideal. We hardly realize the extent to which much of our religion is a kind of purified patriotism. The God of our fathers has still more power and attraction for us than any god of philosophy—"the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac,

and the God of Jacob,"—"Our fathers hoped in thee." But though this ideal of public honor plays a large part in the best life of religion, the ideal of private honor is more important still. The religious life, on any view of it, consists in a certain relation of the individual toward what I may call his invisible environment; it consists in a certain way of being affected by the unseen things of the world. When we have exhausted the so-called facts of science, there is always something left over which we cannot reduce to any kind of position

"In the dull catalogue of common things."

This something impresses us chiefly as power. We can never escape from the sense of being in the presence of what a great English philosopher has called the "unknown and unknowable potency which lies behind phenomena." Consequently we cannot help attempting to enter into some relation to this power. What is the kind of relation which we should try to establish? Christianity teaches a relation of self-abasement, Hellenism a relation—I do not think I am unjust to it—of æsthetic contemplation. Neither relation is satisfactory, neither a true one. What I take to be a truer relation I can only indicate very gener-

ally. It is said of Abraham that he was "the friend of God." Emerson, in one of his *Essays*, puts forward a remarkable conception of the proper relation of a man to his friend. "Let him be to thee," he says, "a kind of beautiful enemy, untameable." We must never carry worship to a point where we lose self-respect. The highest love is characterized by a certain lofty independence. I would say, therefore, "Let God be to you *a kind of beautiful enemy, untameable.* Do not lose your independence, courage, self-respect, in presence of this unknown and unknowable power." "When you travel," says Thoreau, "to the celestial city, ask to see God, not one of the servants." There you have the same kind of idea. The Lord thy God is doubtless a jealous God. But a man also should be jealous in the same way—should be jealous, that is, of his honor.

It is this sense of honor operating, perhaps unconsciously, in religion, which has through many perilous centuries saved the human spirit from the worst forms of superstition. This religious self-respect, this independence, this courage, have come down to us from the northern nations. These peoples' conception of God was less exalted, it is true, than the Jewish, less beautiful than the Greek: but their attitude toward their conception seems to me nobler

and braver than that of either Christianity or Hellenism. The hope of religious progress to-day lies, I think, in the growing tendency of modern nations to take up and develop this attitude. I will offer here two illustrations of the kind of religious sentiment which I call braver and better than the Christian or Hellenic. The first I take from Beaumont and Fletcher's *Bonduca*. It gives us the sentiment of the northern religions in its least regenerate form; but it is none the less not a bad type of the attitude I am trying to express:

"Cease your fretful prayers,
Your whinings and your tame petitions:
The gods love courage armed with confidence,
And prayers fit to pull them down; weak tears,
And troubled hearts, the dull twins of cold spirits,
They sit and smile at...Hear how I salute them:—
Divine Andate, thou who hold'st the reins
Of furious battle and disordered war,
And proudly roll'st thy swarty chariot wheels
Over the heaps of wounds and carcases,
Sailing through seas of blood: thou sure steeled sternness,
Give us this day good hearts, good enemies,
Good blows on both sides, wounds that fear or flight
Can claim no share in."

The other illustration I will offer is of a different character. It consists of a passage from a writer whom I have already mentioned more than once in this paper, a writer near to our own time, who has always appeared to me more clearly than any of his contemporaries to have perceived the lines upon which the religion of the future must travel. I speak of Emerson. The passage to which I refer is one in which he endeavors to express his conception of the nature and function of prayer. In the emphasis which it lays upon the necessity in religion of courage and self-dependence, in the demand which it makes upon the sense of honor in a man, it is neither Christian nor Greek, but Northern:

"In what prayers," says Emerson, "do men allow themselves! That which they call a holy office is not so much as brave and manly. Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself in endless mazes of natural and supernatural, and mediatorial and miraculous. Prayer that craves a particular commodity—anything less than all good—is vicious. Prayer is the contemplation of the facts of life from the highest point of view. It is the soliloquy of a beholding and jubilant soul. It is the spirit of God pronouncing His works good. But prayer as

a means to effect a private end is meanness and theft. . . . As soon as a man is at one with God he will not beg. He will then see prayer in all action. The prayer of the farmer kneeling in his field to weed it, the prayer of the rower kneeling with the stroke of his oar, are true prayers heard throughout nature, though for cheap ends."

I will ask indulgence at this point for an attempt to synthesize the conclusions toward which I have been moving in this essay. It cannot, I think, be denied that there is at the present day among thinking persons a widespread dissatisfaction with the moral ideals of Christianity. Those who feel this dissatisfaction most deeply plead with us for a return upon the Greek view of life. With this plea I confess myself to some extent in sympathy. I sympathize with it as an endeavor to make the moral life beautiful and joyous. At the same time I do not believe that the human race is ever likely to find in Hellenism a satisfaction for its deepest aspirations. Neither Hellenism nor Christianity nor any fusion of the two can give us what we want. Hellenism is superior to Christianity in and so far as it is more natural. But what we want, if we are to live good and effective lives, is something that shall have the naturalness of Hellenism and yet at the same time a deeper

earnestness, a character more vigorous and robust. The morality of the North, with its two cardinal virtues, Chivalry and Honor, seems to me more able than anything else to supply this want. What is needed to-day is a return upon this morality, not a return upon Hellenism. At many points this morality stands in closer relation to Hellenism (to which, of course, it owes nothing) than to Christianity, to which it owes much. This is due simply to the fact that it is, like Hellenism, more natural, truer to the deeper instincts of mankind, than Christianity. It leaves men certain things of which they will never allow themselves ultimately to be deprived, and which Christianity has endeavored to take from them. But it is, as I said, more robust, of a greater virility than Hellenism; for the North is pre-eminently robust and virile, Hellenism and the South pre-eminently delicate, volitant, fickle.

"O tell her, tell her, thou that knowest each,
That bright and fierce and fickle is the South
And dark and true and tender is the North."

This northern morality, moreover, has in it, what Hellenism had not, a conquering and progressive power: for the northern races are conquering races. They move by their mass. Hellenism had no mass, no

volume: it remained thin and isolated. It conquered Rome indeed, yet it conquered only because it corrupted. But the moral ideas of the North have conquered Europe by sheer strength, by a native imperial strength and energy. It is a conquest indeed which Europe has not acknowledged. We have been conquered without knowing it. We imagine ourselves still to be living under the moral constitution of Christianity. But we are, I believe, official Christians and not real Christians. At the bottom of his nature, if he could only get down there and scrutinize it honestly, each man of us is governed by the moral ideas of the North. What is wanted to-day is that we should frankly accept this moral conquest of the northern races, live openly under the government of their ideals, identify ourselves with these ideals, and develop them. As it is, we dissimulate. I would say then—Let us not be ashamed to acknowledge that by which we really live. Let us have done with pretense. Let us cease to call ourselves Christians when we do not follow Christ. Let us cease attempting to reduce Christianity to a metaphor and to make the words of Christ mean to us what they never meant to him. Neither let us, escaping Christianity, conduct in a kind of moral conservatory a flirtation with Hellenism which can come to nothing. Let us

remember that we are ourselves of the North, and that our moral constitutions have a natural affinity for the ideals of the North. These ideals have, it is true, become so confused with other moral systems that it is often extremely difficult to distinguish the northern elements in our ethical creed from other elements of a different origin. But it is, I think, possible to distinguish as essentially northern the two ideals of which I have here chiefly spoken, chivalry and honor: and in the development of these two ideals the peoples of Europe will, I believe, in the future find the brightest employment for their moral faculties.

I may be allowed to add here a note upon what it will occur to some persons to regard as a strange omission. I have made no mention in this paper of a moral conception which there is good reason to regard as in its origin northern—the ideal of Duty. This omission was intentional. I have omitted to speak of this ideal for three reasons. In the first place, though I regard the conception of duty as northern in its *origin*, yet in so far as it operates in our lives to-day it is, I think, quite as much Christian and Hellenic as what I call Gothic. Secondly, it is not any particular virtue, nor, like the Platonic justice, the whole of virtue, ὅλη ἀρετή, but it is merely

a way of looking at virtue and the virtues. And thirdly, it seems to me to be, on the whole, a wrong way and a bad way of looking at the virtues. I have not left unread the famous apostrophe of Kant, but I confess myself not much moved by it. I am even prepared to maintain that so long as we are conscious of performing a good action from a sense of duty we are immoral. To be moral is to identify the whole of ourselves with the whole of good. So long as we think of "duty," we make a false and base distinction between ourselves and the good. Morality is a union of moral subject and object. We suppose that Nelson's famous message, "England expects every man to do his duty," had something to do with the victory at Trafalgar—but falsely. The men who won the battle of Trafalgar were the men who did more than their duty.[6] So long as we do only our duty we are

[6] "Some were sharpening their cutlasses, others polishing the guns, as though an inspection were about to take place instead of a mortal combat, whilst three or four, as if in more bravado, were dancing a hornpipe; but all seemed deeply anxious to come to close quarters with the enemy. Occasionally they would look out of the ports and speculate as to the various ships of the enemy, many of which had been on former occasions engaged by our vessels. It was at this time that Nelson's famous signal, 'England expects every man to do his duty,' was hoisted at the masthead of the Admiral's ship. These

not only unprofitable, but ineffective, servants. I will go even farther. I will maintain that there have been more crimes done in this world in the name of duty than good deeds. It resembles, in this respect, liberty. "O duty, how they have played with thy name!" The more we make the sense of honor take the place of the sense of duty, the truer and braver do we become. As far as my own feeling goes, the very word "duty" sends a chill to the heart. The word "honor," on the other hand, seems to quicken the pulse every time it is spoken. It belongs to the world of romance, desire, enterprise, and limitless possibility. It carries with it all those associations in which, as children of the North, we English are

words were requested to be delivered to the men, and I was desired to inform those on the main deck of the Admiral's signal. Upon acquainting one of the quartermasters of the order, he assembled the men with: 'Avast there, lads, come and hear the Admiral's words.' When the men were mustered, I delivered, with becoming dignity, the sentence, rather anticipating that the effect on the men would be to awe them by its grandeur. *Jack, however, did not appreciate it, for there were murmurs from some, whilst others, in an audible whisper, muttered 'Do our duty! Of course we'll do our duty. I've always done mine; haven't you? Let us come alongside of 'em and we'll soon show whether we will do our duty.'* Still, the men cheered vociferously, more, I believe, from love and admiration of their Admiral and leaders than from a full appreciation of this well-known signal."—General Sir S. B. Ellis, K.C.B., cited by his grandson in *T. P.'s Weekly*, Sept. 22, 1905.

most at home. I am reminded here of some lines in which a young Oxford poet has apostrophized what he calls "The Adventurous Spirit of the North,"—lines which seem to me to give beautiful expression to a part of the sentiment which hangs about the ideal of honor. I can hardly do better than close my paper with a citation from them.

"Seal on the hearts of the strong,
Guerdon thou of the brave,
To nerve the arm in the press of the throng,
To cheer the dark of the grave:—
Far from the heather hills,
Far from the misty sea,
Little it irks where a man may fall,
If he falls with his heart on thee."

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

II

"THE RELIGION OF ALL GOOD MEN"

πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.

"All men," says Homer, "have need of gods." And, while it is often said by men of practical sense and a large experience of life, that "one religion is as good as another," there does seem to be a general agreement among thinking persons that one cannot do without *some kind of religion.* Perhaps this general agreement has always existed; but that it exists to-day will scarcely be denied. Nor can it be regarded as other than a fortunate circumstance that at a time when the accredited faiths are more and more being called in question there should yet be a widespread conviction among men of the necessity of some kind of faith. Never before has there been a more general dissatisfaction with the traditional creeds or a more constant demand for a creed of some kind. To allay this general dissatisfaction, to satisfy in some way this constant demand, is the great reli-

gious problem which lies before this and the next generation. The last sixty years have witnessed a kind of collapse of Christianity. When I speak of "a kind of collapse of Christianity," I mean no more than that there exists to-day an enormous and ever-increasing number of serious and intelligent persons whom Christianity, both historically and ethically, fails to satisfy. I do not say that these persons are right or wrong in their attitude toward Christian beliefs. I do not say that Christianity has failed *absolutely*, but that *for these persons* it has failed; and that they are now so considerable a body that if we have, as I suppose we have, outgrown the doctrine that men must, and should be, damned for their intellectual convictions—however honest—it becomes our duty, our imperative duty, to furnish, if we can, with some kind of religion those who can no longer accept what is called the religion of Christ. The "brother for whom Christ died," though he refuse to believe that Christ died for him, has none the less a claim upon those who do believe it. Those who do believe it, if they also (as they must) believe that some religion, even though not the Christian religion, is better than none, are in duty bound to see that such an one shall not, so far as they can help it, be left altogether *religionless*. This is a duty which Chris-

tians and non-Christians have in common. A common problem lies before both—to find some kind of religion for the honest and serious and intelligent persons who cannot receive Christianity.

Upon this problem many earnest thinkers and workers have been for now a long time strenuously engaged. They have engaged upon it with the conviction that there is, or perhaps with the hope that there may be, outside the creeds, some "religion of all good men" which may serve either as an adequate substitute for, or as a "second best" to, Christianity. That there is some such religion of good men independent of the creeds seems a natural and necessary inference from the vast number of men who are to be found in all ages, and particularly perhaps in our own, adhering to no definite and recognized faith, yet living lives which cannot justly be characterized as other than religious.

What is the essence, what are the component elements, of this "religion of all good men"? The different answers which have been given in the last century to this question seem to me to be reducible to two. As a substitute for what I may call a "full Christianity" we seem to me to be reduced to a choice between Christianity-*minus*-dogma (which will include some kind of Theism) and some form of the

vague Gospel so ardently preached under the name of Positivism. Of the possibilities of a Christianity-*minus*-dogma, of a purely ethical Christianity, I have already spoken in a previous essay.[1] And I here merely repeat that an ethical system, framed for a world momentarily about to perish, cannot have validity for all time, and can have for us to-day but a very partial validity.

Christian ethics are, to borrow an expression of Kant, a kind of *misology*, a species of paradox whose power of appeal depends upon certain supernatural presuppositions. Without these presuppositions Christian ethics, failing in theory, can only justify themselves by succeeding in practice. Have they succeeded? Do they succeed? Can they succeed? It was a bishop of the English Church who told us only the other day that Christianity so far had been a failure. And a yet more eminent ecclesiastic less recently affirmed that this country could not afford for twenty-four hours to live according to the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. Nineteen centuries of failure! *Quo usque?*

That men assent to Christianity with their lips is a small thing in comparison with the dissent from it

[1] *Christ the Forerunner*, pp. 177–233. [The order of the essays is here changed from that which is followed in the English edition. PUBLISHER'S NOTE.]

which they express by their lives. If it be said—and it is beginning to be said—"They live by Christianity, though not by the Gospels," I rejoin, "That is in a sense true: but why call it Christianity?" No! the bloodthirsty attachment to dogma with which the liberal theologians reproach their less elastic-minded brethren is not meaningless. We cannot abandon Christian dogma and keep Christian ethics. The more orthodox, *i.e.* the more consistent, theologians know this: it was the knowledge they had of this which so long kept alive among them the now defunct doctrine that failure in faith carried with it failure in morals. It was because they did not know this that men like Jowett and Matthew Arnold, when they set themselves to repair the ravages of the Tübingen school, failed to satisfy any but themselves. Matthew Arnold advises those who cannot accept Christianity-*minus*-dogma to cling to, and, for the love of God and the salvation of their souls, to accept Christianity-*plus*-dogma.[2] "For God's sake believe it then." As a matter of fact he who accepts either kind of Christianity must accept both; and for my own part, if one could have one without the other, I believe it to be an easier feat to accept the dogma and refuse the ethics: indeed a proof of it is that this is what the greater part of the world *really* does.

[2] See the poem *Pis-aller*.

Having thus briefly indicated my attitude toward Christianity-*minus*-dogma, I cannot here further pursue the subject. I will only express my satisfaction at being on the side of the orthodox, and a believer in the inseparability of Christian ethics and Christian dogmatics; and having done this, I will pass on to consider the adequacy, as a substitute for Christianity, of any form of Positivism, or, as it is sometimes grandiosely entitled, "the religion of humanity."

The founder of this religion—if any religion can be said to have a founder—is, of course, the celebrated French philosopher Auguste Comte. I do not, however, propose to consider here that form of Positivism which belongs peculiarly to Comte. Comte began as an apostle, but he ended as a hierophant and even as a *poseur*. The better Positivism is the non-hierophantic. Of this better Positivism the most eminent representative in this country—I set aside living writers—has been, perhaps, John Stuart Mill: and in speaking here of the religion of humanity I would be understood to speak of such a religion as that adumbrated by Mill in his essay upon the "Utility of Religion" and in the dissertations upon "Theism."

Mill speaks of "that real, though purely human religion, which sometimes calls itself the religion of

humanity and sometimes that of duty." The objection that such a religion is merely morality under a new name naturally suggests itself at once, and had presented itself, as we might expect, to the mind of Mill, who endeavors to answer it. "To call these sentiments," he says, "by the name morality, exclusive of any other title, is claiming too little for them. They are a real religion. The essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires toward an ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire." This is extremely vague language:[3] but what Mill means is, I suppose, something of this kind: Religion is distinguished from morality by its emotional and desiderative character: it is what Matthew Arnold calls "morality touched with emotion"; and in so far as Positivism exhibits these characters of emotion and desire it is entitled to be called religion.

Now, I am prepared to agree with Mill that the essence of religion consists in desire, that it is an emotional attitude. But, granting this, I go on to

[3] For example: "direction" may mean either (1) direction given or (2) direction taken. Mill probably means direction taken, *i.e.*, movement. But a movement of the emotions means no more than an emotion, a movement of desire no more than a desire.

raise two questions. First, is humanity—mankind as a whole—a possible object of such an emotional and desiderative energy? And secondly, if so, if such a "religion of humanity" be truly possible, is it possible to speak of such a religion as "the religion of duty"? The answer to either of these question will, I think, be the answer to both: and I shall not endeavor to keep the two questions separate.

I am aware that no word is more often on the lips of religious men, no word sounds with more pomp from the pulpit than this word duty. I could wish that it were employed only by the Churches. The worst cant, I will venture to say, that is talked in the world is talked about duty. It is a source of many species of tyrannical action. It is always spoken, never done. Even as a word—and its existence is not much more than a word—it is objectionable. It has no warmth, color, inspiration or adventure in it. But it is cold, gray, hesitant, calculative. To imagine it the motive-principle of great actions is to libel great men. "I have *only* done my duty," says Grenville. Let us get beyond this ideal of a *minimum*. If duty be the *maximum* of our achievement, let it not be so of our endeavor.[4]

[4] I would ask the reader to compare what is said upon the same subject on pp. 30-34.

Duty is the prose, religion the romance of our moral being. Religion only begins where duty ends: and the very phrase "religion of duty" seems to me thus to involve a contradiction. It is something of which I find it impossible to form a conception. And when by "religion of duty" I have to understand a religion of duty *to humanity* my perplexity is increased. I can understand a duty to my parents, my children, my friends and neighbors—to school or city or country;—but I have dwelt so long, I confess it, in pagan ideals that I cannot make the words "duty to humanity" mean to me anything at all. They are something "imagination boggles at." A duty so extended becomes to me length without breadth—that is, an *idea*, which is possibly, as Plato might say, "laid up in heaven," but laid up there, we may add, because not greatly in requisition upon earth.

I may sum up the difficulties which I feel with regard to the Positivist creed thus: Positivism is called a religion, as distinguished from morality, because its attitude is conceived as one of emotion, desire, romance. But such an attitude toward a general (often purely abstract) humanity is neither real nor possible. As soon as we try to enter into it we reveal its impossibility by introducing the conception of duty. We exchange a very flimsy and unreal

poetry for a rather bald and uninteresting prose. This prose of duty to humanity, moreover, is little more *real* than the poetry of "religion of humanity." It is a kind of algebraical symbolism. Morality becomes a sort of mathematical equation in which humanity is x—a perpetually unknown quantity: and our religious instincts can never find satisfaction in a God who reveals himself under this symbol of a perpetual x. Religion seeks an object to which the whole self of a man can go out in an ardor of joyous devotion. And of such an object humanity saith, "It is not with me." Indeed humanity as an object of worship, if we insist on a fair analysis of the conception, is something even less real than any God of mythology. To exchange the gods of mythology for "humanity" is to exchange a poetry of the heart for an abstraction of political philosophers.[5] And of the two figments who can fail to prefer the former?

The truth is that in going to humanity for a God we are going unnecessarily far afield. Humanity may be found as far away as Tibet. But it has been

[5] Even Mill, I may here notice, is not altogether satisfied with "humanity." The God he ends in is humanity *plus the possibility of a divinity:* "In making this (*sc.* the service of humanity) the rule of our life we may be co-operating with the Unseen Being to whom we owe all that is enjoyable in life." *Theism,* Part v., *fin.* Mill here travels beyond Positivism

said of God, upon authority high and sacred, that "he is not far from any one of us." And I am inclined to think that here at any rate human experience will be found to confirm divine revelation: and that it will, if sincerely interrogated, report that worship, like charity, "begins at home."

Let us interrogate this experience. Let a man set aside those hours of his youth, in which he was instructed, with fear and trembling in him, in a worship which only did not seem absurd to him because he was too young to appreciate the infinite possibilities of human absurdity, and let him ask himself (if the cave of memory still renders its mystic and fond echoes) what were the first objects to him of natural and spontaneous worship. The first and most natural objects of worship, it will hardly be denied by any, are persons and places. Throughout life, in the religion of all men—whatever their creed—the worship of persons fills, as all men must know, a large space. The devotion to parents and brethren can never fail to be a large part of most men's religion. More

and gets back to the old poetries of the heart, which "though not in themselves amounting to what can properly be called a religion" are yet "excellently fitted to aid and fortify . . . the religion of Humanity" (*l.c.*). This is not Positivism: but it is a remarkable confession of the inadequacy of Positivism from one who called himself a Positivist.

passionate still, more religiously intense, is the devotion which we lavish in early youth, upon friends. Parents and brethren are a kind of divine accident. Our friends we have ourselves chosen out from the whole world;[6] nor is the boy who, though he dares not confess it even to himself, prefers his friend to his father, so unnatural as he may sometimes seem to the laudable jealousy of the latter. He is finding his religion, or a part of it. The worship of heroes, though it be but a boy's worship, is in some sense a worship of God.[7] Later comes the passion of love—in the popular signification of the word:

> *"Ille mi par esse deo videtur,*
> *Ille, si fas est, superare divos."*

I ask in all sincerity, and would desire that every one should answer to himself in equal sincerity: Did

[6] Statius: *Silvae*, ii. 1, 86-8. Interius nova saepe adscitaque serpunt pignora . . . genuisse necessest, elegisse iuvat.

[7] I allow myself here the pleasure of quoting, in this connection, some words from a work familiar and endeared to most of us in our youth. They are taken from the "Conclusion" of *Tom Brown's School-days*. Tom Brown is left standing by the grave of Thomas Arnold in the chapel of Rugby School:

"And let us not be hard on him if, as he stands there, his thoughts are fuller of the tomb and him who lies there, than of the Altar and Him of whom it speaks. . . . Such stages have to be gone through, I believe, by all *young and brave souls*

any man ever love God as he has loved some human beings? Did he ever derive from the love of God a greater inspiration for all good things and thoughts than from the love of some one or other child of earth? Did he never feel that in the love of some single human being he was loving God? "Forasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these ye have done it unto me?[8]

Strong and deep also, though slower and more subdued, is the emotion which attaches us to places.

who must win their way through hero-worship to the worship of him who is the King and Lord of heroes."

Tom Hughes, who wrote that, called himself a "muscular Christian." I would prefer to call him a *lovable Goth.* One does not like to speak ill of *Tom Brown,* but what a failure in a way the book is! The Christianity of the author is sincere enough, but it is the Christianity of a boy (perhaps a boy just confirmed, full of splendid purposes) who has *not thought the thing out.* Ultimately the love of Christ is not compatible with fisticuffs. But what we most of us like in *Tom Brown* is the fisticuffs, and the hero-worship. That is what its author liked. But he could not see that it did not sort with Christianity. Christ to him was the "Lord of Heroes"; and anyone who habitually thinks of Christ in that way might as well never have read the Gospels.

[8] If we put aside Revelation, whether by incarnation or otherwise, what is "love of God" to mean? Can any man believe himself to *love* that which is wholly unknown to him? That in loving human beings we love a God who is beyond them, and *not* them, may, I suggest, be a fact: but it is not a *fact for us;* and "love of God" is an empty phrase if it represents it as a fact for us.

Many and diverse elements contribute to the fullness of this devotion. For him "who ploughs with pain his native lea" there is a real religion of the soil. Then again there is the spell of patriotism—"England, bound in by the triumphant sea." On some again mere scenic splendor exercises an abiding power:

"The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion."

There are also historic ties, and ties half historic, half domestic: "Our fathers worshiped in this mountain." And never far, commonly, from the house where each of us was born will be the graves of our household. Other ties of a sort similar, or but little unlike, need hardly be spoken of. What is the source of the power of each and all of them I neither know nor ask to know. But I ask, is there not religion—not the whole of religion but much of it—in all of them? And if any man tells me that he does not worship these things, that it is not worship that he lavishes on father, fatherland, friend, hills of home and the fields he played in, and rock, and stream,—I know that his "own heart condemns him"; and the apostle who tells us that "God is greater than our hearts" knew, when, and in so far as, he said it,

neither the heart of man nor the mind of God. Let us be honest, let us not, to escape an empty reproach of paganism, call those highest devotions and attachments of which we can have experience by any lower name than that of worship. Neither let us be afraid of making too strong these earthly ties. What we cannot but worship, that we should.

With the religion of humanity, then, as understood by the Positivist, I find myself not much in sympathy. It is too extended to be anything but extremely thin. Religion is an ardor, and ardor lies not in extension but in intension. At the same time, there does seem to me to be a real and legitimate religion of humanity, which consists not in the worship of an ideal and abstract man, but in that of real men. "We live by admiration, hope and love," it has been said: and the world of religion is for nearly all of us very largely the world of heroes and hero-worship. I am not raising here any question of the origins of religion, which some find in the worship of dead chieftains of the race or clan. To apotheosize the dead is a natural thing enough. But equally natural and necessary is the apotheosis which we bestow upon the living; and I believe that in this worship of the living are to be found many of the most important elements of true religion. It is from this that our religion

derives that without which any religion is inoperative —the element of romance. In the abstract gods of philosophy, in deities whose function is to "think upon thought"—that profitless and unmeaning occupation of the God of Aristotle—this note of romance is lacking. The same is true of the God of Theism. The God of Christianity began in romance, but he has ended in pedantry and falsehood: and, therefore, he has ceased to satisfy. He has been formularized and systematized; and with form and system romance cannot dwell, least of all when the form is false and the system perverse. Christianity has clipped the wings of its angels. In the narrower religion of humanity which I have hinted at there are genuine angels, and we can hear the passage of their wings in the clear air of life.

This non-Positivist religion of humanity of which I speak is not, of course, the whole of religion. I contend merely that it is a larger part of it than we think, and that much of our so-called worship of God is worship of men and women. And men and women do not dwell *in vacuo*, but in local habitations, and another element in religion is thus the worship of places. Do I then imagine, it will be asked, that I have exhausted the nature of religion when I say that we are worshipers of persons and places? I answer:

"That depends on what is meant by a person, and what is meant by a place." We talk familiarly of going to this or that place and meeting this and that person. But behind our words, and behind the thing they describe, there is a whole world of mystery. I am not going to raise the question, What is personality? or yet the question (which may be either metaphysical or legal), What is a place? But set before you, I will say, set before you in imagination a mountain height; let it be the Brocken. And figure to yourself on the summit of it a solitary man; let him be the poet Goethe. Goethe was not, so far as I know, either a Christian or a Theist or an adherent of any known creed. But he tells us that, when he stood for the first time upon the Brocken height, his thoughts and sensations found their natural expression in the solemn words of the Psalmist of Israel: "Lord, what is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou takest account of him?" Yet, as I say, he was not a Theist. The words he used merely gave expression to the sense which must be always with every man at all times when he reflects, the sense that he is ever in the presence of an infinite power imperfectly known. We are all of us worshipers of power—of mere and sheer power. We are too apt to suppose that worship is

worship of the good. We have learned, indeed, that that is not so with the worship of savage or primitive races. Nor is it so, I believe, with a large part of the worship of the so-called higher races. The darling of man, like that of nature, is still the strongest. I would even say that man is, must, and should be, largely a "devil worshiper." That, with regard to persons, the highest passion and devotion is often and knowingly lavished on objects the least worthy of it, is a commonplace. The Corsair of Byron had the love of a good woman, and it is the same with all Corsairs and the like of Corsairs. Nothing commands such devotion as power, and the devotion is legitimate. Goodness must stand in the cold disconsolate; and it is only loved when it is seen to be a higher power than mere power. Similarly in nature. The storm, the cataract, the avalanche, the earthquake, the terrors of deep and height—all these instruments of Satan are in greater or less degree *worshiped* by all men. They are worshiped because they are power. There is in this worship, as in all devotion, an *odi et amo:* therein lies the romance of it all. "Love thou the gods by withstanding them," says Sigurd the Volsung, and I could almost think it the last word in religion.

"He who has sicence and art," says Goethe in a

famous epigram, "has also religion; he who has not both these—let him have religion." The effort of all science is toward the appropriation of power. The effort of all art it toward the appropriation of beauty. Religion consists in an ardor of devotion which seeks ever to identify itself with the highest power and the most perfect beauty. Of the worship of beauty as an element in religion I have said nothing, although, of course, it is a potent factor in conciliating those different human affections of whose place in religion I have already spoken. To some extent, of course, beauty and power are interchangeable terms; indeed, it is believed by many that beauty is only worshiped because it is power: and in this sense it has been defined as "the promise of function in things of sight." It is certain that the order and harmony which are a part of beauty are a symbol of power. Whether, however, beauty and utility are ultimately identical I am not concerned to inquire, and it will be convenient here to regard them as distinct. It is sufficient for my purpose that a sensibility to the appeal of beauty should be recognized as inherent in the nature of religion. And all human experience recognizes this. We speak of "the beauty of holiness," and intend in so speaking to pay to holiness the highest compliment in our power.

The Greeks again, made a practical identification of the beautiful and the good. And poets and philosophers alike have identified the beautiful and the true. I would ask, also, Among the many emotions of life, which are those which, recognizing them to have been of the highest purity and excellence, we would most gladly recall? Sunset over the sea, a picture of Raphael, the cathedral of Milan first seen by moonlight—are not these and their like the kind of experiences in which we have seemed to ourselves to draw nearest to the best that life can offer in the way of emotion? Was there not *religion* in these?

Of this appeal of beauty in religion I have not space to say more: and all I could say of it has been many times said. But I have yet to speak of one character in the worship of beauty and power which is of high significance. Beauty is promise and suggestion. It is of the number of unpredictable things. Similarly, the essence of power is that it is unpredictable. We cannot get away from the endless mysteriousness of things. And more mysterious still are the beauty and power of persons. Religion, which seeks to identify us with power and beauty, commits us to mystery. It is a kind of adventure: and that is perhaps why men will never tire of it. We worship that we know not—which is why we worship it. There can

be no religion without Faith; and Faith is called Faith because it is not knowledge. Faith is a kind of gamble; and its justification is that it shall not stake, as many faiths do, that which is worth much for that which is worth little or nothing. Neither must it be barren of judgment; life is an adventure, but it is not a frolic for the foolhardy.

All this, I am aware, is vague, unprecise, inadequate. Is this, I shall be asked, what you offer us instead of Christianity? I reply that I am not offering anything *instead of* Christianity. Let those who have Christianity keep it so long as it supplies to them that which they want. I address myself to those only who are without Christianity and also without any other faith. And even to these I do not offer a religion. Each man must find his religion for himself, since otherwise it can never be to him a religion. I have only tried to indicate certain elements in human life which seem to me to contain in themselves religion, or a part of it: and to show how a great deal of the worship which we think that we pay to God or to Christ is really paid elsewhere. I have tried to show how things appear to me, and I am far from saying that they should appear so to other people. We must save our own souls.

Yet, when I say that "each man must find his

religion for himself," I none the less believe that in religion, as in everything else, education is necessary. When I say, "Find his religion," I mean merely find the final form of it. No one can be more fully convinced than I am of the necessity of an education in religion, and an education, moreover, which should begin in early childhood. We live in a world where wisdom may be had in two ways—by personal experience and by instruction. Instruction, like art, is long, but experience longer still. If we had the whole of time and eternity before us we should do well to get wisdom by our own experience and not as now largely at second hand. But as it is we have not time—

"Und eh' man nur den halben Weg erreicht
Muss wohl ein Armer Teufel sterben,"

"before he is half way to wisdom a poor devil must die." This, which is true of wisdom generally, is true also of that wisdom which is religion. For progress in religion, as for all other progress, we are largely dependent on the experience of others. Indeed, I think, we are even more dependent on alien experience in religion than in anything else. If I am not taught Greek between the ages of five and of twenty it is none the less in my power to learn it between the ages of twenty and thirty. But can we defer edu-

cation in religion to this late age? I believe that we cannot. Our education in religion must begin at our mother's knees. Most of us have come in contact from time to time with men whom we should be justified in calling "irreligious." By "irreligious" I do not mean "unbelieving," and I mean not so much immoral as unmoral, not so much full of frailties, or even sinning, as hard and matter-of-fact and without sensibility for the high and lofty things in life. I should be surprised if most people's experience did not agree with mine in saying that these "irreligious" men came commonly from what we call "bad homes." Or again, most of us know men who were, deliberately, by parents in other respects wise, brought up in no religion—men whose parents refused to instruct them in a creed in which they themselves had ceased to believe. Men so educated commonly grow up, I believe, and remain "irreligious." They may be men of irreproachable morality and of many gifts; but they want imagination, sensibility; they have overmuch of the *siccum lumen* and too little of that *twilight of mind* where alone religion can dwell. A notable example of such a man occurs at once to my mind, though I almost hesitate to adduce it, when I reflect upon his honorable character and life, his eminent intellectual gifts, and the con-

siderable services he rendered to the world of thought —I mean that writer to whom I have already often referred in this paper, John Stuart Mill. To call such a man "irreligious" seems almost to be playing with words. Yet his mind has always appeared to me to be lacking in just those qualities without which religion, in its most exalted significance, cannot exist —*a mind all daylight and no twilight.* Had the son of James Mill been any other than John Stuart Mill, he would, I feel, educated on the same lines, have deserved to be described as "irreligious," in the sense in which I employ the word.

I repeat, then, we must have education in religion, and it must begin at our mother's knees. What form is it to take? I believe that independent of the creeds there is a "religion of all good men," in which we shall all one day unite, and I have tried in this paper to indicate certain elements in it which appear to me to be essential. But I am far from desiring that the children of this or any land should be educated in it. The "religion of all good men" cannot be made a religion of all good children. Children (while they are yet children) we must feed, in the language of S. Paul, with milk and not with meat. Something, however, we must give them. To instruct them in the best morals, to read them the noblest poetry, to show them

the highest art, is useless and empty. The best morals for a child of five is that it shall not fall into the fire, the best poetry is "Little Jack Horner," and the finest art a wax doll which opens and shuts its eyes. Yet I would fain somehow instill into this ignorant, rhyme-loving, doll-loving brat the elements of religion. But how? I am afraid my answer will lay me open to a charge of inconsistency, and that I shall seem in what I say to be executing an undignified *volte face*. What I feel, however, is this: In considering the religious education of the young we must before all things remember the nature of their environment, both personal and local. To educate a child in a religion, however rational, however true, which puts him, or leaves him, out of sympathy with this environment is both short-sighted and criminal. In religious education we have to deal with an existing situation. A living child is not a thing in the clouds. He is upon earth and upon a particular spot of earth, with particular persons, customs and institutions around him. Intellectual truth is no doubt important for him—though no man, perhaps, ever went to hell for mere ignorance. But other things are also important, and for all things, we are told, there is a season. It is important that he should possess imagination, feeling, good-sense: that he should develop

naturally: that he should have a capacity for friendship, be able to worship his equals and his betters: that he should be a good citizen with a faith that his country is the best in the world; that a church should be something more to him than an architect's idea or a mason's bungling: it is important, in a word, that he should not feel himself, as he grows up, an alien in the only surroundings possible to him, a stranger to the associations which mean so much to all his fellows. These are sacred sympathies, and they are deep-seated in the very heart of any religion. To educate a child in an innovating, invading, unrecognized creed is to destroy these sympathies. Had I to live all my life in Tibet and my children likewise, I would educate my children in the religion, if they have one, of the Tibetans. Had I been James Mill living in Protestant England I would have educated the young John Stuart in Protestant Christianity. He would have outgrown it ultimately: but he would have been, I fancy, both a better man and a better philosopher. I prefer some kind of "religion of all good men" to orthodox Christianity: but I think one can only arrive at it (in this age and country) through orthodox Christianity. The religion that is above the creeds we must rise to on the steps of the creeds. I do not wish to see all men Christians, but I

wish, for the present at least, to see all fathers Christians.

The case of the two Mills suggests to my mind a difficulty which is sure to be raised. Is there not a grave want of honesty in deliberately educating a child in religion which one has oneself come to regard as false? I confess that when I reflect how many things one tells to children, in the name of expediency, which are not true, I find this objection a trifle disingenuous. I remember myself how until quite an advanced age I believed that I owed my existence and place in society to the fact of having been found by the wayside, and brought home in a black bag by a friendly doctor. I do not know whether I received worse harm from this entertaining fiction or from the parallel Biblical fiction that the rib of Adam furnished him with a wife, and the ingenious inference I drew from it that Cain got himself a wife by the same methods. But I am sure that I am not to-day a very much worse man owing to either of these pious deceptions. The religious education which I propose to myself for my children will involve me, I do not doubt, in the telling of one or two "noble lies." But when I reflect how many lies I tell which are not noble, I do not feel, I confess, greatly troubled by the hard necessity of

having to tell a lie which would have approved itself to Plato. Moreover, religious education should, I said, begin for the child at its *mother's* knees. In all human probability the mother will be of the number of them that believe. But in any case, being a mother, she will have something of the insight of angels, and some holy spirit will teach her what to say.

There is another difficulty, as between parents and children, of which I feel constrained to say something. He who is worthy of some religion better than that in which he has been brought up, will, as years go on, find it for himself. His creed will leave behind that of father, mother, sisters. The ceremonies and forms which are to them the life of religion may come to appear to him to be the death of it. What way will his duty lie? Shall he by an outward conformity spare the sensibilities of those dearest to him? Or shall he sacrifice those sensibilities on the altar of an obdurate sincerity? No general principle, perhaps, can be laid down which can govern all the variety of forms in which this difficulty may arise. To some parents the new creed of a son may cause uneasiness, to some anguish. It is probably better to be frank at the cost of uneasiness. Where the cost is anguish precipitation is certainly inhuman. The son is

young, he has time before him, and time works strange transformations in the convictions of young men. The parent is old, and "a little turn of the scale," says the Greek dramatist, "brings the aged to their rest." If we keep our bad news a little while from those that are old, they may ere long have passed to where joy and sorrow bring no disturbance of soul. Again, some of a man's convictions are important for the individual, some have importance for the world at large. A great idea, a new point of view, a fresh discovery in history or science—these are like murder, they "must out." We must be fair to our own souls. We live in an epoch of constant new discovery, and of great mutation of opinions and ideas. Few thinking men can hope to escape the difficulty I speak of. Each must, in the long run, judge for himself. There is a silence which is sin; but it is rarer, perhaps, than the speech which is madness and brutality. We must see all sides of our difficulty and know what we are doing. "If thou knowest what thou doest, happy art thou; if thou knowest not, cursed art thou!" Yet the way to our own peace of mind must often lie through the feelings of those whom we least desire to wound.

And here I would notice that no man ever outgrows his religion to the extent which he imagines.

Nor is it well that he should. Once a Christian, always a Christian—up to a certain point. I pity the man for whom the services of the Church in which he was brought up have lost altogether their appeal. I pity the man to whom God is no longer a Father, though I hold no brief for Theism. I pity the man to whom the best of men is not still a Son of God. It is well that the imagination should dwell in these metaphors, though they be but metaphors. Of the existence of a "supernatural" God I think much what Mill thinks: *it is a possibility.* I say only that we cannot worship a possibility. A *possible* God is a possible, and therefore not an actual, object of worship. None the less I feel no difficulty, I will not even admit any inconsistency, in regarding that variety of emotions which I call religious as a service to God the Father. I am myself a part of, a child of, that ever mysterious Power and Beauty which seem to me to be the real objects of all worship. What is meant by the distinction as applied to God, of person and thing I do not know. A man is a person. A corpse is a thing. He who has seen often, or ever, the one pass into the other, will feel how empty is all debate concerning such distinctions. I am not sure, indeed, that a person is necessarily better than a thing: I am at least sure that some things are better than

some persons. Theologians speak of the "infinite value of the meanest human soul." I have never seen a human soul; and if they mean a human being, I say with an unashamed brutality of paganism that I prefer a thing such as the *Iliad* of Homer or Milan Cathedral to a human being such as Elagabalus.

I cannot forbear to add a few words on a subject which must always have interest for "men about to die," and with which most religions deeply concern themselves—Immortality. "Death cannot celebrate thee, they that go down into the pit cannot praise thy name," says the Hebrew poet, employing a form of reasoning not infrequent in Biblical literature which may be called the *argumentum ad Deum*, and which has, I think, this much validity: The truest praise and celebration of God is to live the best life we can here, and to think as little as possible of a "life of the world to come." The matter of which our bodies are composed, Science tells us, is not annihilated. Our bodies, as such, are annihilated. Of an existence of the soul apart from the body, Science knows nothing. "The earnest expectation of the creature" that he will somehow, somewhere, continue to live proves nothing except itself. From the imperfection, again, of this world, we cannot infer to a perfection in another, but rather to the opposite.

Failure in one department establishes a probability of failure in another. But do we, apart from preconceptions in which we were educated, do we expect, do we desire, Immortality? As far as *expectation* is concerned, we all of us, it is true, find it hard to conceive the world going on without us. Yet it is not so hard to conceive it going on without other persons. And even were it true that the world could not go on without us, that argues, not a new birth for the individual, but the extinction of all individuals. And, after all, what account can we give ourselves of the kind of life we expect? With regard to the *desire* for Immortality, is it a fact? It may be a fact in some people, but it is certainly not a fact in others. Many of us wish for nothing better than to "lie still and be quiet," to enter into the rest which remains, we are assured, for the people of God. There are more Buddhists outside Buddhism than ever Buddha dreamed of. The argument against Immortality that "it is too good to be true" will to a great many men never appear convincing.

There are, I would not deny, moments in life when we all of us desire, and believe in, Immortality. When the grave closes over all we loved all the arguments in the world against Immortality are as powerless to convince the reason as they are to alarm the heart.

"The knoweth," it knows better. Yet time, which softens the sorrow of the separation which death brings, too often also obliterates this conviction of, extinguishes this desire for, Immortality. "I can never forget him; he cannot be wholly and truly dead." But the memory grows dim and the faith fades. It is not cynicism to recognize these things; and we do better to be thankful that we believed in Immortality when we had most need to, than to repine that time has weakened or destroyed our belief.

There is no certitude of Immortality. Nor can it fairly be said that there is a probabilty of it. None the less if we rejoice to believe in it no man can take our joy from us. Yet is it well to allow something which is not even probable to influence deeply our habits of life? As long as men continue to live and die, Immortality must always be a subject which will engage speculation. But when the present world gives us so much to think about it, it seems a dissipation of mind to meditate much on the next. When there are so many fields for inquiry, it is a pity to be forever asking of the universe questions which it can not answer, or rather which it cannot hear. The skies are deaf: and if we would question them concerning Immortality, we must go and fetch our answer in person.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

III

HYMNS

οὐ γὰρ ἐν μέσοισι κεῖται δῶρα δυσμάχητα Μουσῶν.

Among the things in life which are proper objects of charity, literature is not one. Human beings do not come into the world—at least it is supposed not—of their own will. We do well, therefore, within certain limits to judge them with charity. But literature is a definite, aggressive, invasive, uninvited thing. Its only justification is its success. It attempts an annexation of the minds and hearts of men which can only earn applause by being more or less complete. It must also be remembered, however, that some minds are weak, and some hearts womanish. There is always silliness and sentimentality in the world. To conquer a weak and womanish human nature, to captivate silliness and sentimentality is not to achieve a real success in literature. It does not evidence real power, and what we demand in liter-

ature before all else is that it should be not moral, nor orderly, nor inoffensive, but truly and really powerful.

Of the literature of hymns, viewed as a whole, I do not think we can say that it answers this just demand. There are, no doubt, in our own and in other languages of the world, many noble and beautiful hymns—many hymns that are genuinely literature. But the general idea called up by the word "hymns" cannot, I think, be thought by any person competent to judge to correspond even passably to the general idea called up by the word "literature."

To a bad hymn, then, I should wish to show no mercy. Nor should I think it proper to lavish an excess of charity upon the writer of one. I feel obliged to say, however, that, while condemning his performance, I respect his motives. I admire simplicity of mind, and bad hymns and good hymns alike proceed commonly from that. I admire, again, plainness and sincerity, and I do not think one can write even an inferior hymn without both. But more than this; the writer of even the poorest hymn must needs possess certain moral qualities which sometimes are, though they never should be, lacking in the creators of literature of a far higher order. He looks not unto men for his reward, but to God and his conscience. He

does not write from any vanity of talents; nor does he seek fame. Even if we impute to him the vulgar ambition of desiring to see the child of his religious musings holding its own in a popular hymnal, we must yet recognize that even there he seeks an anonymity of fame. What Spinoza thought desirable for truth is a fact for hymns—they "bear no man's name." And once more; the writer of hymns deeply and earnestly desires to do good unto men: he has the hope to confirm the faithful, to strengthen the faint-hearted, to give consolation to the sorrowful. The outpouring of his spirit may be but a cup of cold water; but thus nobly prodigal of his frigidity and "washiness," what he offers, he, in some true sense, and with acceptance, offers unto Christ. In a word, it needs a good man to write a bad hymn. Nor can I refrain from remarking how greatly, if we bear this in mind, the vast number of bad hymns in the world must confirm our faith in the excellence of human nature. It is true that we require in man good-sense as well as good-nature; yet the two are so difficult of conjunction that we do well, probably, to welcome either, even without the other.

None the less we should endeavor, as I maintain, to judge hymns by the highest standard. We shall never have hymns which are literature so long as

we overpraise and too much employ such as are not. Yet to apply to hymns this highest standard is more difficult than to apply it to any other species of writing claiming to be literature. Things which are not beautiful in themselves often are so by association. A soiled ribbon, a dead flower, a faded letter, are things in themselves not particularly beautiful. But when they recall to our minds some beloved person or object they are more beautiful than anything in the world save the person or object that they seem to recall. And so with hymns. They are airs from the Eden of our youth. Jangled bells—they are still sweet, like those that fell upon the ear of Faust in the supreme moment of his despair and proclaimed the risen Christ to a heart that believed and yet did not believe:

> *"Christ ist erstanden,*
> *Freude dem Sterblichen!"*

And truly he who lives to be deaf to these errant echoes from the wonderland of childhood has, we feel, somehow lived too long. The great outstanding seasons of the Church—Easter, Advent, Christmas—the significant epochs in the history of our homes—a birth, a death, marriage—all these have hymns consecrated to them both good and bad. Yet the bad can

never be to us as bad as they really are, nor the good good enough. This confusion of judgment is to a great extent inevitable, and to some extent desirable. We want new and better hymns for some of these splendid and affecting occasions; but a good new hymn must lose its newness before it can ever satisfy us like an old and bad one. The remedy is that men of sense and feeling should courageously set themselves down, with all the odds against them, to compose these better hymns. Long before their efforts have met with any general recognition they will, it is true, be in their graves. Yet it may stir the pulse of poetry in them to hope that their children's children may be born into the world, wedded, and carried out of it to the sound of braver songs. Let us love, then, the old hymns in a half-ashamed way, and not too suddenly break with sacred associations. Yet from time to time, in some quietude of the emotions and in a waking-hour of good-sense, let us remind ourselves that they are but a second best.

Another perplexity to judgment arises from the association of hymns with music. It is time that the Privy Council should privily conspire to enact that a bad hymn be sung and set only to a bad tune. Or if such enactments lie beyond the province of His Majesty's Lords in Council, the makers of music

should take this matter into their own hands. They should memorialize the heads of church and state, and should humbly petition that no man be permitted to demand of them that they lavish good sound on bad sense or nonsense, nor allowed to steal the good tune of a good hymn and nefariously appropriate it to the purposes of a bad or indifferent one. Or if this again is impracticable, I would suggest that sensible clergymen, who are, I understand, a numerous body, should ordain that for the space of one year all the hymns in their hymn-book be said and not sung by the faithful. No one who has six or seven times in the year had to read aloud a genuinely bad hymn will ever wish to face it again even when sung to a good tune.

But I have still to inquire, Why are there so few hymns which are really good, so few which can truly be called literature? That the spirit of Religion and the spirit of Poetry are in any way antagonistic no serious man will maintain. How should he, when so much genuinely religious poetry proceeds from poets who do not essay to write hymns? The hymn, as we understand it, is a product of Christianity. It may, of course, be said that Homer wrote hymns, and, with greater probability, that Pindar wrote hymns. They did not, however, write hymns in the

sense in which we employ the word. Or I may, perhaps, say simply that they did not write the sort of hymns I am here speaking of. When I speak of hymns I speak of the hymns of the Christian Churches; and I ask, Why are so few of them good? The fault, as I said, cannot lie in religion. It *is* possible to turn religion into poetry: indeed, by many persons poetry is thought to be the essence of religion. Can it be that the fault lies not with religion generally but with the particular form of it which hymns endeavor to express and illustrate—namely, with Christianity?

"Christianity," says Lord Macaulay, in the same emphatic way in which he announces both his paradoxes and his platitudes, "Christianity is of all religions the most poetic." Lord Macaulay is of all writers the most dogmatic; and I insist on examining closely what he means. Is he saying what he thinks he is expected to say? Or is he saying what he thinks he is not expected to say just because he is not expected to say it? Or, again, is he saying what he really thinks himself? and, if so, is it possible to agree with him?

Let us begin with what we can be sure of. It is certain that the Christian religion contains a good deal that is poetry, whether latent or patent. I will

not upon this point appeal to any consensus of religious men. I will appeal simply to the fact that some hymns are good: that is, some things in Christianity we can turn into poetry. It is equally indisputable, I think, that we have not been able to turn into poetry certain other things in Christianity. I do not say we are unable, I say we have not so far been able, to turn these into poetry. For example, we have not been able, I think, to turn into poetry the dogma of the Holy Trinity. There exist certain hymns consecrated to the Holy Trinity; but these seem either to be concerned mostly with the holiness and little with the triunity of their subject, or else they are admittedly failures. Other hymns in the service of other dogmas I might mention of which the same is true. I do not mention them lest I should be thought to be leading to the conclusion that what is unpoetic in Christianity is its dogma. This I do not believe to be true; indeed, I do not hold it possible to make the separation, which is often attempted, between the dogmatic and the non-dogmatic elements in Christianity. I am inclined personally to think that the doctrine of the Trinity is not in itself a dogma out of which it is possible to draw very much poetry. But I am not so firmly convinced of this as I am of the fact that certain others of the dogmas of Christianity

do contain great poetic possibilities. The dogma of the Resurrection, for example, is, I feel, full of poetry. Its poetic possibilities seem to me quite as great as those of even the most beautiful of the Greek legends, the beauty of which no one calls in question. Yet we have few good Easter hymns, few which draw out of their themes one hundredth part of the emotion in it. Compare with any of them the scene in *Faust* to which I have already referred, or the scene that follows it—the Easter festivities of the common folk who "feel a kind of resurrection in themselves." Or compare with any of them Clough's "Easter Day in Naples." The ordinary Easter hymn misses—does not attempt to express, or bungles the expression of—what Clough and Goethe see, and present, as vital and cardinal.

It is, I think, true, that the best English hymns are those which leave aside dogma, and that very few indeed of our "dogmatic" hymns, if I may call them so, satisfy even a moderate standard. But none the less I do not think the fault lies in the nature of the Christian dogmas. They do not seem to me as a whole necessarily unsuited for poetic expression. Some of them clearly are so: but as a whole they are not so. I have no particular attachment to Christian dogmas as such, and I gladly pay them this tribute.

Some of them seem to me overingenious, academic, tortuous, even sophistical; and in so far as this is true of them they do not make up into good poetry. For we have not yet really settled and laid to rest the "old wrangle" of Poetry and Philosophy. But I still do not feel that we can justly lay the defects of our hymns at the feet of dogma.

For look at our "undogmatic" hymnology! How poor in thought, how thin in sentiment, hollow in tone, meager of utterance, how unmighty, how unmagnificent most of it is! How we tire of the weak, patient, devoted bleat of a sentimentality ever crying for a fold in which, as a matter of fact, it has no mortal intention of ever allowing itself to be penned up.

"I was a wandering sheep,
I did not love the fold,"

and if only I had the courage to say so, or the good sense to perceive it, I do not love it now! What does it all mean? one asks oneself as one turns over page after page of—let us say—"*Hymns Ancient and Modern.*" Are these really and truly anybody's ideals? or, rather, are they anybody's ideals by the time the hymn has ended? Does anyone feel really healthy in this sort of atmosphere? I am speaking,

be it remembered, only of the ordinary, that is, the inferior, kind of hymn. And I conjure heaven and earth to tell me, "Why is it so bad?"

I think we may, perhaps, answer the question, at any rate partially, if we put it in another way. Who makes these hymns?

The two great hymn-making nations of Europe are undoubtedly the English and the Germans. The hymn is, in the main, a Teutonic creation. Can so weak a progeny, one asks oneself, proceed from a people so strenuous, so virile, of such energizing earnestness? And since it seems so, what is the explanation? The Teuton, as we most of us who are Teutons think, stands for the highest type of Christian furnished by European civilization. And this ingenuous Teuton faith in the Teutonic is not without its justification. I do not believe that the Teuton is the best Christian in the world. But I think him a fine fellow; and just because I do not think him the best Christian in the world, I think him the best man among men who call themselves Christians. I think he has done better by Christianity, if I may so express myself, than any other species of European. Did he not indeed give us the Reformation? Is not Protestantism with all its virtues and most of its defects, his peculiar creation? His genius for protest

has been ever his salvation. He is proud of the Reformation because he sees in it a protest against the Bishop of Rome. It *was* a protest against the Bishop of Rome, and, when all is said and done, with all the wrong-headedness of the thing, how fine a protest, how courageous, how overwhelming! But it was a protest against a great deal more than the Bishop of Rome. Against how much more we are only now beginning clearly to perceive. We may say, if we like, that it was a protest against unrighteousness generally. That is true enough: it is, in the main, the nature of the Teuton to "love righteousness and hate iniquity." But it is also his nature to love good sense and to hate absurdity. The Reformation was a protest against absurdity. And it was, moreover, a protest which did not begin in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was then that it found voice—and what a resonance there was in it! But its beginnings go back some ten centuries earlier. When the Teutonic races embraced Christianity they did so because it offered them something of which they were then much in need. They were forever precipating themselves upon the sharp and outstanding corners of civilization. This precipitation of spirit was full of dangers. The Teutonic nations wanted something which should give them pause. They

needed for the moment the opposite of what they had and were. They wanted above all organization, regimentation, humanization. This Christianity offered to them. And so far as Christianity afforded them this they embraced it. But you must take the whole fruit if you want the heart of it. Teutonism had to accept Christianity in the lump. It was not practicable to pick and choose, nor had the Teuton (nor has he) the genius of eclecticism. He took over in a hurry the whole of Christianity. He did not like the whole of it when he had it, but he was too proud, having accepted it, to say so. He could never really square the moral ideal of Christianity with that of Teutonism. As he did not mean to surrender the latter, he endeavored to establish a *modus vivendi* by which the two ideals were left for centuries confronting one another in a kind of armed neutrality. At any moment there was a danger of a conflict between these two opposing forces. The official support was on the side of Christianity: but Teutonism could rely in an emergency on that secret but powerful succor which consists in the natural instinct of mankind for good sense and for what it knows it cannot ultimately do without. The first conflict between these opposed principles came at the Reformation. Teutonism conquered—it conquered, not indeed Chris-

tianity, but the more obvious of its shams. It inflicted a deep and lasting, though not a mortal, wound, upon religious absurdity. Then came a truce. We are now in the twentieth century, and the truce has run out. A conflict is in process less cruelly and inhumanly waged, but with weapons more effective furnished by an enfranchised Science. New allies are upon both sides, and the battlefield is an untried one. God is on *both* sides, but rumor says, and the Teuton credits it, that he favors Teutonism.

What has all this, I shall be asked, to do with hymns? "Much every way." The Teuton is an official Christian. He pays to Christ the service of his lips but not that of his life. I do not mean that he is a hypocrite, though he must and does often appear so to non-Teutons. He is a genuine Christian up to a certain point: but he is not Christian in so far as Christianity, faithfully followed, would leave no place in his religion for the satisfaction of demands made upon him by the world and the flesh which a cogent and right instinct tells him to be legitimate. More than that: he honestly believes himself, since he is not of very fine or subtle perceptions, to be a "full Christian." He mistakes his mildly Christianized Teutonism for Teutonic Christianity. He is not aware how much what he calls the transition from

Teutonism to Christianity was merely an exchange of name. Christianity is the official designation of his religion: but his creed consists really in the best of Teutonism *plus* so much of the religion of Christ as does not conflict with that.

This official Christianity has its official literature. This literature, or rather one part of it, is the hymn-book. Of the perfect good faith of this literature I have already spoken. The good and honest Teuton really believes that he believes in the kind of thing that he has put into his hymns. And in a good deal of it he does believe. This is one of the reasons why, though so few hymns are good absolutely, so many are "excellent in parts." No poetry is so uneven as that of the hymns. The good in these strangely uneven and heterogeneous compositions comes in when the genuine Teuton breaks through, as he again and again does, his official creed and attains to genuine self-expression. When either for the moment the Teuton brushes the Christian rudely aside, or they find themselves upon ground where they ultimately agree—on some common meeting-place of all human feelings and desires—then we get a good hymn or a piece of one. But much in Christianity is unreal to the Teuton: he does not feel it, is not interested in it: he gives it, however, an official recognition, and

explains his discontent with it by supposing that it is too high for him. What his natural man inclines hastily to pronounce nonsense his official man pronounces a mystery. Hence the endless unreality of so much in the hymns, and the perplexing juxtaposition of real and unreal. Here, side by side with something finely conceived, deeply felt, expressed with a simple grandeur, is to be found some piece of sentimentality grotesquely conceived, never reaching the heart, basely and awkwardly uttered.

Protestant Christianity is undergoing to-day all around us great modifications. We are to a great extent everywhere deserting our original Christianity under the plea of " developing " it. (This word " development " plays strange tricks even with the most clear-sighted.) We may hope that our hymns will share this general " development." But we must remember that the hymn has become a type: and that all types die hard. We shall continue for a long time to model our hymns upon those already existing. And the hymn, it is important to recognize, because Teutonic, and because the Teuton had so little real sympathy with certain sides of Christianity, began on the wrong lines. Because the Teuton found in Christianity so much that he was unable to convert into poetry, he lost his standard. He tried to make poetry

of anything and everything; and since his imagination, though powerful, was in inception crude, he selected many of the worst crudities of Christianity and Judaism as the theme of his hymns. The most notable example of a Christian crudity thus apotheosized is one which, if we were not so familiar with it, would offend all the literary, and all the human, feeling in us each time we met with it in the many hymns where it is to be found. How many of our hymns are soiled with nastiness—I can find no other word—concerning the *blood of Jesus?* Even in a hymn in many ways so beautiful and appealing as that old friend of most of us, "Rock of Ages," it is difficult to read without a certain sense of distaste and revolt [1] such lines as—

> *"Let the water and the blood*
> *From thy riven side which flowed*
> *Be of sin the double cure,*
> *Cleanse me from its guilt and power."*

And if we feel this in one of the best of hymns, much

[1] It was the Teuton instinct for the blood of battles which led him to dwell on these crudities. If he could not have the blood of battles he must have blood somewhere and somehow. Ulphilas, it is interesting to remember, when he translated the Bible into Gothic, suppressed the books of Kings, "as they might tend to irritate the fierce and *sanguinary* spirit of the barbarians." (Gibbon, ch. xxxvii.).

more do we feel it in "the many which are bad." The same remark holds good, I think, of the constant allusion in hymns to *the bosom of Jesus.* Even from

> *"Jesu, lover of my soul,*
> *Let me to thy bosom fly."*

I could with it away. These crudities are to be found in the Bible: it is a pity that Teutonism did not leave them there. But the crude attracts the crude. Teutonism is growing less crude. Let us hope that in time these grossnesses will cease to have a place in our hymnologies. It will take us longer time to get rid of the falsity of tone, the wateriness of sentiment, the vulgar, tawdry, and unmeaning imagery which disfigures most of our hymns. But they arise from our ignorance of what we really believe, desire, feel, and worship. The more we honestly endeavor to see things at first hand, to feel deeply, to reflect courageously upon what really draws our desires and governs our hearts, the more frankly we acknowledge as our religion that by which we genuinely live, the sooner shall we grow out of these faults. As it is, we have a hymn-book which, sincerely offered to the service of Christ, has yet in many ways the appearance of being an attempted *reductio ad absurdum* of Christianity.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

IV

THE ECONOMICS OF RELIGION

Religious economy, like domestic economy, and in distinction from political economy, is both a science and an art. It requires both knowledge and sensibility. Its central problem may be stated in much the same words as that of domestic economy: How much, *i.e.*, how little, Religion can one live on, and bring up a family? (I emphasize the family; for no man is religious to himself alone.) It inquires, in other words, how much it is necessary to believe in order also to believe life to be worth living and to transmit that belief in life to one's posterity. How much faith must one have in order to be happy and to pronounce life good?

By Faith I do not, of course, mean the Christian faith—*the* faith as it is often styled by those for whom it is sufficient. I believe it possible to be religious, to have faith, apart from Christianity, and I am assuming that most reasonable persons will here

be in agreement with me. If they are not, I am sorry; for we shall each think the other foolish and irritating. They had better read no further and I will promise to spare them the reproach,

" Cur in theatrum, Cato severe, venisti?
An ideo tantum veneras ut exires? "

I am not going to speak, then, of the Christian faith. Nor do I think I can make clear what I mean by Faith at this point of my paper. We must end in, and not begin with definitions. But I will venture on a description of the kind of thing I mean by Faith. I will borrow my description from St. Paul, who says of it that it is " the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Paraphrasing this description[1] I would say that Faith is the faculty by which we make our best hopes the highest realities, by which we assure ourselves of the worth of the things that are not seen.

Now the things which are hoped for and not seen are of a variety as infinite as the infinite deep of man's heart. But in this manifold of unseen desired things, we may distinguish three objects of pre-

[1] This paraphrase will acquit me of the responsibility of determining the exact sense of the word translated by " substance."

eminent desire. They are the familiar Kantian trio—God, Freedom, and Immortality. There are many to-day who believe that without faith in at least one of these three life is not worth living. On the other hand, there are many who believe in life, or believe that they do, and who yet believe in none of these three things. And I may call attention in passing to the fact that an overwhelming majority of mankind, since they have no idea what they mean by these things, cannot, in any real sense, be said to believe in them. They believe in a something; and that is all that we can say of them—which is why they need not here detain us.

For some persons, then, life is not worth living without faith in God, Freedom, and Immortality. Unless most of what is written and said in the world upon serious subjects has no value except as a study in hallucination, we must believe that this is so. Hardly less certain, I think, is it that some people are able to "get along" without this Kantian trio. Have they any object of faith by which they replace the loss of it? I think that they most of them have. My doubt is whether this object, this something they believe in, is a word or a thing. And when I say that, I have no doubt but that some of my readers will already divine that the something I speak of is what

is called Progress. It is the word of the age—of the hour. The sensationally thunderous sound of it seems everywhere to drown the meek invocation of God, the perturbed and doubting demand for Freedom, the pitiful cry of the heart yearning after its proper Immortality. Is this thunder something other than the crashing of the clouds which still mercifully conceal from human vision the cold and wintry light of Truth?

Let me say at once, that were the Progress of the world something in which we could legitimately and permanently believe, there could be a Faith in it, I think, which might in some sense constitute a Religion. God, Freedom, and Immortality, if they cannot be truly in some sort inferred from or made probable by the facts of things as we know them, remain the suspects of Reason. We do ill, I think, to dwell too much in the hope of them if there is something else, such as Progress, which not only can be deduced or made probable by historical and scientific reasonings, but which can also furnish a religion. What have Science and History to say to Faith in Progress?

The last word really lies with Science; since the question of Progress is not merely anthropological but cosmological. If the planet we inhabit is rush-

ing upon a distant but sure and approximately dateable dissolution, then we are driven, if we are to pronounce life good, from Faith in Progress to faith in a God who shall save us at the last day. The last word lies with Science. And in this matter at least it is vain to urge that the last words of Science are as numerous as the whole body of Scientists themselves. In some other matters, it is true, the oracles of Science are so contradictory that one could wish them all dumb. But in this matter it is not so. Here there is a consensus. The earth and all that is therein is undoubtedly moving toward an ultimate glaciality where life will be insupportable. Some rough edge of the sun, it is true, may one day be rubbed off and descending upon us, reanimate for a while with perhaps over-genial heat the frozen earth; but only for a while. The great winter of the world can at best be only postponed. On the day when that final frigidity sets in what will be the meaning of faith in Progress?

If, again, leaving the cosmologists, we turn to a different species of natural philosophers—those scientists, namely, who concern themselves with the evolution upon this planet of the forms of organic life, what have they to say of Faith in Progress? They are concerned with the "onward" of life; of any

"upward" they can tell us nothing. Speak to them of final causes and they shake their heads. And when Science shakes its head, it is to no end that an *a priori* metaphysics nods an affirmation, the jerky vehemence of which does not absolve it from the suspicion of somnolence. Nor if we go from Science to History do I think that we shall find a much greater encouragement for our faith. Indeed I am not sure that we shall not be going from the deep sea to the devil. Hobbes said of the life of the individual that it was "nasty, brutish, and short." He said it, perhaps, in his haste. He might have said it at his leisure, and with more appearance of justice, of the history of the human race. So short is it in comparison with the æons precedent to it that it seems hardly to count. And there is about its course such a devilish contrariety that the epithets "nasty and brutish" seem sometimes not wholly out of place.

I wish in what I am going to say to guard against misapprehension. I believe that human life is better to-day than it was, let us say, ten thousand years ago. I do not believe in the Garden of Eden, nor in a "state of nature" which was ever less obscene and absurd than the state of nature is now. We are better than our savage ancestors, and we are better than those more distant ancestors "arboreal in their

habits" of whom Science delights to speak to us to our shame. When I say "better," I would be understood to mean "better off"; we get on better. So far we may allow Progress. But what of *faith in Progress?* Can we infer from such progress as we perceive in the world as we know it to a continuity of Progress in the world which we shall never know? To determine such a question fully is not possible for me here. I can only suggest in brief the lines upon which I should be inclined to answer it.

Progress in any given direction presupposes two things; it presupposes (1) an absence of any obstructive forces in the direction in which it is desired to progress; and it presupposes (2) an absence of desire for motion in a different direction. Now, in primitive societies (1) there is obviously less interaction of forces of all kinds. Men and nations, things and thoughts, jostle one another less. Obviously, also, (2) the possible objects of human desire are fewer; one kind of progress, or a restricted number of kinds, is sought after: interest is less distracted: and, as a consequence, the primitive man or nation marches more directly upon the goal of desire. It thus comes about that while the progress from very primitive to fairly civilized conditions of life may be, and in history has been, extremely rapid, it affords

in itself no guarantee of its own continuity in the future. It affords no guarantee in itself. But we should have a guarantee if it could be shown that, as civilization, or what is called civilization, increases, two essential conditions are satisfied. These two conditions are: (1) that the interaction of forces should be not only an interaction, but a harmony of action (2) that the multiplicity of interests should not produce a dissipation of energy issuing in vacillation. Does life, on its higher levels, satisfy these two conditions? I believe not. Concerning the second of the two conditions I speak with some hesitation. I will only say that, so far as one can form a judgment, it does appear likely that the increased multiplicity of objects of interest and desire, which the movement of civilization gives birth to, must issue either in a general paralysis of the human energies in which no advance is made, or in an ever increasing specialization where each man will so dwell in a closed circle of his own interests and knowledge that community of action in any sort will become impossible. Half the world will be without the knowledge of its own real interests and the other half without the knowledge of any interests save its own.

But it is with the other of the two conditions of progress I have named that we approach the real

crux. The movement of civilization gives rise to an infinite interaction of forces previously either latent or operating in isolation. Numberless forces, that is, become externally related between which there is no internal relation. When I speak of "external relations" I am not committing myself to a doctrine of Chance. As the stone falls so it lies. As the world was to begin with, so it must work itself out. What I mean by the external relating of objects internally unrelated, I may express by a perhaps trivial illustration. I go into the street to purchase some gloves. I encounter, in such a way that I cannot escape from it, a motor-car proceeding at a pace which seems to rival the velocity, and to drown the noise, of the solar system. I perish untimely with all my imperfections on my head. We call that an accident: yet never were cause and effect more evident. The forces of the universe from the beginning were converging from two directions to produce contemporaneously the two factors in this disaster. But between the two factors—the desire in me for gloves and the passion for speed in the motorist—it is impossible to show what I call any internal relation. The thing is immoral, irrational, it is "nasty and brutish," and it has made my life short. Now multiply, I would say, the one man desiring gloves by five hundred million

desiring what you will: multiply the motor-cars without widening the streets: and there you have an image, one-sided, I admit, and exaggerated, but yet in some sort an image, of the condition of affairs toward which civilization is moving. There are, of course, in the world other things than motor-cars: motor-cars are bad things, and there are in the world many good things, as *e. g.*, laws directed against motor-cars: and in many cases we are able to prevent the converging of forces whose collision might result in a fatality. But we cannot prevent their convergence unless we are aware of their existence. And history is at a thousand points the record of the convergence upon and collision with one another of forces whose existence was unsuspected until it was too late to prevent their collision. Assyria, for example, built up a vast empire in blissful unconsciousness of Persian power. Persia went on its way serenely ignorant that Greece was waiting for it round the corner. The Greek spirit, in its decline, fled for refuge to Egypt, ignorant wholly that there it was to meet that Christianity which it transformed. Christianity and the Roman empire knew nothing of one another till they met. Christianity besieged for long years the civil power of Rome: yet it could never have calculated that just the whim of a light-minded emperor would

admit it to the supremacy it sought. Let anyone read in the pages of Gibbon the attempt of that historian to discover on naturalistic principles the causes of the triumph of Christianity: reading it fairly he can only pronounce it futile, and will find himself obliged either to admit a miracle greater than any in the Gospels or to allow that the causes that govern the rising and falling of nations and principles bear no internal, or moral, relation to their effects. He must either postulate for this, and for other events of scarcely less magnitude, an overruling Providence (in which case he passes again from faith in progress to faith in God), or else what I call an external relation of the internally unrelated: which will, I believe, amount to the same thing.

It may be objected that, though the relation is external and unmoral, its effects are the triumph of the stronger force. That is, of course, true. But, I ask, stronger in what respect? The colliding forces may be equally strong but in different ways. The one, A, may be strong with a force as great as or greater than that of B in so far as resistance to C is concerned. But it may lack exactly that force which is requisite to resist B itself. If A and B both met C, A might be better able to resist it than B might be. But it does not, therefore, follow that if

A and B conflict, A will have the victory: for B may possess a virtue which it can employ upon a certain vulnerable part in A, whereas this virtue was useless against C since C's vulnerable point was not the same as that of A. Everything, therefore, depends upon what force meets what. And there is no internal or moral principle governing the collision, the external relating, of forces.

I repeat, therefore, that, as civilization progresses, history becomes more and more a record of the external interrelating of forces internally unrelated. It is true, of course, that as knowledge increases we become aware of the juxtaposition of forces in a way which was not possible when knowledge was more limited. It may be said that this knowledge enables us to make adjustments. But here I would notice two facts: (1) As knowledge increases so does the greatness and complexity of the forces juxtaposed. And if history shows anything it shows that the complexity moves faster than the knowledge. What else is the meaning, in internal politics, of social problems? (2) We perceive the juxtaposition of forces: that is only true in a sense. What it is more exact to say is that we perceive the juxtaposition of bodies in which these forces are stored up: where exactly the force is located we can only guess.

I believe, then, that for faith in progress we have no surer ground than we have for faith in God. Indeed, I hold that to believe in Progress we must first believe in God. And that is what many persons find themselves unable to do. I pass no judgment on them. I simply note a fact—perhaps the most significant fact of the age. These persons would like to believe: but they feel rightly that a *credo quia cupio* is not only a piece of fatuity but a species of gross self-indulgence. They do not think God impossible. They do, however, feel Him to be improbable: and mankind can worship the impossible but not the improbable.

Are such persons as these cut off from Religion? Is there any faith left to them on which they can live and bring up a family? This is the great question of the economics of Religion. I have tried, to some extent, to answer it elsewhere.[2] (Here I have been mainly concerned to show how the question arises.) But I may be allowed, perhaps, to recapitulate in some sort here the answer which I have given elsewhere, and to add one or two fresh considerations. And let me begin with a monition. I am inquiring about Religion and not about morality—which is called morality because it is not Religion. That much morality can issue in no Religion is a truth which our

[2] *Independent Review*, October, 1905.

everyday experience too readily illustrates. For the vulgar and the insensible we have always with us. That there can be genuine religion, again, with a morality at any rate extremely deficient is a truth which, though obscure to the Churches, is patent to anyone who to the gift of insight adds the greater gift of charity—or shall we say that these two gifts are one? He who is least in the kingdom of morality is now and again great in that of Religion. That was the lesson which Christ himself taught on that splendid and moving occasion when He "stooped and wrote in the dust." He saw that morality at the best was only the beginning of Religion and that it was a beginning which Religion could sometimes do without. We cannot save our souls by believing in morality. I say this not as disparaging morality—for it is something, after all, which only rare souls can dispense with—but as exalting Religion.

The ancients used to ask themselves whether virtue was knowledge. If it was knowledge it was teachable. But where are the teachers? Some answered that no man could be a teacher of virtue; others, with perhaps more of truth, that all men were teachers of it. Others, again, maintained that virtue was right opinion and that it came to men by a divine chance, or, as we should perhaps say, by "grace." Now religion

is, as I say, not morality, it is not mere virtue. A man can be (as was said of Thrasea) *ipsa virtus* and yet not be (Thrasea perhaps was not) a religious man. Neither, again, is religion knowledge—or why do we speak of faith? But I would say of religion that all men (and all things) are teachers of it—that it is not right opinion, but right feeling, and that it comes to men by divine chance. All men and all things are teachers of it. "*Habet testimonia Deus,*" says Tertullian, "*omne hoc quod sumus et in quo sumus.*" Religion is not any one thing: it is the pulse and sense of all things: or rather of all those things that lie nearest to us. For I do not want a man to be in a rapture about the universe. That is to prostitute the emotions. I want a man to respond emotionally to his proper environment. He who responds emotionally to the whole universe responds to something which asks him no questions and which cannot hear his answers: for the universe is wide and deep and the response is inarticulate. And that is why I say that religion, though it can be taught, comes by divine chance. For where a man is, there is his religion. And he is where divine chance has located him. The city of Cecrops is, to my mind, a more truly religious place than that city of Zeus which a royal and lovable pedant preferred to it. "Let a man go home,"

as Emerson says. The universe rejected us at our birth. It flung us upon a particular spot of earth, among particular people, into the midst of particular traditions and associations. "Abide thou there," it said, "there is thy religion. And do not whine to me about infinite longings."

No man, as I said, is religious to himself alone. But neither can he be religious to the whole world. That is why the divine chance furnished him with a family, and ordained that a large part of every man's religion should be his domestic faith. Why a man loves his wife and children (who often enough strike others as singularly disagreeable persons) I do not know. But neither do I want to know. Let him go on doing it. He is somehow saving his soul. Still less do I know why a man loves his friends for whom the law does not oblige him to do anything. Whether he loves them for τὸ ἡδύ, or τὸ χρήσιμον, or τὸ καλὸν, I know not. But I know that there is religion wheresoever a man says or thinks, "Would that thou wert born in my father's house." Why, again, do we love places? Yet there is a genuine religion of locality. There are places which in some men can call up a spiritual response (it matters not how) not less deep and pure, and seemingly not dissimilar in kind, to that produced in others by the thought of God or

the love of Christ. Indeed I think it difficult not to find religion everywhere provided we do not go too far for it. Poetry, music, art, association, tradition, the past—there is religion in them all—one can hardly get away from it. And when I speak of association and tradition I am not using mere words. I said there was for many men no religion of progress. I will add here that there is a kind of religion which is such out of the very negation of progress. To some extent we are all of us, whether we like it or not, of the religion of our fathers. I think we should all perhaps be more willing to be so than we are. If religion is not knowledge, what need is there to break our hearts over truth of detail? Why are we thus over-earnest that our religion should be wholly and entirely true? Shall I never more enter a church because the resurrection is a dream? There is a slavery to truth even as there is a slavery to tradition. Let us by all means have freedom of thought: but it were better for us that we had never been born than that we should have freedom of thought without freedom of imagination. There are unrealities which are types of the real. "Christianity is not true." Neither are Homer and Virgil. Let us still live in Christianity as we might in a drama. We need not share all the emotions of the gallery. But we can sit with dignity

in the stalls. It is possible to over-indulge ourselves in this respect. But we run to-day a greater danger, I fancy, of too little indulging ourselves.

After all, what is Christianity? To love Christ and God and to trust to rise again from the dead. As far as rising from the dead is concerned, our belief in it, like our disbelief, can in no wise condition the event. It will or will not be, as may happen: our conjectures do not affect the issue. And touching the love of Christ and of God, I feel that if the heart of man were as well known to its owner as to its author, it would mostly be found that the affection which we believe ourselves to lavish upon gods we know not is only another name for the love we give to men and women whom we do know. Each of us, at any rate, is surrounded by men and women, places and things, which are capable in their combinations of educing emotions similar in kind and degree to the emotions called forth by the thought of God. For myself I believe that these emotions are not merely similar, but the same. I believe that anyone who interrogates his experience with intelligence and sincerity will find that, whatever his professed creed, all these human and earthly things I speak of fill an immense place in his religion. He will say, perhaps, that they do so because of his creed. For myself I believe that these

are the true *prius*. Without them his creed would be form without content. These are first and God is an afterthought. I should be sorry to say that the afterthought was merely vanity and vexation of spirit. It may be that those sacred and precious emotions of which I have spoken do truly conduct us, by a process which is not necessarily illogical because unanalyzable, to a something beyond and higher than themselves. If that be so, there is all the more reason why we should confide ourselves with a gay and glorious abandonment to the service of these emotions. The strength of religion is enterprise. Yet we must begin our adventure along the path of the *notum nobis*. Whither it will ultimately lead, who can tell? for, though men have thought to measure the mind of God, there is no one who has gauged the deep heart of man. Whither we shall finally arrive I think it mean-spirited to be forever anxiously questioning with ourselves. Still meaner of spirit is it to feign a surety which we do not possess, and which, did we possess it, would divest our great enterprise of living and feeling of all its beauty and glamour. The goal of desire is desire itself: our highest longings contain their own satisfaction. The substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen, is just this—that we hope for without seeing them. In the

long run we cannot get away from our own hearts. Let us, therefore, abide joyously in that unexplored Paradise. We shall not find there ultimate truth. But we can, I think, find happiness. We can find sufficient to enable us to pronounce life to be for us, as for the intelligence which created and beheld it upon the first day, " very good." To attain this happiness, to be able to pronounce this verdict, is, I believe, possible without a preliminary faith in God, Freedom, Immortality, Progress. The solar system may be rushing upon dissolution. But we can never present the prospect of that dissolution to ourselves as a fact in the same way as our best human emotions are a fact for us. How it will be for generations who feel the " ends of the ages " nearer to themselves than they are to us, I cannot say. We are told that men live happily on the edges of volcanoes. Perhaps they will be able to get along when they come to dwell in the anticipation of a universal life-destroying frigidity. I can conceive this last generation of men eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage despite the certainty of the coming of glacial conditions which will put an end to everything of the kind. I can see them calculating the exact date at which it would be temerity to think of prolonging their existence. I can see them tranquilly and philosophically

betaking themselves to a last warm bath and openi their veins in it. It does not seem to me very unlikel or very terrible. But I do not know how it will ap pear to others.

I can imagine at this point an objection which may appear serious. You bid us trust in, it may be said, you bid us trust in and be happy with certain beautiful human emotions. But the existence of these very emotions is conditioned by that of certain external objects which are never the property of some people and which have, even for those who possess them, no guarantee of permanence. There are griefs which life inflicts—separation, disease, death, poverty —which life cannot heal. And of all this you say nothing.

What *can* I say? I have not meant to suggest that for everybody life is worth living. Some lives are; some are not. The heart knoweth and no stranger can intermeddle. To one there is a voice which says

" Up and end it, lad,
When the sickness is thy soul:"

And I am not sure that a wise man will slight so high a mandate. But another, a voice of different tone, advises that " there is still horse exercise and sea bathing." That was the voice, for example, that

spoke to Stevenson, who had some little reason, after all, for thinking life "nasty, brutish, and short." For myself, I am content to remember that there are still Homer and Virgil, walking parties, reading parties, faces about one not clouded, and hearts undebased. "Death closes all"; but I do well enough if I can lie alone in a boat and read how the helmet of Hector frightened Astyanax, or in companionship tramp the moors, and argue the sun to setting while I debate the existence of God. "A sort of spiritual hedonism," you will say. I think it comes to something like it. That is the sort of way in which I would propose to save my own soul. Other persons will have others ways: and I believe that only a few have no way. To these few I have nothing to say. I did not create them: and I leave them to the mercy of Him that did. Of what mercy they may find we can know nothing. If it is empty to build too much on the hope of it, it is also foolish to deny the possibility of it. Here, too, there may be a substance in that which we hope for which is not given in our predicates.

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

V

CHRIST THE FORERUNNER

κἂν ἑτεροῖά τισι τῶν πυλλῶν καταφαίνηται τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κυριαχῶν λὸγων ἰστέον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἀναπνεῖ τε καί ζῇ.

I

St. Paul speaks of Christians as those who "have the mind of Christ." It is very usually supposed that, whatever in Christianity is doubtful, however much certain facts of history or dogmas of theology may be impugned, we none the less have, within certain limits, a clear and true knowledge of this "mind of Christ" of which St. Paul speaks, that we do understand the thought of Christ in its broad outline, the general character of His aims, the substance of His moral teaching. This is commonly held to be true by all save a few extremists (with whom I cannot here concern myself) who imagine that we know nothing of Christ at all. I do not range myself with these extremists, and shall, as I said, pass them by: but

neither do I believe, with the great mass of less extreme theologians, that the conception of the mind of Christ which most students of Christianity have is at all a true and just one. I believe that there exists a profound misconception both as to the kind of mission with which Jesus Christ believed himself to be invested, and as to the object in view of which he framed His moral teaching. The nature and extent of this twofold misconception it will be the first objects of the pages which follow to expose: but not their sole object: if they had no other object I should not care to write them. There is a certain healthy animal pleasure to be got out of destruction while one is still engaged upon it: but it leaves behind it a sense of inward desolation, a pitiful demand upon the heart, " Build thou again the walls of Jerusalem." I shall endeavor, therefore, when I have exposed what seems to me to be the inadequacy of the current conceptions of " the mind of Christ," to show what I myself take to be the true significance of the Gospel, wherein I believe its value to lie, and what in it I hold to be permanent for all time.

II

An " Entwickelungsgeschichte " of Christ is a thing hardly possible even to the gayest of *a priori*

historians. As has been often remarked, we know nothing of the early life and of the education of Christ. Till the age of thirty ἔλαθε βιώσας. We may imagine him in Nazareth to have attended the classes of the village *hazzan;* and I think we must also suppose him to have attended those of the scribes, who, if they were not to be found in Nazareth, would be accessible in the larger towns of Galilee. The sayings of Jesus, in their Talmudic style, are clearly the reflex of some such course of advanced instruction; and in St. Matthew, Jesus actually seems to apply to himself (for the words can have no other reference) the phrase, "*a scribe* instructed unto the Kingdom of God" (Matt. xiii. 52). Moreover, it is in the character, not of an independent prophet, but an exponent of the Hebrew Scriptures that, according to St. Luke (iv. 16, *sqq.*), he makes his first public appearance. Anyone, it is true, could come forward thus in the Jewish synagogue, but only certain persons did, those, that is, who had received the necessary preparation. We must reflect, also, how unlikely it is that, if there were scribes at hand, our Lord would neglect such opportunities of instruction. He may have learned to think poorly of the scribes later; but that he began life by sitting at the feet of some one or other of them I cannot doubt. Even in

remembering his subsequent hostility to them, we should not forget that it was a scribe to whom he said, "Thou art not far from the Kingdom of Heaven."

Until the age of thirty, then, we may imagine the life of Christ to have passed quietly in the study of the Scriptures, in listening to the interpretations of the *Sopherim*, and in the endeavor after a knowledge of himself and of God. How in the midst of this quiet life did the call to "leave father, mother, brethren and sisters" come to him? That he had nursed this project in silence for long years there is no reason to believe. Great and ardent natures in the vehement years between twenty and thirty *cannot* keep silence. It is far more natural to suppose that some great spiritual event in the life of Christ brought about this great and sudden change. Only one event, among those of which we have knowledge, could have been adequate to produce this. "John did baptize in the wilderness, and there went out unto him all the land of Judæa." From the land of Galilee also there doubtless came to John more than one disciple. Christ at any rate came to him; and in this visit to John we may most naturally see, I think, a sudden revolt in Jesus against the formalism, the "learnedness," of "scribes instructed," not "unto the King-

dom of God," but unto the traditional interpretations of the Scriptures and of life.

By John Jesus was baptized, and to John, we may suppose, he "confessed his sins." [1] One wonders what fancied burden may have lain upon the soul of the disciple who had come so great a distance to receive the symbols of a "new life." [2]

In the account of the baptism of Jesus by John there is, upon one point, a remarkable discrepancy between our authorities, the significance of which has, I think, escaped commentators. St. Matthew strongly emphasizes the reluctance of John to perform this rite. St. Mark and St. Luke say not a word of this reluctance. The fourth Evangelist has no account of the baptism whatever, despite the fact that in verse 33 of the first chapter he betrays that he is quite well acquainted with the story. Why does St. John omit the episode? Why is St. Matthew so anxious to call attention to John's reluctance? For one and the same reason, namely, that both Evangelists are anxious to throw a veil over the fact that Christ

[1] See page 129.

[2] Compare the gospel of the Hebrews: "Ecce mater domini et fratres ejus dicebant, ei, 'Iohannes baptista baptizat in remissionem peccatorum. Eamus ut baptizemur ab eo.' Dixit autem eis, 'Quid peccavi, ut vadam ut baptizer ab eo? nisi hoc forte quod dixi ignorantia.'"

began as the disciple of John the Baptist.[3] The anxiety of the non-synoptic writer to show Christ's independence of, and the superiority of his mission to and of John is very striking. If any part of the Gospels is a "party pamphlet" it is the first and third chapters of St. John's Gospel. "He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light" (i. 8): "He must increase but I must decrease" (iii. 30.)—one cannot read expressions like these without feeling that one is reading a pamphlet in answer to a pamphlet. St. John is answering opponents who contended that Christ, far from being the Messiah, was but one of the school of John the Baptist unjustly exalted by his disciples at the expense of the Baptist. This objection would have come from one of two quarters. On the one hand, it may have proceeded, toward the close of the first century A.D., from the school of the Baptist himself. For some fifty years after the death of Christ, the school of John and the school of Jesus existed side by side in amicable relations to one another. I incline to regard the opening chapters of St. John's Gospel as the echo of a gradual disturbance of friendly relations between the

[3] The same tendency is observable and even more marked, in the account of the baptism presented both in the Ebionite and in the Nazarene gospels.

school of Christ and that of the Baptist. On the other hand the objection may have come from the orthodox Jews. The scribes and Pharisees could not be so stupid as not to see that they could most easily hold the common people to the traditional Judaism by "playing off," if I may use the expression, John the Baptist against Jesus.[4]

In either case, I think no one can read the Gospel with an open mind without feeling that the charge which St. John is tacitly answering has some foundation in truth. If there had been no John the Baptist there would have been no Jesus: and this is a fact which the Gospels rather willfully obscure. It is true indeed that both St. Matthew and St. Luke put into the mouth of Christ the words, "Among them that are born of women there is not a greater prophet than John the Baptist" (Matt. xi. 11=Luke vii. 28); and that Christ spoke more than once words to this effect we may well believe, and may most naturally see in them the tribute of a generous disciple to his master. But either Evangelist adds qualifying words: "Yet the man who is least in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than he." *Those* words were not

[4] Since writing this, I have made acquaintance with the work of Baldensperger, *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums.* The English reader may compare Jülicher, *Introduction to the New Testament,* Eng. transl., pp. 384, *sqq.*

spoken by Christ! They date, one feels sure, from an age in which it was already debated whether salvation was possible to those who, having preceded Christ, had not been received into his church: "*Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus.*" The most insignificant Christian is asserted to be greater than John: and the assertion was intended to dispose once and for all of the Jewish, or Baptist, pretension that Christ was but the disciple and continuator of the Baptist.[5] Christ himself only said of John, simply and truly, that he was greater than all prophets that ever were.

The occasion also of this remarkable tribute is interesting. Our authorities represent John as sending to Christ two of his disciples. John was at this time imprisoned in Macherus. The disciples are bidden to ask of Jesus, "Art thou he that should come, or look we for another?" The whole incident is related in Matt. xi. 2, *sqq.*=Luke vii. 18, *sqq.* That John in prison had the opportunity of sending such a mission we need not believe. Nor is it likely that the two disciples asked of Jesus the question attributed to them. If we may believe our authorities, John had long

[5] Even orthodox commentators have felt uneasy over this verse wishing, some of them, to substitute "he that is younger" (*i.e.* Christ) for "he that is least."

previously answered it for them. None the less some such mission as that described may very well have taken place. John was in prison. His disciples were without a master. Two of them by a natural impulse betake them to the most prominent of the disciples of their old teacher—a disciple already himself a recognised "baptist." If there could be any doubt in our minds as to what the "baptism" of Jesus at this time was, it is removed at this point by St. Luke, who definitely tells us (vii. 29) that Jesus baptized *with the baptism of John.* "And all the people that heard, and the publicans, justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John," *sc.* by Jesus, for what else can the words mean? John was already in prison.[6]

The first turning-point in the life of Christ was when in Galilee he heard from the waste places of Jordan "the voice of one crying" to him to leave the religion of tradition for a new religion—which was a religion just because it was new, and because all religion must be new born daily in us. The second turning-point was the imprisonment (or perhaps rather the death) of John. The disciple was freer:

[6] This appears from the parallel passage in Matthew. St. Luke does not actually mention it in the passage before us: but he has already mentioned it in iii. 20.

he dared more to obey his own impulses: and he felt the inspiration and strength which come to a man who stands at length alone. How many of the disciples of John accepted him as their leader we do not know. Many of them were clearly offended in him. St. Matthew relates a remonstrance which certain of them addressed to him on the subject of fasting (Matt. ix. 14). The disciples of John fasted, those of Jesus did not. The remonstrance is interesting, since on the one hand it shows that John's disciples regarded Jesus as one of them, and considered themselves to have a claim upon him, and on the other, it makes it clear that the great body of them were not willing to recognize him as the successor of the Baptist:—a fact which is also, of course, abundantly indicated by the existence side by side all through the first century of a Baptist school distinct from Christianity. However that may be, we cannot doubt that, of the multitudes who had hung upon the lips of John, large numbers came over to Jesus, abandoning the other disciples of the Baptist. For a long while —until the day, indeed, when the people who had expected an earthly kingdom found themselves "put off," if I may so speak, with a heavenly one—it was Christ's position as the successor of John which made the common people his protectors against the

scribes and Pharisees. This comes out very clearly in the question asked of Christ by the chief priests and elders[7] as to the "authority" of his ministry (Matt. xxi. 22, *sqq.*=Luke xx. 2, *sqq.*). In the counter question of Christ, "The baptism of John, was it from heaven or from men?" what is implied is, "My baptism is that of John: I am the successor of John." This gives a real answer, and not, as according to the traditional view, a captious and evasive one.

The position of Christ as the continuator of John I may illustrate here, finally, by directing attention to two well-known passages of the Gospels. In St. Mark (Mark vi. 14=Matt. xiv. 2=Luke ix. 7) we read, "King Herod heard of him, . . . and he said that John the Baptist was risen from the dead." Antipas was, perhaps, not so superstitious as the simple Evangelist imagined. What he perhaps said was, "Another John!" *i.e.*, "Another radical, another anarchist!"

The other passage relates to the question asked by Jesus of his disciples in the neighborhood of Cæsarea Philippi (Mark viii. 28=Matt. xiv. 2): "Whom do

[7] That the official Judaistic party was not so opposed to the Baptist as tradition would have us believe I have tried to indicate elsewhere. *cf.* pages 208-209.

men say that I am? And they answered, John the Baptist, though some say Elias; and others, One of the prophets."

III

I want now to inquire how far the teaching of Christ compared with that of John bears out these inferences as to the relations of the two which a careful and open-minded study of the records seems to yield.

Little as we know of John the Baptist, in comparison with what we might wish to know, the broad outlines of his teaching are quite clear. Our main authority is the third chapter of St. Luke (vv. 1-18) who is fuller than the other Evangelists.

Like the prophets of the Old Testament, John heralded a "day of the Lord." "Repent ye, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." The "Kingdom of Heaven" to the Baptist means simply "wrath to come": and in shadowy language (interpolated now, in order to make it yield references to Christ) he announces the coming of a Bringer of the Wrath, "who shall baptize you with [the Holy Ghost and with[1]] fire: whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and will gather the wheat

[1] The words in brackets I take to be a spurious addition.

into his garners, but the chaff he will burn with fire unquenchable." The sum of the Baptist's Gospel is the advent of the Messiah, who is to bring with him the end of the world: and the need, in view of this imminent end of all things, of repentance. The Messiah of John is a purely mystical and ideal figure. John's eyes are not, like those of Isaiah, fastened upon some great figure in actual world-history (of history we may suppose him to have been wholly ignorant), and it follows that the kingdom which his Messiah was to bring in, when he had purged his floor, was not a kingdom of this world, but a kingdom equally mystical and ideal with Messias himself; and does he not, indeed, call it a Kingdom of Heaven?

The Kingdom of Heaven, then, means the end of the world.[2] There is a Wrath To Come from which we shall be saved only by repentance, and by bringing forth "fruits unto repentance." Two symbols of repentance seem to be recognized: (1) the rite of baptism; (2) the confession of sins (Matt. iii. 6). But these are no more than symbols; over and beyond these it is necessary to produce *fruits unto repentance.* What these fruits unto repentance are it is not difficult to discover. "The people asked him, saying,

[2] For the sense in which I use the phrase "end of the world," see Appendix A.

What shall we do, then? He answereth and saith unto them, He that hath two coats, let him impart unto him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do likewise. Then came also publicans to be baptized, and said unto him, Master, what shall we do? And he said unto them, Exact no more than that which is appointed unto you. And the soldiers likewise demanded of him, saying, And what shall we do? And he said unto them, Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely,[3] and be content with your wages" (Luke iii. 10-14). To understand these precepts rightly we must bear in mind that they are precepts addressed to a world momentarily about to perish. They are not to be regarded as practical precepts. They are counsels of perfection: or, I would rather say, they are *counsels of indifferency.* To men awaiting hourly the end of all things and "wrath to come," what are coats and meats? ("Care no more to clothe and eat.") What are dues to the publican, his pay to the soldier, when every moment may bring the baptism of fire? The message of John to all and sundry is the utter indifferency of all earthly things in view of the instant coming of "the Kingdom of Heaven." In urging repentance upon all who came

[3] Or more correctly, "Extort nothing from anyone by force, neither cheat any of anything by false accusation."

to him, John was not calling them back to what we term morality, to the ordinary duties of daily life. He expected to see all the relations of everyday life overturned *in ictu oculi*. What he demanded of each man was that he should make such a life as he was now living impossible. The ordinary man cannot get along without his two coats (*i.e.*, a cloak and a tunic); the publican cannot live unless he exacts rather more than "what is due"; and the life of the soldier who was content with his pay (though we do not know to what soldiers John is speaking) was probably little worth living. John gives them all impossible commands just because they are impossible. He demands a new life altogether and not a new life on the old lines. We cannot go on "in a groove" when "the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand."

IV

"Now after that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee[1] preaching the gospel of the Kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled: the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand" (Mark i. 14, 15).

These are the words in which our oldest gospel describes the opening of the public ministry of Jesus.

[1] Prompted, the words suggest, by fear of Herod.

John and Jesus, we notice at once, proclaim their gospel in words practically identical: "The Kingdom of God is at hand." Can we doubt that Christ's initial conception of his mission was to proclaim in Galilee exactly that gospel which John had proclaimed in Judæa? It was this same gospel, moreover, which, at a later period, he committed to the twelve and to the seventy when he sent them forth to "preach, saying, The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand."

What John meant when he spoke of the Kingdom of Heaven I have already said. He meant the day of wrath and the end of all things. We may most naturally imagine Christ to have *begun* with exactly the same conception and no more. But he cannot have ended in it. When he says "The Kingdom of God is within you," he says something which John would not have understood. The Kingdom of God to John remains always a kind of huge sensation drama.

To follow the transition in Christ from the conception of the Kingdom of God which he received from John to that in which he finally rested, we must consider for a moment the different environment of the two men. The work of John lay in Judæa, and his eyes were fixed necessarily always upon Jerusalem: "There went out unto him all Judæa and they

of Jerusalem." He worked near the capital of the Holy Land, where there was more moral corruption, more wealth, luxury, arrogance, dishonesty, hypocrisy, than in the smaller towns and in the villages of Palestine. It was the authors of all this whom he had in sight and in mind when he cried, "O generation of vipers," and spoke to them, not of a "Kingdom of Heaven" within them, but of "wrath to come." The mission of Christ, on the other hand, lay in the poorer and unsophisticated villages and small towns round about the Sea of Galilee, among fisher folk and the simple poor. The poverty and squalor of many of the inhabitants of these districts we can easily divine; and the terrible ravage of disease among them is clearly presented to us in the Gospels themselves, the pages of which furnish often nothing but a melancholy procession of lame, blind, deaf and dumb, and "possessed." It was among these people that Christ "went about," as the sacred writer simply says, "doing good." Accordingly, instead of the fierce denunciation of the Baptist, "O generation of vipers," we have the invitation which still invites, "Come unto me, all ye that travail and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." If we want, then, to know how the Kingdom of Heaven, as conceived by John, differs from the Kingdom of Heaven as conceived by Jesus,

it differs as "the day of wrath" from the "day of rest." By the Kingdom of Heaven both John and Jesus mean the end of the world. Both figure that end as a day of wrath; but Christ figures it also, and by preference, as a day of rest. For certain persons, to whom he only rarely addressed himself, it was to be a day of wrath, of weeping and gnashing of teeth, a baptism with a fire which "is not quenched." But for those among whom his work chiefly lay, it was to be a day of rest—of rest from labor, oppression, poverty, disease—a day and a place such as Job had pictured—"There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest; there the prisoners rest together, they hear not the voice of the oppressor; the small and the great are there, and the servant is free from his master." And we can thus see what it means to have the Kingdom of God *within us*. It means to have escaped in our conscience from the judgments of men, to have a mind which is untroubled by the sorrows and accidents of to-day, because it sees that "all things come to an end," to have a heart fixed upon the thing that is good, and at peace in the contemplation of it.[2]

[2] We must remember, however, that it was to the Pharisees (Luke xvii. 21) that Christ said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." He may have meant *within you Pharisees*. "You

That by the Kingdom of Heaven Christ understood an imminent end of the world ought not, I think, at so late a day as this to admit of a doubt in the mind of any serious person who studies the New Testament with candor and openness. But so few persons do study that book, and of those so very few do so with a candid and open mind, that I may be allowed—indeed I seem obliged—to give a few reasons for believing that Christ expected an immediate end of all things. In doing this, I shall try at the same time to develop a new view as to Christ's own conception of his personality and his mission. I shall then go on to draw what seem to me to be the just and proper inferences from the admission, once it is made, that Christ believed himself to be living in the last years of the world. For from the moment we persuade ourselves that Christ believed this, it becomes necessary to view his moral teaching from a new standpoint.[3] From this new standpoint, I believe

Pharisees," he may have meant, "have a *day of wrath* stored up in you: the judgment of God has begun in you already: already is the Prince of this world (Pride of Place) judged."

[3] The grand defect of Renan's *Vie de Jésu* is, that though he clearly recognizes the "apocalyptic" nature, as he calls it, of the "Kingdom of Heaven," he does not perceive how fundamentally this recognition of it must change our judgment of Christianity upon the ethical side. Throughout his work, but particularly in chapters vii. to xvii. (ed. i.) he betrays an

we shall be able to throw much fresh light upon many of Christ's darkest utterances—such as that cruel saying, "Let the dead bury their dead"—and to give a juster interpretation to some of the golden paradoxes of the Sermon on the Mount.

It was the proclamation of the coming end of things that drew to John the multitude of his disciples. Was ever any prophet of the end of the world without a following? "The vacant and the vain" are in all ages lightly roused "to noble raptures" by the expectation of the Day of the Lord; and in primitive ages this expectation is a potent force in noble natures also. It was this "apocalyptic"[4] message of John which had roused Christ himself, we can hardly

uneasy feeling as to the complete consistency of the old ethical with the new historical standpoint. In chapter vii. he makes a desperate endeavor to saddle Christ with the inconsistency into which he himself has fallen. "That there may have been," he says, "a contradiction between the belief in the approaching end of the world and the general moral system of Jesus, *conceived in prospect of a permanent state of humanity* nearly analogous to that which now exists, no one will attempt to deny." Grant the premise that the "moral system of Jesus" *was* "conceived in prospect of a permanent state of humanity" and the conclusion, inconsistency in Jesus, follows. Deny this premise, and the conclusion, inconsistency in Renan, follows.

[4] I purpose (though the procedure is purely arbitrary) to use for convenience' sake—the word "*apocalyptic*" with reference to a near, "*eschatological*" with reference to a remote, end of the world.

doubt, to the New Life. This doctrine of the end of all things was undoubtedly the center of the Baptist's gospel. Would his great successor and continuator lightly abandon it? He came into Galilee—straight from John—preaching, "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand,"—the very words in which John had prophesied the end of the world. He sent his disciples far and wide with the same message. Those to whom he addressed himself, those to whom his disciples spoke, would many of them be men who had listened to John. Could this phrase "Kingdom of Heaven," however much Christ might (as we have seen he did) make new associations to gather round it—could it ever lose, for those who had heard John, its apocalyptic significance? [5]

This apocalyptic doctrine which Christ received (I will not yet say accepted) from John appears in St. Paul, powerfully coloring his whole thought. The faith in it seems to have been shared by the early churches generally. The world is to St. Paul a world upon which "are come the ends of the ages." The

[5] How near the apocalyptic teaching of Christ was to that of John we may divine from the λόγιον in Didymus: Psalm lxxxviii. 8. διὸ φησὶν ὁ σωτὴρ· ὁ ἐγγὺς μοῦ ἐγγὺς τοῦ πυρός· ὁ δὲ μακρὰν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλείας (*Texte u. Untersuchungen*, v. 4, 142.)

line of this apocalyptic teaching must have passed from John the Baptist to Paul through Christ and his disciples. (For St. Paul and the apostolic generation generally, the end of the world is, of course, bound up with the "*second* coming" of Christ.)

"Christ," the orthodox Christian (that magnificent abstraction) will object, "Christ was eschatological: he was not apocalyptic. He spoke of an end of the world, but a far distant end"—so far distant, if I may interpolate, as hardly to come within the sphere of practical preaching. In answer to this objection of the orthodox Christian (whom I may be allowed to employ as we employ that other beautiful abstraction, "the man in the street"), I will only notice here that, on the one hand, his contention assumes an utter break in the continuity of development from John to Paul such as nothing in our records indicates, while, on the other, it imputes a stupidity to the whole entourage of our Lord such as we could scarcely credit in a class of board-school children—a stupidity which led them to misinterpret him on a vital and essential point; and it supposes him, moreover, to have allowed those who were to carry his gospel through the world to bear about with them this central and deep-seated error, of the existence of which, even supposing him human, he must have

been well aware; and, supposing him divine, was there anything hid from him? [6]

Having called attention to this, I will pass on to consider what that "coming" was which Christ promised, or prophesied, to his disciples—a coming with which, as all, even our orthodox Christian, are agreed, was bound up the end of the world. I do not believe Christ to have spoken of a "second coming" —at least not in the sense in which we understand the words: nor of a distant coming: nor yet, finally, of his own coming.

The coming of which Christ spoke always was the coming of one whom he designates the "Son of Man."

The phrase "Son of Man" is borrowed by Christ, as it would seem, from the Book of Daniel—that book of the Old Testament which seems to have impressed the imagination of our Lord. It means nothing more nor less than "man," and it is several times used in Daniel, without any mystical significance, merely as a synonym for "man." But in one remarkable passage of Daniel it carries with it the Messianic sense

[6] Cf. Tertullian, *Praecer. Haer.* "Solent dicere non omnia apostolos scisse . . . rursus convertunt, omnia quidem apostolos scisse, sed non omnia omnibus (? nobis) tradidisse, in utroque Christum reprehensioni inicientes, qui aut minus instructos aut parum simplices apostolos miserit."

which it had on Christ's lips and in the minds of his contemporaries: "Behold, *one like the Son of Man* came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought him near before him: and there was given to him dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed" (Dan. vii.).

To the mind of the ordinary Jew of the time of Christ, familiar with this passage, and with passages not dissimilar from the Apocryphal Scriptures, the words "Son of Man" had necessarily a Messianic significance.[7] The Messiah was to come in the form of a man: he was thus exalted above the strange-shaped Cherubim and the fantastic gods of the heathen.[8] To some Man, who should come "with

[7] See Appendix B.

[8] We are accustomed to speak rather scornfully of an anthropomorphic religion. God made man in his own image, and man has spent his Sundays in endeavoring to return the compliment. We are inclined to laugh at this feeble attempt of gratitude. We should do better to reflect what a step forward man made when he exchanged a beast-god for a man-god. We may also profitably remember that a God who is a Spirit evades and is unpredictable, a God who is a Man may be depended upon, as it were, to be just and true and bound by the best human standards.

clouds and great glory," God was to give power and dominion over all things: this Man should reduce the earth to subjection, end this present world, and bring in "a reign of righteousness." Such was the popular conception of "the Son of Man," among the mass of Jews at the beginning of the first century of our era. Such also without doubt was the conception in the mind of our Lord.

It is universally supposed that Christ applies to himself this title of Son of Man, and it is commonly supposed that he employs it (in preference to the title Son of God) partly from humility, and partly to emphasize the human side of his personality, that the faithful might see in him a man ὁμοιοπαθής and "tempted at all points even as we are." How foreign these ideas, which Christ is thus supposed to associate with the title, are from any that could have existed in a Jewish mind I need not pause to notice.[9] Christ uses the title Son of Man as a synonym for Messias, simply because it was so used in the literature then most widely read, the later and apocryphal

[9] Yet these are the ideas which our best school text books still enjoin us to associate with the words "Son of Man." How little a Jew associated the idea of humility with the phrase we may see from the saying of Abbahu (Talmud, Pal. Ta'anith, 65): *If a man saith, "I am a god," he lieth; "I am a son of man," he shall one day rue it.*

"prophetic" books, of which the Book of Daniel is the type. Other phrases, as well as many ideas, taken from Daniel are to be found in the discourses of Christ.

Does Christ, in employing this phrase "Son of Man," apply it to himself?

I am fully convinced that he never does so: and that the idea that he did so came into being only after his death. This statement partakes somewhat of the nature of a paradox, and I must supplicate a patient hearing while I endeavor to substantiate it. Christ constantly had on his lips the phrase "Son of Man," constantly spoke of the "resurrection" and the "coming" of the Son of Man: and by the Son of Man he always meant the Messiah. Those are facts which I take to be certain, whatever else in the gospel record may be doubtful. The question I raise is this: Did Christ regard himself as the Messiah, or as the Forerunner of the Messiah? Is John the herald of Jesus, or are both John and Jesus the heralds of another—of the "Son of Man"?

I would remark, in the first place, the constancy with which, according to the traditional view, Jesus arrogates to himself the name "Son of Man," and the openness with which he does so, even at the very outset of his ministry. We, taught falsely, as we have

been, to associate with the words the idea of humility and humanity, hardly realize what this means. But remember that to a Jew of our Lord's time, to whom the school books of this country were unknown and who never sat in agony through a sermon in an Englglish village church (or, for that matter, in an English cathedral [10]), the words meant nothing other than Messiah.[11] Is it credible that always and openly from the beginning Christ spoke of himself as the Messiah?

But, passing this by, I would call attention to a different kind of fact. I would notice, and emphasize this—that always the central point of Christ's gospel is not, as we might expect, the *presence* of the Son

[10] Cf. Farrar on Luke v. 24: "Christ used it to indicate the truth that God highly exalted him because of his self-humiliation in taking our flesh." Is the origin of all this false sentiment and bad exegetics an epigram in Augustine? "The Son of God was made a Son of Man that you who were sons of men might be made Sons of God."—(Serm. cxxi.) The idea appears, it is true, in the Greek Fathers: but it probably passed into popular thought through Augustine.

[11] John xii. 34 is commonly quoted as indicating that the phrase "Son of Man" was not commonly understood, as used by Christ, of the Messiah: "How sayest thou the Son of Man must be lifted up? Who is this Son of Man?" These words seem to me clearly to justify the conclusion which they are supposed to combat. The Jews do not ask, "What do you mean by Son of Man?" but "*Whom* do you mean?" (It does not occur to them that Christ means himself.) This is quite

of Man, but his *coming*. Never does he say, "Lo, the Son of Man stands in your midst," but constantly, "Ye shall see the Son of Man coming." Nor is this coming, in the Synoptic Gospels, represented as a *second* coming. The idea of a second coming only arose after the disciples had come to identify the crucified Christ and the Son of Man. "When the Son of Man comes shall he find faith upon earth?" Luke xviii. 8). "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man come." If we had only sayings such as these in which the phrase Son of Man occurred, it could never have been supposed that Christ applied the name to himself, or regarded himself as anything but a "messenger before the face" of the Son of Man (or Messiah). And if we examine critically and fairly the other places in the Gospels where the phrase occurs, I think we shall see good reason to doubt whether Christ ever used it of himself. There is of course great difficulty in determining what parts of the Gospels are to be regarded as

clear if we compare Christ's own words to the disciples, "Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?" *Vide infra.*

I may notice that the Pharisees, to whom Christ so constantly addressed himself, were least of all men likely to mistake the significance of this faith. It is first definitely Messianic in those portions of Enoch which are indubitably due to the Pharisaic party.

giving the genuine words of Christ. I think it will be admitted, however, that, with some reservations, those utterances which contain the characteristic phrase Son of Man are more likely to be genuine than others. The phrase was always in Christ's mouth: there was a certain mysticism and inspiration in the utterances which contained it, that would cause them to be preserved very nearly in the form in which they were delivered—precisely because they were only partially, if at all, understood. Nor indeed are utterances containing the phrase likely to have been falsely attributed to our Lord in a later age. For elsewhere in the New Testament the expression is found only in a single passage of the "Acts" (Acts vii. 56), and twice in the book of Revelation (Rev. i. 13; xiv. 14): and in the non-canonical literature of the Apostolic Age I think I am correct in saying that it occurs but once. Ignatius speaks of Christ, "who after the flesh was of David's race, who is Son of Man and Son of God" (*Eph.* 20): but I have not found the phrase in any other Apostolic Father. The explanation of this no doubt is that the phrase perished from popular speech (as a designation of the Messiah) with the death of the Messianic idea itself.[12]

[12] That Marcion employed the phrase (Lietzmann) means no more than that Marcion employed St. Luke.

We have good ground, then, for supposing that those utterances of Christ, in which the phrase "Son of Man" is employed, are more likely than any others to be genuine λόγια, and to embody our Lord's conception of the Messiah. But this is true, I think, only with certain reservations. I do not wish to press these reservations; but I should prefer myself to exclude from consideration (1) the utterances of Christ, concerning the Son of Man, given in the Fourth Gospel, and (2) those supposed words of Christ where in applying to Himself (as is thought) the title "Son of Man" he prophesies his death and the manner of it: since these are things which no man can foreknow, Christ cannot—I approach the Gospels, be it understood, from a frankly naturalistic standpoint—Christ cannot have spoken the words such passages attribute to him. I would remark, in parenthesis, that it is the frequency of utterances of this second class which has lent assurance for so long to the idea that Christ speaks of himself as the "Son of Man."

I do not wish, as I said, to press these two reservations. With regard to the first of them, indeed, though I am not disposed to confide greatly in St. John's Gospel, I have the feeling that it may very well contain many genuine λόγια, and that those, in particular, which are connected with the Son of Man

should not be too lightly set aside. There are in all ten such λόγια in the Fourth Gospel.[18] This number may, I think, on inspection, be reduced. For example, xii. 23, "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified," is probably only another form of the λόγιον in xiii, 31, "Now is the Son of Man glorified and God glorified in him." If we regard whole utterance belongs to the same species of λόγια, we cannot pay much regard to their different historical setting as given in John. In connection with these two λόγια I would take John iii. 13, "No man hath ascended into heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man: and as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up." This is, of course, interpreted as a prophecy by Christ of the manner of his death. That is because we start with preconceptions. Put aside these preconceptions, and the natural meaning of the words, "the Son of Man be lifted up," is that suggested by the preceding reference to his ascent into heaven. The lifting up of the Son of Man is his exaltation to the skies whence he came. His descent and ascent are regarded as accom-

[18] I give the references: i. 51; iii. 13; v. 27; vi. 27; vi. 53; vi. 62; viii. 28; xii. 23; xii. 34; xiii. 31. All these passages are dealt with in what follows. (I omit ix. 13, where there is some doubt as to the true text.)

plished because they are so in the mind of God. The whole utterance belongs to the same species of λόγια, as those concerning the glorification of the "Son of Man." To the same class belongs xii. 34: "How sayest thou, The Son of Man must be lifted up?" and the answer to this question may be found in two other sayings of our Lord, i. 51, "Ye shall see the heavens opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man"; and again, vi. 62, "What if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before?" All these sayings should be classed together and interpreted by one another. Christ spoke often, no doubt, of the coming heavenly glorification, perhaps also (iii. 13) of the heavenly pre-existence of the Messiah. He also, in three passages of this Gospel, speaks of his power upon earth. In v. 27, we are told that the Father hath given the Son "authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of Man." And in vi. 27, Christ speaks of "everlasting life which the Son of Man shall give you." In another mysterious utterance the same life-giving power of the Messiah seems to be spoken of, though the actual words seem clearly to be colored by the language of subsequent Eucharistic theory: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood ye cannot have life in yourselves"

(vi. 53). In none of these passages does Christ identify himself with the Son of Man. The reference to Christ exists, of course, in the mind of the Evangelist, and the setting of the passage is meant to present it to the reader. But in these passages, viewed as λόγια, there is no such reference. "St. John" has been more faithful to the actual words of Christ than we could well have expected. There remains, it is true, one passage in this Gospel of which I have not spoken, of which the same cannot, I think, be said. In viii. 28, Christ is made to say, "When ye have lifted up the Son of Man ye shall know that I am he." Here I freely admit that there is attributed to Christ an identification of himself with the Messiah. My only wonder is that this has not more often occurred. I should wonder at this even in a more authentic document: and I regard the Fourth Gospel as a document of inferior authority. The writer himself, it is certain, believed Christ to have proclaimed himself the Son of Man. Is it not strange that only in this one passage should he actually put this claim into Christ's mouth? I think I am also entitled to notice that the passage in which he does so is one of those in which Christ is made—in which, that is, the Evangelist imagines him—to prophesy by what death he should die.

I thus (passing to the Synoptists) come to the second class of passages concerning which I decided to make a reservation. That in *all* of these the Evangelists understood[14] Christ to mean himself by the phrase Son of Man is indisputable. Nor do I wish to deny that these passages, in their context, bear this meaning. But the connection between the λόγια and their contexts is throughout the Gospels, as most persons admit, uncertain and disputable. The language, moreover, in this class of passages, is almost always vague and mysterious to a degree. In no one of them, however, does Christ, in the Synoptic Gospels, identify himself with the Son of Man, and in the greater number of them, as I shall hope to show, the words he uses apply only by a forced interpretation to himself, and are far more easily understood of some third person. They will naturally have submitted to slight alterations in the hands of writers who gave to them a different signification than their primary one.

It is impossible that I should here deal individually with each and all of the texts in the Synoptics in which the phrase "Son of Man" occurs.[15] Many of these merely repeat one another with slight varia-

[14] *i.e.*, understood the time of writing.

[15] Statistics, etc., as to the usage of the expression in the

tions: such "duplicates" I shall notice only where the variations are important. In general, without being exhaustive, I undertake to notice all passages which present any difficulty, and in particular those which *prima facie* appear to tell against the view for which I am contending. Throughout I shall employ St. Mark as our primary and best authority, and where the other two Synoptists offer a Marcan λόγιον without any noticeable divergence I shall cite Mark alone. There are, however, a good many non-Marcan λόγια concerning the Son of Man in St. Matthew and St. Luke, and to any of these which are noteworthy I shall call attention.

I begin, as I promised, with those sayings in which Christ speaks of the sufferings and death of the Son of Man. That Christ should have spoken often of the sufferings of the Son of Man (assuming him not to have identified himself with this mysterious personage) will not excite surprise, if we believe that the conception of a suffering Messiah (due primarily perhaps to Isaiah) was already familiar to Jewish thought. But in any case that he should have prophesied the crucifixion of this Son of Man is, I think,

different Synoptic Gospels, and a full list of references may be seen in Dr. Armitage Robinson's *Study of the Gospels*, Note, B.

not possible.[16] Nor in our earliest authority, St. Mark, is he ever made to do so. In St. Matthew he does indeed do so explicitly (Matt. xxvi. 2, "The Son of Man is delivered up to be crucified"); but I think I am fairly entitled to such advantage as my point of view derives from the divergence here of our later and earlier authorities. There are in St. Mark six passages where our Lord speaks of the sufferings, betrayal, etc., of "the Son of Man." Of these I will notice first a passage which is found—with variations—in all the Synoptic writers:—Mark ix. 31. "The Son of Man is delivered up into the hands of men [and they shall kill him: and when he is killed after three days he shall rise again"]. The words which I have enclosed in brackets are omitted by St. Luke. The omission is I think highly significant:[17] and it becomes the more so from the comment which both Mark and Luke pass upon the utterance as a whole:—"and they understood not the saying" (ἠγνόουν τὸ ῥῆμα). If the apostles understood the words Son of Man as a designation not of the Messiah but of their human master, and if Christ had actually ut-

[16] Crucifixion, of course, was not even a Jewish punishment.

[17] Its significance is the same whether we suppose St. Luke to be employing here an "Ur-Marcus" or drawing upon some other source. That he made the omission on his own authority is not credible.

tered the sentence which Luke omits, it would have been impossible for his audience to have misunderstood Christ. The utterance of Christ, we cannot but feel, was less specific than Mark and Matthew represent it. Christ spoke generally of a betrayal of the Son of Man. He was no doubt presaging, as he well might, his own rejection; but by the betrayal of the Son of Man he means here, I think, the betrayal of his cause: "He that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me"; and Christ was the messenger of the Son of Man.

Upon the same lines I would explain another passage (Mark x. 33), where all the Synoptists agree in making Christ prophesy the betrayal and death of the "Son of Man." I give the version of Mark: "Behold we go up to Jerusalem: and the Son of Man shall be delivered unto the chief priests and the scribes: and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him unto the Gentiles: and they shall mock him, and shall spit upon him, and shall scourge him, and shall kill him: and after three days he shall rise again." [18] Of this passage I can only say that it proves too much. Even those who believe that Christ

[18] What Christ means by the "resurrection of the Son of Man" I shall indicate later, p. 171. I therefore leave aside here the examination of the phrase.

prophesied his sufferings and death can hardly suppose his prediction to have included such precise detail. Such detail must have been largely supplied, as most persons will, I imagine, admit, *ex post facto*:— our Evangelists were, after all human. A fair criticism must be willing to put aside all this extreme specification: and putting it aside, we are left with nothing more than was contained in the passage which I have already examined (Mark ix. 31), namely a prediction in general terms of the rejection, in the person of Christ, of the cause of that Son of Man whose representative and messenger he imagined himself to be.

With these two passages we may compare Mark viii. 31 and ix. 12,[19] where we have similar predictions which take, however, a more general form of expression. On these more general passages, therefore, I need not pause to comment. The same, I think, is true of the two remaining (though slightly dissimilar) texts in St. Mark in which the Son of Man's betrayal is alluded to. Of these the first is the utterance at the Last Supper, "The Son of Man goeth, even as it is written of him: but woe unto that man

[19] Mark viii. 31 is represented in Luke and Matthew: but Matthew omits "Son of Man": ix. 12 is not represented in Luke, but is given in Matthew.

through whom the Son of Man is betrayed" (Mark xiv. 21): the other is the utterance in Gethsemane, "The hour is come: behold the Son of Man is betrayed into the hands of sinners" (Mark xiv. 41= Matt. xxvi. 45: the passage is not paralleled in Luke).

These two sayings are not strictly prophetic: nor could they take a more general form than they do. In both, as elsewhere, I understand the words "Son of Man" to have been used by Christ as equivalent to "the cause of the Son of Man." Such a manner of speech would be just as natural as many which we employ in common parlance to-day. A British general is led into a trap by a treacherous guide, and we say, "England was betrayed." Or again, we say of opponents of Free Trade that they are "abandoning Cobden and Bright." In either case we personify a cause. Just so does Christ when he speaks of the Son of Man to be imperiled. He is the spokes- "Kingdom of Heaven" which the Son of Man is coming to found. In his own peril he feels the cause of the Son of Man to be imperiled. He is the spokesman of that cause: and to reject his words is to despise the cause: and "whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words . . . the Son of Man also shall be ashamed of him when he cometh in the glory of

his Father with the holy angels" (Mark viii. 38).[20] In this λόγιον we cannot fail, if we interpret it naturally and fairly, to feel that Christ distinguishes himself from the Son of Man: and I fancy that we shall not find reason to think that he does otherwise in other utterances.

I have now exhausted the utterances in St. Mark which have reference to the sufferings and betrayal of the Son of Man. Those in the other two Synoptists are with one or two exceptions included in this catalogue. To one of these exceptions (Matt. xxvi. 2), where the actual crucifixion of the Son of Man is mentioned, I have already called attention: nor need any others detain us save one.

In Matt. xvi. 12, we read: "Elijah indeed cometh and restoreth all things; but I say unto you that Elijah is already come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed. Even so shall the Son of Man also suffer of them." And the Evangelist adds that "then understood they that he spoke to them of John." The passage is omitted in Luke: and in Mark (ix. 12-13) there is no mention of John. That this mention of John [21] is a piece of false exegesis on the

[20] So too St. Luke. In St. Matthew the utterance is little more than hinted at.

[21] For this reference here to John *cf.* below, p. 172.

part of Matthew I shall try to make clear later. I wish here to notice that just as Matthew irrelevantly introduces John, of whom Mark says nothing, so he endeavors to identify the sufferings of the Son of Man with those of Jesus: and this also Mark does not do. Mark has, "And now is it written of the Son of Man that he should suffer many things and be set at naught." What exactly our Lord's constant allusions to the sufferings of the Son of Man may have meant, it is perhaps not possible now clearly to determine, for the reason that we know so little as to the Jewish conception of the suffering Messiah. But I think it most natural to suppose that Christ here and elsewhere is speaking of the wrongs which the Son of Man endures in the rejection of his prophets.

I pass now to a different class of passages—where our Lord speaks of the Son of Man without reference to his future suffering and betrayal. These—which are not so numerous as might be thought—admit of a twofold division. There are (1) passages which speak of the present activity of the Son of Man; those (2) which speak of his "coming," of the results of his coming and of his final glorification.

(1) First then, the present activity of the Son of Man. I will begin with two passages which are very familiar and common to all the first three Evangel-

way of saying, "The Kingdom of the 'Son of Man,' as I have come prolaiming it, is, in distinction from the ascetic rule of John, a kingdom of joy." Or again, lastly, "The Son of Man came to save that which is lost," is merely the equivalent of saying, "The Kingdom of Heaven is a Kingdom for the poor and miserable and sinful."

I should add that I do not think that the past tense "came" in any of these passages presents a real difficulty.[23] In the first place we may be presumed to be dealing with a translation from an Aramaic original.[24] And secondly it is quite conceivable that Christ should at times represent the coming of the Messiah as it appeared to his prophetic vision, and as it was to the mind of God—that is, as already a fact. And thirdly, I am inclined to see in the past tense a reference to the pre-existence of the Son of Man, though I believe this pre-existence to have for Christ a peculiar meaning of which I shall speak presently.[25]

I still remain sensible of the fact that to many persons the interpretation I have offered of the pas-

[23] The tense varies in the Greek from perfect to aorist: *e.g.*, Matt. vi. 19 has ἦλθεν, where in the parallel passage Luke has ἐλήλυθεν (Luke vii. 34).

[24] Whether written or oral.

[25] *Cf.* page 171.

sages we have just considered will appear strained. I may say here, therefore, that the full justification of these interpretations is, perhaps, only given by their consistency with those of other passages which I have still to notice. This first category of "passages dealing with the present activity of the Son of Man" presents difficulties which are absent from my other category. In dealing with these difficulties I think we ought not to forget a fact to which I have been so far loath to call attention. But I feel obliged to draw to it the attention of those to whom I may seem to have been putting a too forced construction upon this or that text. That fact is this: the compilers and the subsequent editors of our records, believing Christ to be the "Son of Man," and knowing this to be the title by which he always spoke of "him that is to come," must inevitably at some places have been led to make our Lord use the words as an equivalent for the pronoun of the first person. That such places do exist (among which it is possible that some of the passages which we have just been considering may belong) I will show by a notable example. The really remarkable thing is that such passages are not more numerous than they are.

In Matt. xvi. 13, according to the Authorized Version, we read, "Whom do men say that I, the Son of

Man, am?" The disciples answer to this, that some say John, some Elias, some one of the prophets. "And Simon Peter answered, Thou art the Christ the Son of the living God." Now, if we remember that "Son of Man" meant to the Jew "Messias," it is clear that in the answer of Peter we get no more than was given in the question of Christ: and since no one answers a question before he has finished asking it, it is clear that there is something amiss with the words, "I, the Son of Man, am"; and we are not surprised to learn that the best MSS. at this point offer a Greek which in English means "the Son of Man is." It is supposed that the pronoun of the first person was somehow interpolated into the inferior MSS. The explanation of this I leave to the textual critics. All I wish here to notice is that "Son of Man" and "I" (or "me") in Christ's mouth were, for the early editors of our records, more or less interchangeable terms: and it is only natural to suppose that the authors as well as the editors and copyists of the Gospels regarded them as such.

It is to be observed, also, in this connection, that occasionally the same saying of our Lord appears in more than one Evangelist, with the difference that one has, another has not, the phrase "Son of Man." A good instance of this (in which, however, I believe

the words "Son of Man" to be genuine in the Gospels in which they occur) is the remarkable passage where our Lord speake of the Sin against the Holy Ghost. St. Matthew and St. Luke offer "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him" (Matt. xii. 32=Luke xii. 10). The sense here is quite clear, if we suppose that, by "Son of Man," Christ means some one other than himself, "one that is to come." Those who blaspheme against the Messiah shall be forgiven: but it shall not be forgiven to those who blaspheme against "the Spirit of God indwelling in good men," [26] the spirit of the "Kingdom" which Messias is bringing. That Christ cannot here by "Son of Man" refer to himself is clear to anyone who puts on one side the Trinitarianism in which he has been brought up. The Holy Spirit of which Christ spoke could only have meant the spirit of God or goodness in himself (that is *ex hypothesi* in the Son of Man). A distinction between blasphemy against himself (as Son of Man) and blasphemy against the Spirit in him (as Son of Man) would have been meaningless. Something like this may have been the difficulty in the mind of the second Evangelist

[26] Samuel Butler; the whole interpretation is his.

which led him to omit from his text all reference to the "Son of Man." We may suppose him to have found the utterance, and such interpretations of it as Trinitarian faith could suggest, too hard and enigmatical. Certain it is that he only says: "All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewithsoever they shall blaspheme, but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness" (Mark iii. 28-29). To speak against the Son of Man is to be incredulous of His coming, and of the mission of Christ. In a moment of impatience and wrath our Lord turned upon His adversaries: "Reject," He seems to be saying, "Reject the Gospel of 'the coming,' sneer at My 'Son of Man': but, for the love of God, when you see a good work done before your eyes, give God the credit!" *Because they said "He hath an unclean spirit."*

(2) I now come to my second category, to the passages, that is, which speak of the coming of the Son of Man, and of the results of that coming. Nor do I think that this category need detain us long. I am bold to maintain that in it there are no utterances of Christ in which the words, "Son of Man," do not easily admit of being referred to someone other than Christ himself. I shall be surprised if most of them, indeed, if all of them, once my point of view is seized,

once we accept the conception of Christ as Forerunner of Messias, do not seem clearly to demand this reference.

I have already cited the remarkable λόγιον from Matthew x. 23, "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel before the Son of Man come." With this we may compare Matt. xvi. 28, "Some standing here shall in no wise taste of death till the Son of Man come." Look again at Mark xiii. 26, "They shall see the Son of Man coming in clouds with great power and glory." Or at Matt. xix. 28, "The regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit upon the throne of His glory." Or at Luke xviii. 8, "When the Son of Man cometh shall He find faith upon the earth?" and again at Luke xii. 40, "In an hour ye know not the Son of Man cometh." Compare lastly—examples could be multiplied endlessly, but I do not desire to serve the purposes of a concordance to the New Testament—compare Matt. xxiv. 37, "And as were the days of Noah so shall be the coming of the Son of Man." It will be said, of course, that in all these passages Christ is predicting His own second coming. But with what a strange detachment does He speak of it! how little does he seem, upon a natural reading of His words, to identify himself with the Son of Man! Is this detachment natural? Is it Hebraic? Is it possible? We

must remember also, I may repeat, that these λόγια must have undoubtedly to some extent become colored by the later beliefs of those who have recorded them. If they seem to us to contain so little which identifies Christ with the Son of Man, must they not, in all human probability, have contained even less of this character when they first issued from our Lord's lips? And what, finally, are we to make of the one or two passages in which no honest critic, as I think, can fail to feel that Christ seems actually to distinguish himself from the Son of Man? What are we to make of, "Whosoever shall be ashamed of Me and of My words, of him shall the Son of Man be ashamed when He shall come in His own glory and in His Father's and of the Holy Ghost"? (Luke ix. 26). So St. Luke, and in almost the same words St. Mark (Mark viii. 38). In a different context St. Luke presents a very similar utterance: "Whosoever shall confess Me before men, him shall the Son of Man confess before the angels of God." What are we to make of *that?*

I believe that we can make nothing of it, nor of similar passages, except upon some such hypothesis as that which I am defending. For myself, adopting, as I have said, a purely naturalistic standpoint, I think it not likely that Christ ever spoke of his own resurrection and second coming. But even those who

do not adopt this naturalistic attitude cannot but find, I think, grave difficulties in the current identification of Christ with "the Son of Man." And after all, even those who believe in the divinity of Christ yet allow that, as man, he was ignorant of many things, and in many things mistaken. Why should he not have been mistaken even with regard to the coming of the Son of Man? Because he was Son of Man must he therefore, *as man*, have been aware of it?[27] May he not have been conscious of the stirring of mighty forces in the world, of the birth of a new idea, of the advent of a new era? and, ignorant that he himself was to be the author of all this, may he not have "looked for another"? I say this for the sake of those to whom truth cannot be truth if it takes away the divinity of Christ, and because I hope that some of the conclusions in this essay may be thought true even by those to whom my naturalistic attitude generally may appear false or offensive.

I wish now to call attention to two passages in the Gospels, containing the phrase Son of Man, which on a *prima facie* view will be thought to belong to the first of my two categories, *i. e.*, to the class of

[27] Justin (*Dial. Tryph.*) mentions a Jewish tradition that the Messiah would be unaware of his own mission till he had been anointed by Elias.

passages where our Lord predicts his own death and the circumstances attending it. I believe these two passages to be wrongly placed in this category, and desire to speak briefly of what I take to be their true interpretation. In Matt. xix. 28, Christ speaks of "the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit upon the throne of his glory": and in Mark ix. 9 (=Matt. xvii. 9) he charges his disciples to tell no man of "the vision" (his so-called transfiguration) "till the Son of Man be risen from the dead." These two passages are accepted by the faithful as prophecies of Christ concerning his own death and resurrection: and are, as such, rejected by the faithless, and marked spurious. I would ally myself with neither side. I do not believe that Christ spoke of his own death long before it occurred, or of his resurrection at all. But I do believe him to have spoken often and much of the Resurrection of the Son of Man. What then is this "Resurrection" or "Regeneration" of the Son of Man?

To answer that we must penetrate a little more deeply into the popular Messianic ideas of the time. It is supposed [28] that these ideas were largely colored by indirect Persian influences. In the Persian theology the coming of the Kingdom of Ormuzd was to

[28] *e.g.*, by Renan.

be preceded by the coming of two prophets. In an exactly similar way the coming of the Messiah, according to popular Jewish notions in the time of our Lord, was to be preceded by the coming of two prophets. Very remarkable is the manner of the coming of these prophets. *They are to be raised from the dead,* to undergo a παλιγγένεσις. To what an extent this expectation of the rising of a prophet, or prophets, from the dead was in the air at the time we see from a number of places in the Gospels. "He asked them saying, Whom say the people that I am? They answering said, John the Baptist: though some say Elias, and others that *one of the old prophets is risen again.*" With this we may compare Luke xvi. 31: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." As to who the prophets were that should precede the Messiah, opinion was not settled. "And those that are dead I will raise up again out of their places," says the Book of Esdras (ii. 2, 13), "and bring them out of their tombs . . . for thy help will I send my servants Esaias and Jeremy." More usually the prophets put forward are Elias and either Jeremiah or Enoch. With regard to Elias there was a practical consensus of opinion: Elias must first come. I should now like in the light of these facts

to examine the remarkable passage of St. Mark's Gospel from which I excerpted the first of my two references to the resurrection of the Son of Man. "And as they came down from the mountain he charged them that they should tell no man what they had seen till the Son of Man be risen from the dead. And they kept that saying with themselves, questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should mean. And they asked him saying, Why say the scribes that Elias must first come? And he answered and told them, Elias verily cometh and restoreth all things . . . I say unto you that Elias is indeed come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed, as it is written of him" (Mark ix. 9-13).

The importance of these verses is twofold. In the first place, the disciples ask, *not*, Why say the scribes Elias must come before the Son of Man? but, Why say they he must come *before the resurrection of the Son of Man?* Read the verses carefully, and there is no doubt of it. Remember also that this resurrection of the Son of Man is mentioned in the same breath with the coming (=resurrection) of Elias. Can we doubt, that being so, that Christ imagined the Messiah would come into the world by being raised from the dead, by a παλιγγένεσις similar to that which was

always predicted for Elias?[29] The Son of Man whom Christ awaited was, we cannot but suppose, some great person of Jewish history who was to be raised from the dead. Who, to Christ, that person was it is idle to speculate. He would hardly be one of the prophets: two prophets preceding a third is not a sufficiently dramatic progression. Nor, again, was he to be one of the house of David. "How say the Jews," Jesus asks his disciples, "that Christ is the Son of David?" and in the popular exegetical manner of the day he proves that this cannot be so. Further than this we cannot go toward identifying the Person, the vision of whose *palingenesis* filled the imagination of Christ.

The second point which calls for attention, in the passage of St. Mark which I have just quoted, is this: The disciples are made to ask whether Elias must not first come. Why has the companion prophet, Enoch, Jeremiah, Isaiah, or Elisha, dropped out?[30] The answer is clear. Christ himself was this companion prophet—at that time: only later was he the Messias.

[29] See what is said of the Resurrection of Enoch and Elias in *Act. Pil.* ii. ix.=xxv. (Tischendorf)=*Nicodemus*, xx. 4 (Hone).

[30] *Cf.* John i. 21, where Elias and "the prophet" are distinguished. It should be added, however, that in Malachi iv. 5-6, Elias is mentioned alone.

The disciples, when they put the question, recognized him as one of the two prophets who were to precede the Son of Man. They imagined that Elias was *to follow Jesus*. Jesus answers, "Elias is indeed come." By those words he is most naturally (in the version of St. Mark) to be understood to identify himself and Elias. Only in a later age did it come to be thought that by Elias he referred to John. "Then the disciples understood that he spoke unto them of John the Baptist," adds St. Matthew (Matt. xvii. 13). Here again, as in so many places, the excellence and antiquity of Mark is attested by the fact that he spares us this well-meant gloss. That Elias should come second of the two prophets is not unnatural from two points of view. On the one hand, he would thus have a pre-eminence as Finisher and Perfecter. On the other hand, the prophet most generally associated with him was probably Enoch: and this gives a chronological fitness.

Christ, then, is a herald of the Resurrection or Palingenesis of the Son of Man and his kingdom. He is one of two such heralds, the other being, of course, John. He seems to have regarded himself as the reincarnation of Elias,[31] and, perhaps, looked upon John as a recreation of the patriarch Enoch.

[31] *Cf. Act. Pil.* xv. (Tisch.)=*Nicod.* xi. 1-3, 22 (Hone).

The Son of Man was to rise from the dead,[32] to come with clouds of glory and to end the world. Nor is this coming distant—neither the immediate disciples nor Paul were mistaken in thinking that Christ spoke of an imminent end. It is we who are mistaken when, to save the credit of Christ's astrophysics, we add this further accusation of stupidity to the burden of all those others which we have heaped upon disciples and evangelists. I will add yet a few more words upon this point. "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come." That is an utterance which could not be mistaken, and that can have come from no one but Christ. If it be urged that the verse is a later addition, I rejoin that it is the last kind of thing anyone would have dreamed of inserting. When the second coming of Christ had been so long expected in vain, when already it was begun to be said that Christ had spoken only of a distant coming, where in all the Churches would there be found the man to insert such a verse? What is

[32] Christ may even have added "on the third day," a mystic formula with which we may compare Daniel vii. 25 (*cf.* xii. 7), "until a time and times and the division of a time,"—a monstrous circumlocution for "a little while." The parallel from Hosea vi. i. 2 has often been cited: ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τριτῃ ἀναστησόμεθα is the Septuagint version of it, with which compare the Greek of Luke xviii. 33 (*cf.* Luke xiii. 32).

surprising is that in this period of distressed faith the verse was allowed to survive. For very early in the history of the Church there undoubtedly arose a body of Christian theologians who set themselves down to obscure, to the best of their power, the *apocalyptic* nature of Christ's teaching—to hide the fact that he spoke of an immediate end. It is to these persons, or their influence, that we owe the present condition of the thirteenth chapter of St. Mark, the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew, and the twenty-first chapter of St. Luke. These three chapters all embody what is roughly one and the same discourse—a discourse purporting to be a discourse of Christ, but shown not to be so by the fact that it contains an unmistakable prophecy of the Fall of Jerusalem. That this discourse does not embody a good many genuine λόγια of Christ I should judge it rash, or even false, to assert. But these λόγια have been "worked up," and worked up for a very definite object. What that object is may be easily seen. "All these things shall come to pass, but *the end is not yet*" (Matt. xxiv. 6). "For such things must be, but *the end is not yet*" (Mark xiii. 7). "These things must first come to pass, but *the end is not by and by*" (Luke xxi. 9). Contrast with all this—"Ye shall not have gone over the cities of

Israel till the Son of Man be come," and it is clear at once that the eschatological discourse given in the thirteenth chapter of St. Mark, and more or less reproduced in St. Matthew and St. Luke, is, in its present form, the work of some faithful Christian, in the second or third generation after Christ, who is endeavoring to lie for Christ that Christ may not appear to have lied to the world: who is offering to those who had waited in vain for an instant coming the consolation of knowing that it had never been promised to them. If we knew the thoughts and feelings of the last survivors of the Apostolic Age, as one by one they passed away not having seen the coming of the Lord, we should judge tenderly this "pious fraud," this lie for Christ.

But the end which Christ had in view *was* "by and by." "Let your loins be girded about and your lights burning." "The Son of Man cometh even as a thief in the night." "As the lightning that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven shineth unto the other part of heaven, so shall also the Son of Man be in his day." "Be ye therefore ready also: for the Son of Man cometh at an hour ye think not."

It is in the light of these, and similar, sayings that we are to interpret the only "sign" which our Lord was willing to vouchsafe to the Pharisees.

"Then certain of the scribes and Pharisees answered, saying, Master, we would see a sign from thee." And he answered, and said unto them, "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign: and there shall be no sign given unto it save the sign of the prophet Jonas." So far St. Matthew, in general agreement with St. Luke (Matt. xii. 38-39; Luke xi. 29). But St. Luke continues: "For as Jonas was a sign unto the Ninevites, so also shall the Son of Man be to this generation." This is not an explanation, it is merely an amplification. St. Matthew continues: "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." We may admire the ingenuity of "Matthew's" exegesis and yet go elsewhere for our interpretation. If we want to know what the sign of Jonas is we must go to the Book of Jonas, where, in the third chapter and the fourth verse, it stands written, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown." Jesus, like Jonas, is a prophet of the immediate coming of the end.[38]

[38] Since writing this I have read the Abbé Loisy's *Church and Gospel.* Section ii. of that work brings out well the apocalyptic character of the "Kingdom of Heaven," and gives some additional illustrations from the parables and words of Christ generally.

V

I now come to the thesis toward which all that I have so far said has been leading. Only the intense and fierce conviction of the immediate coming of the "Kingdom of Heaven," and the end of all things, could have given birth to the ethical system formulated, or adumbrated, by Christ. Only by recognizing this conviction as the dominant thought in Christ's mind can we rightly either understand, or appraise, his moral teaching.

The justness of this thesis ought indeed to be apparent as soon as it is put into words. It has never hitherto, so far as I know, been put into words because the criticism of Christianity upon the ethical side has scarcely yet begun.[1] The critical movement which began with Strauss some sixty years ago has in its development become almost purely historical. The more this historical criticism has found acceptance, the more closely, as a consequence, have those who accepted it clung to ethical Christianity. Robbed of the Christ of prophecy and miracle, they have all the more eagerly taken refuge with the

[1] In saying this I do not forget the criticisms of Haeckel. Many of these are trenchant: but there is a narrowness of view, and a bitterness of heart about them, in virtue of which they will always give offense and never carry persuasion.

Christ of the Sermon on the Mount. They have doubted of everything in Christianity except its ethical teaching: to doubt of that would be "to carry doubt to the verge of self-annihilation." As a matter of fact it is not so much that these persons fear to carry their criticism to its logical conclusion as that it has never occurred to them to do so. They have been brought up on the teaching of the Gospel; they drew it in with their mother's milk: they are surrounded with institutions based upon it: "our fathers hoped in thee." And it thus comes about that even the most enlightened of them can blithely and assuredly tell us that the central thing in Christianity is "not the incarnation, but the imitation, of Christ." [2] In the Christianity that is to be we shall hear still, I hope, a good deal of the imitation, but more also of the *limitation* of Christ.

For unless we are to allow an utterly fundamental contradiction (such as Renan seems to hint at) in the very heart of Christ's teaching, I do not see how we can escape the necessity of wholly revising our view of Christian ethics. Renan (*Vie de Jésus*, xvii. *ab. init.*) seems to see in Christ's conception of the "Kingdom of Heaven," a confusion of three ideas: the idea of an earthly triumph of a democracy of

[2] Matthew Arnold, *Literature and Dogma.*

paupers, the idea of an internal Kingdom of God, the idea of a purely *apocalyptic* Kingdom. That the third of these, which, as I think I have shown, was Christ's main idea, often travels away into hints and suggestions of the other two I do not deny, though I am extremely skeptical about the democracy of paupers. The two first tinge the third, it may be, with an occasional shade of inconsistency: but except for that the apocalyptic idea is paramount. For I ask, "Can any moralist, firmly persuaded of the imminent dissolution of the world and all things in it, frame an ethical code adequate for all time?" [3] This question really answers itself: but I will none the less try to show, very briefly, the extent to which Christ's main apocalyptic idea dominates his moral teaching.

We come at once to the heart of that teaching when we see, as we may see everywhere, the kind of disciples which Christ demands. "If any man come

[3] I anticipate the objection, "It has proved adequate"; and I rejoin:—1. We do not really live by this code: that in it which we do not like we call "hyperbole," and leave alone. 2. A wrong morality becomes right at many points when it has subsisted 1900 years. 3. Many things in Christianity which we do accept are bearing us rapidly along to social dissolution: I will only instance here that "fostering of the feebles" against which the best voices in the land have been lately, but perhaps too late, loudly raised.

to me and hate not his father and his mother and wife[4] and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke xiv. 26; *cf.* Matt. x. 37). Is that a parable? is that a "Jewish hyperbole"? is that an "impassioned metaphor"? We do not indulge in "impassioned metaphor" when we are waiting every moment for the day of judgment. No, it was not a metaphor: (we know too well how literally his hearers always took our Lord). What are wife and children, parents and brethren, to men upon whom, ere they can traverse all the cities of Israel, the Kingdom of Heaven will have come? He who would "save his life" (*i. e.* continue to live under the old family, social, and political conditions) must inevitably, in "the coming of the Son of Man," "lose it": but "whosoever will lose his life for my sake the same shall find it." The message of Christ to every man is that he shall *lose his life.* He is not only to give up some things, but he is—literally and not in a metaphor—to give up all, all that makes life what it is and worth living. He is, in the phrase of St. Paul, to "hide his life with Christ in God." No so-called duty is sacred whether toward the living or toward

[4] "And some there are that have become eunuchs for the Kingdom of God's sake."

the dead. The disciple must leave his living father to "shift for himself" in his old age, and he must leave his dead father to get buried as best he may. "Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father. Jesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their dead;[5] but go thou and preach the Kingdom of God" (Luke ix. 60). Can anyone reading *that* imagine Christ to be speaking in metaphors? Could anything more convey the impression of a grim and brutal literalness? No wonder that he said he had not come to bring peace upon earth, and that a man's foes should be those of his own household! (Luke xii. 51; Matt. x. 35). That hard saying, again, to the young man who "had great possessions" (in which a misguided philanthropy has seen a precept to promiscuous almsgiving), is of the same order as the precept to let dead men bury themselves: "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give it to the poor, and come and follow me" (Matt. xix. 21; Mark x. 21). The cardinal thing here is not the giving to the poor: one could point to passages where Christ even seems to discountenance that: the poverty of the poor is but a little thing in view of the instant end of all things: the cardinal thing is the getting rid of one's riches, the *losing of one's life:* the giving

5 "Let him bury himself."

to the poor is only the means to this end which is readiest and most obvious. *If thou wilt be perfect!* Here we see the meaning of that other impossible precept spoken upon the Mount, "Be ye, therefore, perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 48). To be "perfect" means to have broken with all human ties, and to expect of life nothing but the end of it, *i. e.*, the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven. "Take no thought for your life what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on." Is not the Kingdom of Heaven at hand?

Such is to be the outward condition of the disciple whom Christ demands. He must be without home, family, friends, money, food, clothing: these are the external symbols of "perfection." His internal life is to consist of poverty of spirit, mourning, meekness, the hunger for righteousness, mercy, purity, love of peace (Matt. v. 3-9). "The poor in spirit are blessed, for the Kingdom of Heaven belongs to them," *i. e.*, they may "count the sufferings of this present time as nought" when they reflect upon the nearness of the end. "The mourners are blessed for they shall be comforted," *i. e.*, in the swift coming of the Kingdom the quick and the dead, the mourned-for dead, shall be one. What the

hunger for righteousness, and what purity mean, in the system of Christ, we may see clearly from that "Jewishly hyperbolical" command—"If thy hand offend thee cut it off, if thine eye [6] offend thee pluck it out." The "perfect" will gladly enter the Kingdom of Heaven maimed or blind, if that be the price. And what meekness, mercy, love of peace mean, in the system of Christ, we may learn, again, from the words of Christ himself: "But I say unto you that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also: and if any man will sue thee at law and take away thy coat, offer him thy cloak also: [7] and whosoever shall compel thee to go with him a mile, go with him twain: give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not away." [8]

There is no one who does not know that these precepts, literally pursued, mean, in any age, the dissolution of what is called society: and so we approve them with our lips but not with our lives. But

[6] Pericles (in Plutarch) said to Sophocles: "One should have not only pure hands but pure eyes." *Cf.* Tertullian *Apologet.* 46: "At Christianus salvis oculis feminam videt." See the whole chapter.

[7] Compare the words of the Baptist: "He that hath two cloaks let him impart unto him that hath none." (Luke iii. 11).

[8] Is there no end to these Jewish hyperboles? Note also the climax.

they were meant to govern, they did govern, the *lives* of those to whom they were addressed. What are blows, coats, money, to men before whose eyes floats ever the vision of the end of the world and the day of the Son of Man? "Blessed are they who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness, for the Kingdom of Heaven belongs to them." The end is "by and by": it is but "a little while," and "then shall the King say . . . Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Matt. xxv. 34).

I think I have said enough to show how necessary it is in interpreting the moral ideas of Christ to have our attention always fixed on his apocalyptic ideas. Behind all his words and thoughts there is the vision of the Son of Man who will be present with clouds of glory and with the angels of his Father before a man can "go through all the cities of Israel." Christ died without seeing this day of the Son of Man: like those of whom St. Paul spoke, he "died in faith": he was of that blessed company of enthusiasts who believe though they have not seen. Something like a doubt, indeed, seems to have passed through his mind as he hung, in mortal weakness, upon the Cross. He who had borne to be left alone of all men seemed to feel himself at length left alone

by God: "My God, my God, why hast thou deserted me?" His life's work appeared a failure. "It is finished," he said, in the bitterness of that thought. He had hoped to be rapt away into Heaven with a glory of clouds in the train of the Son of Man: and he was left hanging on the Cross! It was finished: all was finished: apparent earthly failure could go no further. The end of all things had not come, and men had not believed. Could Christ in that last hour have foreseen the future of the gospel he had preached, the burden which he bore upon the Cross would perhaps not have been lightened. Could he return to earth to-day would he find any comfort? To find his name above all names would move but little one who taught that we must receive the Kingdom as little children, and that he who was greatest in it was least. He who washed the disciples' feet would repudiate the worship of a kneeling world. Would he look upon our churches, and the laborers in them, and upon the friends of his gospel without the church, and say: "It is finished: it is all done with: vain is my faith, and my preaching also vain. I looked for a day of the Lord which should be 'by and by.' It came not, it comes not, it will not come. Looking to that day, and away from all things else, I preached that a man should hate father and mother,

should cast from him all the gifts of fortune and should abase himself in the dust; should cease for the brief time remaining to be a *man*, since in a little while he was to become as the Angels of God. In vain was my life, empty my preaching, to no end my faith, void my death."

No: it is not, I think, in this way that Christ would speak if he again "became flesh and tabernacled among us." To many, I know, it will seem that the conclusions set forth in this Essay, should they be correct, would not only justify but necessitate such a judgment as I have here imagined Christ to pass upon his work. Had I thought that was true I should not have written what I have written. But because I know that some will think it true, I wish to indicate briefly wherein it seems to me that the life and preaching of Christ were *not* vain.

In the life of Christ we have the picture of a life spent in a struggle with the powers of darkness, a struggle against the powers of him whom Christ, still under the dominion of popular Hebraic ideas, calls Satan. The end alike of Christ's preaching and his healing is the overthrow of Satan. "I beheld," he says to his disciples, when they return from their successful mission, "I beheld Satan as

lightning falling from Heaven." And, similarly, the "crooked woman" whom he heals he speaks of as "this woman . . . whom Satan hath bound" —Satan being the author of all disease, not of "possession" alone. Christ's mission is, by the exercise of "the spirit of God," to defeat Satan and his angels. "By the spirit of God" he casts out devils, and it is the possession of this spirit, and its exercise, that is one of the signs of the coming of the Kingdom (Matt. xii. 28). "I will put my spirit upon him"—"the spirit of the Lord is upon me," Isaiah had said: and it is by faith in this spirit that Christ works against the legions of evil spirits which he believed to encompass the steps of men. No wonder that this spirit, the author of all man's best endeavors, is that against which to blaspheme is the unforgivable sin!

In this battle against the powers of darkness, Christ is limited by the fact not only that the forces opposed to him are so great, but that the time permitted to him is so short. The Son of Man may be here at any moment. Christ's whole powers are thus within a very brief period exercised to their utmost to win back from the kingdom of Satan to the kingdom of God as many souls as possible.

It is the contemplation of this strife, this intense

war between the spirit-of-God-in-man and the spirit of Satan, that gives so high a value to the study of the life of Christ. For in all progress what is really valuable, what is truly motive or impulsive, is personality, is the spectacle of glorious human energies directed not, it may be, to the right in fact but to the right in faith. What is wanted is that a man should throw himself upon what he believes, and become one with it. And in no other great man do we find the effort of the spirit toward good so intense, so pure, so constant as in Christ; and this not so much on account of what he brought with him as because of what he left behind him. He so left behind him all that was alien and hampering that he saw all things with the "single eye," the whole of him was "full of light." Oneness of purpose and freedom of spirit were his shield and buckler. If it be objected that he directed this divine energy upon an ideal that will no longer bear examination, I rejoin: That is in part true, but in large part false; and in any case to ask concerning a great religious teacher, "Is his immediate teaching true or false?" is as impertinent as to ask it of a great poet. Such questions are questions which only the foolish ask about the great. I would as soon ask of Shakespeare, "Is what he says true?" as ask it of Christ. I recognize in the life of Christ

the struggle of the spirit-of-God-in-man toward good, and that is enough for me.

This unique and potent personality, then, we cannot too intently contemplate. I say *personality* advisedly, and not *person*. The *person* of Christ has passed forever from the earth, "the clouds have received him." They are foolish Galileans who think to-day to recall it. "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven?" We can never know Christ as the Middle Ages, with their vigor of faith and defect of history, thought to know him. He can never be to us a person, a friend. He who called himself father and mother and brother of whoever should do the will of God can be all that to us *only ideally*. We can feel the exhortation of his personality, the impulse of his spirit: but we cannot, as we fain would, lavish on his person the devotion of intimacy.[9]

Are we left, then, with nothing but a shadowy personality lost in a transcendent effort toward a mistaken ideal? Have the words and thoughts of

[9] I may mention in this connection that what seems to me to be the grand defect of a book to which I once owed much, *Literature and Dogma*, is, that the center of the new Christianity with which Arnold would replace the old is just this unknowable thing—the Person of Christ. One great merit of Jowett is his recognition of the unknowableness of Christ as a Person.

Christ no longer for men to-day any value, and significance? God forbid! as St. Paul would say. I certainly am far from thinking that, and for this reason—To all great spirits their ideals are largely mysterious, and the thoughts and speech in which they endeavor to embody them are always of wider import and extension than they themselves are aware. The words, even of the wisest, are as often as not "wiser than those that use them." Particularly is this true in the case of great ethical or religious spirits; and it is more than all true in the case of Christ. His ideal, as he formulated it, was not a human ideal, but a heavenly ideal. He did not wish to give men "something to live by," but something wherewith to face the day of the Son of Man. The question he tried to answer was not *πῶς βιωτέον;* but *πῶς ἀθανατιστέον;* He thought that the way to God was away from men, or perhaps rather away with men from all the ordinary conditions of human society. The saints of his "Church" (though he had no "Church") were to make themselves, as later, through St. Paul, they boasted themselves to be, "the filth of the world and the offscourings of all things" (1 Cor. iv. 13). Yet at the same time he had moved too much in the society of human beings of all descriptions, had entered too deeply into their

feelings, knowing what was in them and loving them, not to dwell constantly in his thoughts on the problems of society as it existed before him, and to let fall constantly precepts applicable, not to the ideal disciple who had "left all," but to the casual hearer of the word who, having heard, returned to the cares of this life. It is impossible to legislate for angels without at the same time affording useful lessons to those who legislate for the children of the world.

For this reason the moral precepts of Christ do not all fall under one category. We may, I think, recognize three different classes of precept. There are, firstly, the "precepts of perfection," as I may call them—as when he said: "Sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and come, follow me"; or as when he said, "He that cometh unto me and hateth not his father and his mother . . . is not worthy of me." There is, secondly, a class of precepts which stands midway between these "precepts of perfection" and the morality of every-day life; precepts addressed indeed to the "perfect" disciples, but yet colored (unconsciously) with the thought of the hearers lost in the cares of the world: precepts which may be described as the exaggerations of all the ordinary virtues: as when he said, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them

that hate you, pray for them that despitefully use you": or as when he said, "Whoso looketh upon a woman with an eye to lust after her hath already committed adultery.[10] Men in a world of men cannot live by these precepts: but they can, and must, live toward them. Thirdly, and lastly, in many of his sayings Christ seems to forget the angels, and speak to men as such. Some men he does not try to make saints of. He lets be the scribe who asked him, "Which is the first commandment?" "Thou are *not far*," he said, "from the Kingdom of God." For such men he again and again lets fall practical precepts, as when he says, "If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way: first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift"; or as when he says, "When thou doest thine alms do not make thy coin ring in the box like a trumpet, as the hypocrites do . . . let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth."

[10] I call this a "precept" because it is so in spirit, though not in form. I choose it (in preference to some precepts in form) because it is a typical Christian exaggeration. Few would be saved were the sentence true: and what would become of the virtue of the ἐγκρατής? Do not most of us prefer the ἐγκρατής to the σώφρων?

And apart from these distinctions, we cannot be too often reminded of many things of which *all* the Gospel precepts remind us—of the transitoriness of earthly things, the sorrows of the world, the uncertainty of riches, the need for simplicity, the folly of arrogance, the sin of cruelty, the necessity of what Christ calls love, or "charity": Christ speaks of all these "as never yet man spake," and speaks still "with authority and not as the scribes," *i.e.*, not as the professors of moral philosophy. He has "touched" them all with an "emotion" of which we can only say that we know not what it is, but that it is the spirit of Christ, and something that we are all still endeavoring, each in his own way, to realize in our lives: something which invites and attracts, as nothing else does, with the promise of a peace of the heart amid all adversities and all temptations: "Come unto me, all ye that travail and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

Of the gospel of love or charity, as set forth by Christ, and as developed by the Fourth Evangelist and by St. Paul, I feel obliged, since I have classed it with the permanent part of Christ's teaching, to say a few words by way of caution or monition. In such a universal extension of it as Christianity proposes, this gospel of love is impossible of acceptance,

Not only is it not possible to love everybody, but the more we love everybody the less are we likely to love those to whom our love is in the first instance due. There are, moreover, some injuries which men, who are men, cannot forgive, as, for example, some wrongs done to a parent, or a sister, or an insult offered to the dead. There is also a something called "self-respect" or "honor," which, though it be responsible for many follies, is yet a most "subtle master" to teach many virtues. A universal charity which would have us "turn the other cheek" abolishes this self-respect or honor. And in general, the moral judgment, which, as men, we pass upon men, is that which holds society together.[11] This moral judgment cannot co-exist with universal love. It is true that if we knew this or that man—knew the whole of him, that is—we should judge him in particular circumstances differently from what we do; or, as it has been expressed, "to know all is to forgive all." It is thus possible, and useful, to view the command to love as the command to acquire knowledge. The cause of wars and battles, and of strife between individuals, of most of the hate and rancor in the world, is the inability, or unwillingness, of

[11] τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ξυμμένει ἡ πόλις.
Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, 1132, *b.*

men to enter into one another's feelings, to get to know one another. The highest wisdom is that which can see into, and know, the hearts of men. That wisdom was Christ's pre-eminently: he *knew* what was in men and *loved* them. This insight, this love born of knowledge, he acquired when he sat down to eat with publicans and sinners. He sat down to eat with them, and he "judged no man." We who have to live in society cannot "judge no man." But we can, and must, remember that human justice is but a rough-and-ready expedient; that the sinner is, perhaps, in the eye of perfect justice, not the aggressor, but the victim; that a man's real life is something hidden. St. Paul speaks of the "life hidden with Christ in God," and that phrase, perhaps, better expresses than anything else the secret of the peace which is to be had in the religion of Christ. When "our life is hidden with Christ in God," we are raised above the moral judgments of men; their condemnation and their praise alike cannot touch us; the Kingdom of God (whether as wrath or as rest) is within us. So also in judging others, we need to remember that each man has that in him which *our* judgment cannot touch, which God alone sees and judges. By following Christ and seeking after God we become able, perhaps, more and more, by sympathy and single-

ness of heart, to see into this hidden life of our fellow-men—the life of the soul. And this insight means love, not the "watery friendship" of cosmopolitanism and philanthropy, but a love which is founded in knowledge and sustained by good sense. In some such fashion as this may we convert to our use the gospel of a universal charity.

The gospel of love is bound up with the conception of all the peoples of the earth as one great family with one Father, God. The idea of the whole earth as one great family is, perhaps, rather due to St. Paul than to Christ. Christ speaks, indeed, of many from the East and from the West who shall sit down with Abraham in the Kingdom of Heaven: yet he calls the Jews, and not these, the "children of the Kingdom" (Matt. viii. 12). It was left to the Apostle of the Gentiles to proclaim God the Father of all men: "For ye are all children of God by faith in Christ Jesus . . . there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female:[12] for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

[12] This ought not to be compared, I think, with the well-known apocryphal saying of Christ concerning the sexlessness of the children of the Kingdom, nor with the saying "they neither marry nor are given in marriage." St. Paul has in mind the distinctions in the way in which, under Roman Law, *patria potestas* affected respectively a son and a daughter.

None the less it is Christ who has taught the world to call on God as "our Father which art in Heaven . . ." He spoke of himself as the Son of God, and he spoke of others (just as St. Paul speaks of them) as sons of God. St. Luke preserves a remarkable utterance of our Lord concerning this sonship: "No man knoweth who the Father is but the Son, nor who the Son is but the Father" (Luke x. 22). Once again—*the life hidden in God!* This sonship is something mysterious and indefinable. The *Quicunque Vult* has tried to define it, and with what a result! The warrant of sonship is the possession of "the spirit of God," or the "Holy Spirit." The conception of a "Holy Spirit" is derived, in the first instance, perhaps, from the older Hebrew prophetic writings, though Christ's conception of it may owe something to the later apocryphal Jewish Scriptures. There was a great deal of theorizing about "the spirit" in the time of our Lord, as we may see from the writings of Philo Judæus. In the old Hebrew prophets "the spirit" is the power to prophesy. But in Christ's mouth it is power *both to do and to say.* "I by the Spirit of God cast out devils" —"The Holy Spirit shall teach you what to say." This Spirit is not born with a man, but it is the fruit of works. It is at once the result, and the cause, of

holiness. Its function is twofold. On the one hand it is the source of strength, and on the other the source of comfort (or counsel). The possession of this spirit and the consequent sense of sonship with God is the central and fundamental thing in the religious life. That it was made thus central and fundamental with Christ, we cannot doubt when we see how the earliest Christianity puts the doctrine of the Trinity (into which it had corrupted it) in the forefront of its system. But the Trinitarianism of Christ is pure and simple and illuminating—God and the man, and the Spirit of God working in and with men, by deed and by word, toward a union of the divine and human in which "the Son goeth to his Father." Here at any rate in the teaching of Christ is something that all men can accept, something that none who have once felt the religious principle stirring in them (and no man, if we may believe Plato, can go through life without that experience) can reject. This contrast between the Trinitarianism of Christ and the Trinitarianism of Christianity may serve to illustrate the contrast at all points between the freedom of spirit which Christ achieved, and the iron bondage in which so many of his disciples still live. Here again St. Paul, with his signal largeness of mind, has penetrated to the center of

the mind of Christ. Christ came to liberate the human spirit from a dual servitude, from the bondage of sin and from the bondage of the law. Of the freedom from the bondage of sin which Christ brought I have already said sufficient for my purpose. He who has "hidden his life in God" has passed out of condemnation: he has lost his life and thereby found it. As St. Paul expresses it, "There is therefore, now, no condemnation for them that are in Christ Jesus: for *the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus* hath made me free from the law of sin and of death." For St. Paul, indeed, "sin came by the law," and bondage to the one is, in a sense, bondage to the other. For Christ bondage to the law is something different and separate. The law was given "because of the hardness of our hearts." But he upon whom God has "put his spirit," he who has become as a little child toward the Kingdom, he who is pure and meek and poor in spirit—such an one has left behind him the "hardness of heart," the insensibility to goodness, which belongs to the many, and because of which Moses gave the law. Such an one is free from the law: indeed he is the lord of it rather than the servant: or, perhaps, we may say, he lives to it not as a thrall, but as a friend. Christ did not come, as he says himself, to destroy the law:

he is a Jew speaking among Jews as a Jew. "Not one jot or tittle of the law shall pass away till these things happen." What he came to destroy was the false interpretation of the law, the formalism and rigidity which the "tradition of the elders" had infused into it. "Why do ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?" Religious progress is determined by the interpretation which each succeeding generation gives of the law delivered to it by the generation which went before. He who fetters the freedom of this interpretation is fighting against Religion and against God. The true interpretation of the law is that put upon it by the Spirit, "the Holy Spirit," which is the free Spirit, "the Spirit of God indwelling in good men."

Can any one, reflecting on these things, fail to perceive a certain analogy between the manner in which the law was interpreted in our Lord's day and the manner in which the Gospels are interpreted in our own? The Church has so fenced round with tradition the New Law that few are able, and few care to attempt, to bring to bear on the interpretation of it a free and fresh spirit. Few see the life and teaching of Christ with their own eyes: and perhaps that is why so few live by it. We hear to-day a great deal of talk on all hands about the prevailing

want of Religion. Such complaints have not been wanting in all ages, and need not surprise anyone. But in particular a great deal is said about the irreligion of young men. That young men are irreligious is a belief that could, I think, proceed only from persons who have lived very little among them. That they appear irreligious is due to the fact that the religion they are offered, and which they reject (for that is what it amounts to) is offered in the wrong form. If it be thought that they are the victims of a vulgar Rationalism, that also is, in the main, false. Young men, as a whole, do not live by the intellect and by reason: with some justice, they pity those who do. For the most part they live by feeling and impulse. Their objection to Christianity is *not intellectual, but moral.* It is the whole tone, temper, and sentiment of the traditional theology which distresses them. They do not say, in so many words, "Precepts framed two thousand years ago with direct reference not to life, but to the end of it, framed for a world about to perish, can have no value for us who 'shall live and not die.' ('The living, the living, he shall praise thee!') Can we, who ever crave 'more life and fuller,' submit to become 'as the filth of the world and the offscourings of all things'? Can you ask us, in the midst of a world

of breathing men, a world of beauty and desire, to make ourselves 'fools for Christ's sake'?" They do not use these words: but if instincts were words I think they would. They feel the unreality, the unserviceableness for life, of the traditional Christian ideal. We must remember also, that they take their Christianity not from Christ only, but from Paul: and those who experience "intellectual difficulties" more, perhaps, from Paul than from Christ. And they find patent in the teaching of Paul many doctrines which were only latent in that of Christ. In particular they encounter everywhere in Paul the rigid antithesis between flesh and spirit. They bear to be told that "the flesh profiteth nothing," "in my flesh dwelleth no good thing": and they assent with their lips and dissent with their lives. They are creatures with bodies which they take pleasure in: they are creatures with instincts and impulses which the spirit that is in them pronounces healthy (or "holy"), and they have heard other voices—

> *"Write it in blood upon a rose-leaf scroll:*
> *All wisdom I found hidden in the bowl,*
> *All answers to all questions saving one,*
> *'Which is the body, and which is the soul?'"*

So that when they hear from Paul that "the flesh

warreth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, for these two are contrary the one to the other," I should not be greatly surprised, or even shocked, if they retorted upon him that

" The soul is but the senses catching fire."

They want a religion which shall be purged of everything which is not " something to live by " and for. They desire a Christianity adapted to the wants, not of angels, but of men. They need a new *Imitatio Christi*, such, perhaps, as that which Benjamin Jowett projected, " a new Thomas à Kempis, going as deeply into the foundations of life, and yet not revolting the common-sense of the twentieth century," combining " in a manual of piety, religious fervor with perfect good sense and knowledge of the world." [13] Such a work as Jowett has here in mind (and it was a work that no one would have been better fitted than himself to accomplish had he added —as I fear he did not—to the love of truth that of candor) such a work as this is what our times are waiting for. Already, indeed, something has been done toward the writing of such a work. Already, from within the Church, voices are heard proclaim-

[13] *Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett*, ii. 151-152.

ing the limitations of Christianity as formulated by Christ. Already we are growing accustomed to hear from the pulpit more of good sense and of the wisdom of life. Great truths, of which Christ never dreamed, are put forward as truths of the Gospel. Teaching diametrically opposed to, is now "reconciled" with, that of Christ. Words of Christ, which were false or mistaken, are being left on one side or explained away. We are being told that "Christianity is progressive" (which means that the mind of man is progressive and has grown out of a good deal that is in Christianity), and that, though "Christ abideth forever," he is not "the same yesterday, to-day and for all time." Though with all this there is mixed up a good deal of dissimulation and want of frankness, though there is too much compromise and too little courage with it, though to moral fervor there is not added perfect intellectual honesty, yet some progress has undoubtedly been made toward a reconstruction of Christianity. What is wanted now daily is more of the *free spirit*, which I will venture to call, even in this connection, the Holy Spirit. We need all of us (to employ a phrase of Hegel) to "fight under the banner of the free spirit," that we may be delivered from the bondage of the New Law.

VI

I cannot part from my subject without saying a word or two about the great Apostle who was really the first interpreter of Christ to the world, and who, in a sense, made Christianity. In the Kingdom of Heaven (if that be not wholly a "dream of the heart and a cry of desire") there can be few greater than Paul. In the pages of the New Testament three great and commanding personalities stand out clearly above all others—John the Baptist, Jesus Christ, St. Paul. I will try very briefly, by way of conclusion, to set these three in relation to one another, and show what degree of continuity and development there is between them. In so doing I shall in part be summarizing what I have already said of the relation of Jesus to John: but I hope at the same time to be adding certain ideas which before I had not opportunity to develop.

The New Testament begins with John the Baptist. It would, perhaps, have been more appropriate had the Old Testament ended with him. The message of John is the last rallying cry of Judaism—by which I mean pure Judaism. Judaism had long been without a voice of its own. The contemporaries of John interpreted, they did not create. They were

not speakers, but commentators. Even the creators of the literature of the Apocrypha were not voices, but echoes. In John, Judaism spoke for the last time in tones independent and authentic. John does not say, "This is he of whom Esaias spake": he proclaims the Messiah according to his own vision, the Messiah of John, not that of Esaias, nor another. He is the last of the Prophets and not the first of the Evangelists.

The necessity which lay upon the first Christians of finding an Elias for their Messiah[1] led them to put forward John as the Forerunner of Christ. They were thus obliged, while obscuring the true greatness of John, to treat him with respect. That they have distorted some of the facts concerning him cannot, I think, be doubted. How they have obscured the relationship of disciple to master in which Jesus stood to John, I have already shown. But they have also, I fear, in order to make complete the parallel between John and Elijah, departed in some other details from historical accuracy. Elijah sojourned in the desert: so therefore must John: had not

[1] They had to be content with an Elias, though current Jewish notions perhaps demanded a second prophet. The manner in which the Gospels dispense with this second prophet is very striking.

Isaiah, moreover, spoken of "one crying in the wilderness, Make ready the way of the Lord"? That John, like Christ himself, withdrew often to the mountain and the moorland, to "a desert place," for the sake of that nearer communion with God which solitude seems often to afford—to be "alone with the Alone,"—and that often the multitude followed him to these retreats, as they did Jesus, and "pressed upon him to hear the word," that daily also, large crowds were baptized in Jordan—all this there is no reason to doubt. Yet that the main field of John's prophetic activity lay "in the wilderness of Judæa" is, I think, not credible. The place of the prophet is not the wilderness, but the market-place. The wilderness of which Isaiah spoke was the wilderness of a crooked and sinful and stony-hearted world. John's path lay, we need not doubt, through the heart of great cities, like Jerusalem and Jericho. Herod did not go into the wilderness in search of a rebuke touching his brother Philip's wife. It is the prophet who comes always to the palace of the King, and "stands before him." "*Thou* art the man: thus sayeth the Lord God of Israel . . ." We can see the Baptist standing before Herod, as Nathan stood before David, the last of the holy men of Israel who dared to rebuke mighty kings.

But we must beware of seeing anything political in the mission of John. The man whose mind was filled with the thought of the Kingdom of God and its instant coming was little likely to concern himself with the political reorganization of earthly kingdoms. John was a revolutionary just so far as *all* prophets are so. But he was not, he could not in the nature of things be, the prophet of a political creed. At the same time he no doubt appeared as such to many of his contemporaries. Indeed, Josephus tells us so in so many words: "Herod," he says, "feared lest the great influence John had over the people might put it in his power to raise a rebellion: for they seemed ready to do anything he advised" (*Antiquities*, xviii. v. 2). This, according to Josephus, was the reason of John's execution. However that may be, John was undoubtedly suspected of troubling himself about the condition of kingdoms other than heavenly. Nor can I help suspecting that his supposed political creed found him powerful friends in no less a body than the Pharisees. In this, again, I think, the Gospel record has designedly obscured historical fact. The Evangelists exhibit quite a painful anxiety to prove a hostility between John and the Pharisees. Yet many facts seem to point in a contrary direction. The prophet who re-

buked King Herod to his face (and that for a violation of the Mosaic Law) was not likely to be wholly distasteful to the Pharisees. Moreover, the Pharisees were undoubtedly among those who came to John's baptism. They did not come out of curiosity, or in search of a rebuke:—the prophet goes to such people with his rebuke, they do not come to him. The Pharisees came to be baptized: that is, they believed. St. Matthew, it is true, makes John address those of them who thus came as a "generation of vipers" (Matt. iii. 7): but in St. Luke these words are addressed, not to the Pharisees, but to the multitudes generally. St. Mark, again, speaks of "the disciples of John and the Pharisees," who "were wont to fast" (Mark ii. 18: the words are spoken in the person of the Evangelist); and this agreement in ceremonial observation may indicate a deeper agreement. When Christ is asked by the Pharisees, finally, upon what authority his baptism rests, he pleads the authority of John, and his interrogators have to appear, for the time being, satisfied.

The fact is that John, partly as being constantly in Jerusalem—the center of the Jewish world—and partly as being the protégé of powerful sects, such as that of the Pharisees, was in the eyes of the ordinary Jew of our Lord's time an infinitely greater

figure than Christ, whose work lay in the small towns of Galilee, and who outside Galilee, particularly in Jerusalem, was quite unknown.[2] This important fact the Gospels are evidently designed to obscure.

If it be asked *why* the Pharisees accepted John and rejected Christ, the answer is, I think, given in what I have already said. I do not refer to political reasons, though these doubtless weighed; but far rather to what I said earlier—that the gospel of John was pure Judaism. There were two distinct departments of Judaism—the Law and the Prophets. In contradistinction to Christ, John left the Law alone: and in the department of prophecy, to which he confined himself, he expressed a pure and independent Judaism which, because it was such, conflicted with none of the prejudices of the scribes and Pharisees.

The figure of John the Baptist has often been a subject for the painter's art. It was a favorite theme in Italian art of the sixteenth century. Of all these attempts to portray the Baptist, none (not even excepting that of Raphael) is more beautiful and delicate than that of Andrea del Sarto. But one looks at it for the first time in bewilderment. It comes as a

[2] The Pharisees could never, had they wished it, have hurried John off to execution as they did Jesus.

kind of shock. One asks oneself, "Is this John the Baptist? or is it a fancy of Bacchus? or of Antinous?" The painter, we may suppose, cared very little about John the Baptist. A beautiful picture, in obedience to the custom of the time, wanted a sacred title, and that was all. Yet the picture may speak a kind of parable to us. There are still two ideals of life between which we are, most of us, driven to and fro uncertainly, the mediæval (of which the John of the Gospels may furnish a type) and the Greek, which the John of Andrea so powerfully, indeed so alluringly, expresses. The former we *cannot* love: we have, to put it bluntly, too much good sense and too much self-respect. The latter we are *afraid* to love, lest by any chance we corrupt our souls with "the pride of life," lest we find that the "flesh and blood" which we honored "cannot inherit the Kingdom of Heaven." This picture of Andrea, which both is, and is not, the Baptist, may be allowed to suggest to us that the Greek form of life is that under which ultimately we should desire and strive to order ourselves. But we cannot enter into this kingdom of beauty by violence, but by patience and discipline and by years spent in the wilderness. The John of Andrea with his robe of gorgeous scarlet once went in desert places with a "raiment of

camel's hair about his loins." The flesh and the spirit are one, but they are a harmony in discord. We must first feel the discord before we can enter into the harmony. The Greek ideal was until John and Christ. To it succeeded the mediæval ideal. The effort of to-day seems to be toward a return to the Greek ideal:[8] only that those who return to it will find it (or make it) different, because, for long years, they have been in the wilderness.

John the Baptist came fasting. Jesus Christ came eating and drinking. Christ himself, in this very connection, warns us against deducing from differences of ceremonial differences of spirit. The ideal of Christ and the ideal of John are not to be contrasted as asceticism and humanism. Asceticism and humanism are both meaningless terms when applied to these two. Instead of being separated by pursuing, the one the ideal of asceticism, the other the ideal of humanism, John and Jesus are united by a common ideal which I may call *athanatism*:—

[8] Of the practicability of this return to Hellenism I have spoken more fully in "Christian, Greek, or Goth?" and have considerably modified the view here taken. The Greek ideal, I may here add, is an *ideal of perfection*. We must move toward it, but we cannot fly at it, and our present-day needs will be better answered, not by coquetting with Hellenism, but by endeavoring to apprehend what I call the Gothic ideal.

things of this world are coming to an end, and the world without end is upon us.

But the points of contrast between John and Jesus are not few. John, as I said, was the last of the prophets. Jesus is the first of the saints. Yet the difference is not a difference of mission, but a difference of temper. John and Jesus are alike the children of Judaism. Until Paul, Christianity and Judaism were not separate. In *mind* the Baptist and his disciple are at one.[4] But in *temper* they differ.

This difference of temper arises, to use a very modern-sounding expression, from difference of education. I cannot better figure to myself the initial disparity between John and Christ than by saying that the latter impresses us somehow as an educated, the former as an uneducated (or shall I say non-educated?) man. This impression which I receive from these two men is so forcible with me that I may be permitted (since it seems to escape the observation of so many) to dwell upon it.

The two most distinguishing characteristics which mark off the educated from the uneducated man (or which should do so) are moderation and sympathy. Of these John had neither, Christ had both. Everywhere in John we seem to observe exaggeration and

[4] I mean as regards *kind*, not in respect of *degree*.

incoherence; everywhere in Christ an enthusiasm which is strong, deep, and equable. And, touching sympathy, I think few of us would have cared to confess our sins to John! One feels that he not so readily as Jesus forgave much to them that love much. Jesus "knew what was in men, and loved them": we imagine John a little deficient both in knowledge and in love. Modesty, again, distinguishes the educated, where the education has been true: but it is not a virtue which sorts with the prophetic mission, or which we easily associate with John; but in its stead a fierce and gloomy pride. Whereas he who is still the ensample of goodness to half the world asked in all sincerity, "Why callest thou me good?" and spoke truly of himself as being "meek and lowly of heart."

Of the nature of the education which Christ received I have already said something. We can only guess at it. That he disputed with the doctors in the temple at twelve years of age we need not believe. But certain it is that he was with labor somewhere or other "instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven." He expounds the law on his own principles as one familiar with the principles of his opponents. He does not idly and ignorantly beat his head against the Mosaic ordinances. He is going to develop, not

to do away with them. His gospel was at once a gospel and a Mishna. No man can develop, though any man can abolish, that which he does not understand. Christ would not, moreover, have been so bitter against scribes and Pharisees if he had not experienced their teaching. Those who abuse universities are (witness Gibbon) those who have been educated at them. But in any case, no one, I think, can read those parts of the Gospels, where Christ is represented as arguing with his opponents, without saying to himself, "This man also was a dialectician. This is not one of the crowd who has entered the arena of argumentation in ignorance or insolence. This man was trained in the fence of words." Again and again, the scribes and Pharisees are not really answered, but are silenced, by a kind of divine σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος. Yet with all this, of course, love of truth. "Thou are not far from the Kingdom of Heaven," he says honestly to an honest opponent.

That Christ was familiar with the wisdom of the Greeks is unlikely. That he had some knowledge of the Greek language I have no doubt. There must have been not a few Greeks in Galilee, not a few in Jerusalem,[5] many in "the parts of Tyre and Sidon."

[5] The inscription on the Cross was in Latin and *Greek* and Hebrew.

We may imagine that it was in the Greek tongue that he held that very Greek dialogue with the Syro-Phenician woman (Mark vii. 26). But he was not a student of Greek thought; and that is why the Fourth Gospel is a suspect unto this day. There were, of course, a good many Greek ideas "in the air" at the time; and, of course, some scribes had a knowledge of Greek literature. Parts of the apocrypha, again, betray Greek influences. In these indirect ways, and through these impure channels, it is possible that some ideas, Hellenic in their origin, found their way into the mind of Christ. But if so, also out of it. Christ was not a Greek philosopher (as he appears in the Fourth Gospel) nor any kind of philosopher. The creators of religions never are so, or almost never. They are not philosophers because they are poets.[6] The eye of their imagination, like the eye of the poet, "glances from earth to heaven," and "bodies forth," not knowledge and system, but "the forms of things unknown"—all that eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor hitherto man's heart conceived.[7]

[6] And between the two, as Plato says, there is *παλαιόν τι μεῖχος*.

[7] I think it possible that Christ may have come, in a very mediate and indirect way, under Greek influences in Samaria. He evidently had a deep interest in and sympathy with the

However, all that I wish here to call attention to is that whereas in John we have a spiritual phenomenon of complete and utter simplicity, in Jesus we have a spiritual phenomenon of some complexity and presenting a certain paradox. Take from John his devouring enthusiasm and what do you leave him? The transport is the whole man. In Christ there is the same enthusiasm, the same "*heiliger Ernst*," only chastened somewhat: but there goes along with it a certain intellectuality, more of the "critical spirit" (including self-criticism), more of dialectic, and, lastly, more—I can find no other word—more

Samaritans. The culture and religion of these people was essentially "syncretic," and an important element in it was undoubtedly Greek. The origins of gnosticism, in a later generation, were traced to the Samaritan, Simon Magus; and, in any case, in Samaria was to be found a syncretism of Jewish, Assyrian and Hellenic ideas such as characterizes Gnosticism (*cf.* Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte,* vol. i. p. 206, *sqq.*). Josephus charges the Samaritans with the inconsistency of sometimes asserting, sometimes denying, their Jewish nationality: *Antiq.* xi. 14. 3. It is clear that their civilization was (through the Sidonians: Josephus, xii. 5.5.) so permeated with alien ideas that their claim to Jewish nationality might well seem to them doubtful. It must be remembered also that in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes they embraced the Greek cause with avidity: Joseph. *Antiq.* xii. 5. From the time, then, of the Seleucid Kings down to that of the gnostic heresy there was in the heart of Palestine a Jewish people permeated with Greek ideas: and with this people our Lord seems to have been, at different times of his life, in contact.

of good-sense, I can imagine Christ, at some touch of the magician's wand, passing into Plato: but I cannot think of John in that way. Both were mystics. If they came again to the earth, John would be a mystic still, still crying in the wilderness. But in the voice of Christ does one not fancy that one would detect a change, that one would recognize the accents of a divine common-sense? Of the two, as we know them, or guess at them, I would say that John runs by us uttering a voice loud and vehement, runs by and on, never pausing. Christ, too, utters a voice loud and vehement (yet there is pity in it and tenderness), but as he utters it he pauses a moment in his course that he may hearken to the echo in the far-away solemn hills.

Paul, "a servant of Jesus Christ," is a figure hardly less commanding than his master, not less strong to impress, not less gracious to draw to himself love. Save "in the spirit" he never knew Christ, and perhaps on this account he has understood him better than those who did; for a great man is in some sort most of a stranger to those who know him best—know him best, that is, after the flesh.

What strikes one first and most in Paul is, I think, that he was emphatically not one of Tertullian's *animæ naturaliter Christianæ*. I do not say that be-

cause he persecuted the Church of Christ: Marcus Aurelius did that, who was pre-eminently such an *anima naturaliter Christiana.* I do not say it because he began life as "a Hebrew of the Hebrews." I say it because I think we can always detect in this vehement and truly Titanic spirit, the dying, the still glowing embers of a passion and pride which the Apostle himself would have been the first to confess and condemn. He is one who has violently forced himself, crushing all his natural powers, into the spiritual condition of the Christian. The stripes which fell to him as a Christian were nothing to those which he bore to become one. But some men are born Christians, some achieve Christianity: and St. Paul was of this latter class. To the same class belongs also Augustine. Both are of the order of those, to adapt a metaphor of Aristotle, who have taken the bent bow of the spiritual life, and forced its concave to convex, though with an eye not (as in Aristotle) to ultimate straightness but to permanent convexity.

What the great "vision" was which imposed upon Paul the necessity of this utter spiritual conversion, we can never know. We know, indeed, that extremes in human nature meet, that the terror of the eagle and the meekness of the dove are, as spiritual em-

blems, never truly antithetical. We know, too, that he who persecutes a dogma or a principle may sometimes do so from an uneasy suspicion of its truth, and that doubt is the first step to truth. We know also (or we willingly fancy) that the spirit of God, like the wind, speaketh in man as it listeth: that there is some mystery in the spiritual condition of the most commonplace persons, while over the spirit of the spiritually great, there brood clouds and great darkness which none may penetrate and which only impiety would *care* to penetrate. What St. Paul saw and heard, then, upon the road to Damascus we may forbear to inquire. Something happened at which his spirit plunged suddenly from the one pole of life to the other. This is why the thought of a permanent antithesis in the human spirit, and indeed in the world, pervades all his writings: "The mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace." This antithesis was perhaps latent in the Christianity of Christ; that is to say, Christ, had he been Paul, had he been the apostle *of the Gentiles*, would have brought it more prominently forward. Now the only valuable[8] commentary upon a great

[8] *i.e.*, valuable *absolutely*. Commentaries which explain what a thinker actually thought in his own age, have a relative, but only relative, value.

thinker is to exhibit what he would have thought had he been with us, had he applied himself to our problems. That is what St. Paul does for Christ, and not only in this matter of flesh and spirit, but in other things also. This is *development*, without which nothing can live: whatever seems to live without it is dead.

There seem to me to be four points at which Paul develops upon original lines, and adds to, the Christianity of Christ.

1. The first of these is that which I was just noticing—the old wrangle of flesh and spirit. Of this I said something earlier in this essay,[9] and need add little here. What we want to know is, "What would St. Paul say of it to-day?" He would no longer, I think, represent the true spiritual condition as one in which the spirit has subdued and trampled under foot the flesh. He would speak of a *co-operation of flesh and spirit*. We are coming round to-day already to this truer conception. It may be found in Browning, one of whose great merits is that he looks the facts of these things in the face and expresses them with an obscure candor. It may be found in the sermons of educated clergymen, where *they* are found. It is a pity that these should commonly

[9] Page 202, *sqq.*

represent it (in defiance of historical accuracy) as found in Christianity. Why not say, "This is mine, this is ours: after nineteen centuries of standstill, we have moved on one step"? When there is a truer opinion and a greater frankness upon this subject which so much occupied Paul, we shall have less of a great many things that are distressing and absurd, —less of a certain carnal perplexity in young men, less of a certain kind of poetry and novel, less of a certain kind of behavior hidden from parents and sisters, but perhaps known to God. And upon this whole matter perhaps a good rule is, "*De his rebus tace, aut, si loqueris, vere loquere.*"

I suppose I should at this point say something of the meaning which St. Paul attaches to the word spirit—something about the Trinitarianism of Paul. I shall say very little, and shall base what I say on one epistle—that to the Romans—a more certainly Pauline document than any other, and a compendium of the Apostle's theology.

The Trinitarianism, then, of Paul is almost as simple as that of Christ. God is our Father, the Father of all of us, though we be slave or Scythian. Jesus Christ is his Son—"the Son of God with power *according to the spirit of holiness*" (Rom. i. 4). What, for St. Paul, is this "spirit of holiness,"

and in what relation does it stand to "the spirit of God" by which Jesus cast out devils? The best answer to that is contained in the eighth chapter of this Epistle to the Romans. In the sixteenth verse of that chapter St. Paul says, "The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are sons of God." Who is this Spirit that "beareth witness"? It is *the Spirit-of-God-in-Christ*. In the ninth verse St. Paul says, "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his." In this last verse the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ are one and the same, except that this distinction has to be made: The Spirit of God dwells in Christ absolutely: but to us it can only come through Christ: we can never have the Spirit of God in itself, but only the spirit of God in Christ—it comes to us through Christ. This is what Paul means when in v. 26 he says, "The Spirit itself maketh intercession for us, and he that searcheth the hearts (*i.e.*, God) knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit" (*sc.*, of Christ). The Spirit of Christ (*i.e.* the-Spirit-of-God-in-Christ) is mediator between us (our spirit) and the spirit of God in itself, absolutely. By "our spirit" St. Paul seems to mean that in every human being there is a sort of neutral

spirit—a δύνήμις τῶν ἐναντίων—which may be developed toward righteousness or away from it, toward life or death, according as we move to or from Christ. "And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life (has passed from a δύναμις to an ἐνέργεια) because of righteousness" (v. 10). There are thus three kinds of spirit: the absolute spirit of God, the mediating Spirit-of-God-in-Christ, the neutral human spirit which can ally itself with this Spirit of God in Christ, and by so doing attain the Sonship. But Christ is the Son of God absolutely, since in him dwells the unmediated Spirit of God—he is "the Son of God with power according to the spirit of holiness." We can only be children of adoption, for we have received only "the spirit of adoption" (viii. 15): yet even so we are heirs—"joint heirs with Christ." Such is the Trinitarianism of Paul. That he even speaks of Christ as God has yet to be shown. Christ is the Son of God in a higher way than we can ever be: but he is not God.

2. It was Paul who divorced Christianity from Judaism.[10] This, again, was a consequence of his

[10] This statement requires qualification. Paul did not divorce Christianity from Judaism in the sense in which, later, Marcion did. Paul's attitude to Judaism may be described as mid-

mission to the Gentiles, and is also intimately bound up with his doctrine of flesh and spirit. Judaism—the Law—was "after the flesh." Its symbol was circumcision. Christianity is a "law of the spirit of life." Its symbols are the Cross and "the circumcision of the heart." The Christian conquers the flesh by the spirit as Christ conquered the law by Christianity. He who achieves this conquest is "not under the Law." Flesh and spirit, Judaism and Christianity, works and faith—in each of these antitheses we have exactly the same idea. "Faith and works" is a phrase one hardly dares to utter. Will it one day cease to be redolent of the bad temper of successive generations of theologians? By "works" St. Paul does not mean the doing of one's duty, he means circumcision and abstinence from meat offered to idols. By "faith" he means living to Christ in the spirit of Christ. The word means also to him, of course, belief in certain facts of Christ's life and death. But this *material faith* (if I may make such a distinction) is never in the foreground with St.

way between Christ and Marcion. Judaism was for him unessential to Christianity; for Marcion it was antagonistic to it. (Marcion's *Antitheses* developed the different points of contrast between the two religions.) But Marcionism was as legitimate a development of Paulinism as Paulinism was of Christianity.

Paul as it is with most of us; but ever in the foreground is the *spiritual* faith in Christ, the living in the spirit of Christ, the suffering and dying for Christ's ideals. If St. Paul beheld among us to-day one of those many who, lacking the *material faith*, are yet trying to live to Christ, and, for Christ suffering obloquy or poverty or both, can we not hear him saying, "Henceforth let no man trouble thee: for thou bearest in thy body the marks of the Lord Jesus"?

The complete separation which we find in Paul between Judaism and Christianity we do not, as I have said, find in Christ.[11] Yet the development was, even from Christ's point of view, legitimate. The death of Christ had shown the futility of attempting to drag Judaism in the train of Christianity. Christ had "caught hold of the skirt of him that was a Jew" and had tripped in it and fallen and failed. Paul left Judaism behind him altogether. Christ could not have done so even had he been (as he was not) willing. He had no other public but a Jewish one. With his death the Gospel was really expelled from Palestine, and driven necessarily to Greece, Asia and Rome if it was to have a home anywhere.

[11] It is worth remembering here that in the second century Cerinthus identified pure Christianity and pure Mosaism.

One might well fancy one saw a divine Providence in the fact that precisely at the conjuncture when Christianity had to go to the Gentiles or to perish, there arose the one man capable of carrying it along the great ways of the world. Paul was at once the most and the least Jewish of men. "Hebrew of the Hebrews," he was yet at one and the same time a Greek, a Roman and a Jew, a debtor, as he truly says, both to the Greeks and the Barbarians. His Greek culture, though it is the fashion to make light of it, is abundantly manifested. He had "sat at the feet of Gamaliel," whom we know to have been a Hellenist. He cites the aphorisms of the Greek poets. He flatters the Athenians ("I perceive that you are exceedingly religious") like an orator of their own decadence. And in his epistles he is *διαλεκτικώτατος τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.[12] The Roman in Paul also, I think, comes out, occasionally. I noticed before[13] how in speaking of the Fatherhood of God

[12] Note *e.g.*, in the Epistle to the Romans the constant raising of *ἀπορίαι* (e.g., iv. 1. *sqq.* *ἀπορεῖται* whether Abraham was "justified by faith"). Note also the frequent employment of a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*, *e.g.*, vii. 7. "Is then the Law sin?" *cf.* vi. 1. The Hebrews had plenty of natural "Scharfsinnigkeit," but these things are eminently Greek and not Hebrew.

[13] Page 196, footnote.

he has in his mind the Roman *patria potestas*. So, too, in the passage from the Epistle to the Romans to which I have just referred, Paul speaks of sonship by adoption in a manner which recalls at once the peculiar use made by the Romans in all times of adoption. Throughout the Epistle there are many things which would have a fuller meaning to a Roman than a Jew could find in them. Even in "I speak unto men that know the Law" one fancies Paul is thinking at one and the same time of the Ten Commandments and the Twelve Tables.

It was this versatility and "modernness" of spirit, this many-sidedness, which, combined with greater spiritual gifts, made St. Paul the one man capable of converting the world.

3. The third point in which Paul adds to Christianity as he received it, is the treatment he gives to the doctrine of the Resurrection.

Christ, as we have seen, looked for a "resurrection" of "the Son of Man." Paul expects a "resurrection" (a second resurrection) of Christ, which is to bring in the end of all things. Belief in the first resurrection of Christ and in his immediate coming again—his second resurrection—are the two cardinal dogmas of Paul's theology. But they almost cease to be dogmas by the treatment which he

gives to them. I do not speak of the emotion which he infuses into them, but of the kind of parabolic significance which he draws out of them. The death of Christ upon the Cross is made a figure of the death to the flesh which we must all die, if we wish to live. We must become "dead with Christ to sin": we must "*crucify* our members with their affections and lusts," we must be "crucified with Christ." In exactly the same way Christ's resurrection is made a "type" of that spiritual resurrection which each man (descending, if I may amplify, into hell and for three days agonizing there with the powers of darkness in himself) must endeavor to realize in his life: in order that "even as Christ rose from the dead, so we ought also to walk in newness of life." Here we are at the true center of the Pauline theology, and face to face with a "doctrine" that will survive all the permutations which Christian theology in general must undergo.[14]

4. The fourth, and last, contribution made by Paul, independently, to Christianity was *organization*. This organization was twofold, organization

[14] These remarks are based upon Matthew Arnold's *St. Paul and Protestantism*. Arnold's interpretation of St. Paul's doctrine is, I may notice, more or less identical with that of the Valentinian gnostics.

of the Faith, and organization of the Faithful. With the first disciples their "faith" was an unanalyzed emotion. It was a faith or love hoping all things, believing all things of goodness and of that high embodiment of it which they called the Christ. It is put forward as a reproach against St. Paul that he intellectualized Christianity. The charge is just, but as a reproach it cannot be sustained. The unexamined ideal is not worth entertaining either in religion or in anything else. Paul took the Christian faith and endeavored to make clear its place in the development of the religious idea—confining himself, of course, to the manifestations of that idea in Jewish history. Into the heterogeneous body of teaching delivered orally to him as the gospel of Christ, he endeavored to fix and arrest the essential elements, at the same time exhibiting these in their true place in the order of religious development. The analytical subtlety of his mind (truly Greek) added to an impressionableness of temperament truly Hebrew, enabled him with an unfailing perception of the essential, to leave "a whole of parts" that Christianity which he found without form or coherence.

One might even say that Paul understood the teaching of Christ better than Christ himself. The Gospel, as it came from the heart of Christ, was a

thing wandering and unrelated. Paul gave to it relations and permanence. To this day the key to the understanding of Christ lies with Paul. If the hearts of theologians were known, I fancy there would be found many who have inadvertently and unconsciously loved Paul more than Christ.

In external organization Paul found believers and left a church. Christ had sent out disciples to proclaim in the highways the coming of the end: but rules and system and a community, in the strict sense, he founded none. Why should he? The end was at hand. Paul believed as firmly as Christ in the immediateness of the end. But the faithful were scattered, their faith was often weak, they were always falling away: any new "wind of doctrine" carried them from Christ to someone else: so that the very immediateness of the coming made organization imperative if many of them were not to die in their sins. The church which Paul organized was organized with a view to the end of the world. If he saw it, as it still exists to-day, I believe he would be more astonished at the survival of so temporary an institution than at finding the end of the world not yet come.

In the long and learned introduction prefixed to his edition of the Bible (dated 1813) by the Rev.

John Brown, I read that, "Perhaps about A.D. 2860 or 3000 Satan will be again loosed from his long restraint: and, after corrupting the members of the Church, will assemble the Turks, Russians, or others of a savage temper, to destroy her: but the fearful vengeance of God shall overtake them in their attempts. *Then cometh the end of the world*, at what distance we know not." This irruption of Satan, this high-handed action of Turkey and Russia, this end of all things, those who read these lines will be able to await with equanimity in a different place from this. The Rev. John Brown has gone thither before us; but he may be allowed to speak to us a kind of allegory.

The year 2860 is ever upon us daily: daily is Satan unloosed, and peoples "of a savage temper" arm themselves against the truth of God: the end of all things is ever staring us in the face. John was right, Jesus was right, St. Paul was right, when each proclaimed the immediate coming of the Kingdom of God. It comes daily when Satan, (that is, Sin and Ignorance and the Pride which either engenders) is cast down by the power of Justice and Right Knowledge and Simplicity: when "men of a savage temper" are diverted from their wrath by the soft answer of good-sense. It comes daily to all who,

without losing interest in life, or the healthy sense of the world, yet feel that all their actions look to an end that is not on earth. To the man who through the day keeps his eyes upon the duties of the day to do them, who is just, kind, moderate, healthy-minded, who also at the close of each day goes out at his door, and, lifting his eyes from the earth, looks awhile at "the unnumbered stars of God," though he stand there without speech or prayer—to such an one the Kingdom of Heaven comes daily. For that which sent John to the dungeon, Christ to the Cross, Paul to the block, each filled with the faith of the instant coming of the Lord, was nothing else than this—the sense, which should be in each one of us, of a perfection ever about to be attained, a joy and peace ever about to be realized. He who has not this sense of the ideal may, as truly as he that lacks "charity," be counted dead before God.

THE END

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN (KINGDOM OF GOD)

In saying that by "Kingdom of Heaven" Christ means the end of the world, I ought to add two qualifications.

Firstly, the phrase is sometimes used by Christ in the sense not of the actual end, but of the preparation for that end. Thus when he says, "The Kingdom of God is at hand," he does mean *the end:* but when he compares the Kingdom of Heaven to a grain of mustard seed he is clearly thinking of the preparation for, and the preaching of, "the Kingdom," the increase of the faithful who believe in the instant coming of the Son of Man. But even when he uses the phrase in this secondary sense of preparation, there none the less dominates in the background the conception of the actual end. This is clearly seen in such parables as those of the Sower and the Tares, where the final harvest is throughout the dominant thought.

Secondly, in saying that the "Kingdom of Heaven" means the end of the world, I must not by "end of the world" be understood to mean the dissolution of the terrestrial system. The "kingdom" is to be *probably upon earth.* By "end of the world" I mean merely the complete disruption of all the ordinary relations of life, of all that makes human existence distinctively human. How utter and complete Christ figures to himself this disruption we see in such sayings as, "In the Kingdom of Heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage." A kingdom in which we are to be "as the angels" may fairly be spoken of as an "end of the world," *from my point of view,* which is merely that the teaching of Christ is inapplicable to ordinary human society or to any society other than a supernatural one.

Whether beyond this complete alteration of human life Christ contemplated a further and more distant readjustment of things—whether, that is to say, he regarded the kingdom upon earth which Messias was to bring as temporal or eternal—it does not seem possible to determine. In the Book of Enoch from which (and from Daniel, upon which Enoch is largely in the nature of a commentary) so many of Christ's Messianic ideas seem to be derived, both views seem to be put forward—the book being a compilation from the works of different Messianic writers. If Christ, with Enoch xci.-civ., supposed the kingdom of the Messiah to be limited in duration, then he may be said to have contemplated two ends;

if, with the other authors of that book, he imagined the kingdom to be eternal,[1] then the "Kingdom of Heaven" may without qualification be described as the end of the world, so long as by world we understand not *mundus*, but *societas hominum*. The conception of the Messiah's kingdom as not, in the first instance, eternal, seems to me to be that which best harmonizes with the doctrine of Christ generally. It seems clear, for example, that he is thinking of a kingdom on our present earth, to be followed by one elsewhere, when he says, as reported by St. Mark: "There is no man who hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for my sake and for the sake of the Gospel, but he shall receive a hundredfold *now in this time* (ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ) . . and in the world to come life eternal." The words ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ (which, though omitted by Matthew, are found in both Mark and Luke) must be (1) referred to a Messianic reign, and (2) interpreted as emphasizing (*a*) the immediateness of its coming, (*b*) the limit of its duration (in contrast with ζωὴν αἰώνιον in the words which follow).

[1] In Enoch i.-xxxvi., the kingdom is eternal, but the members of it die.

APPENDIX B

THE SON OF MAN

A brief summary of the principal views that have been held as to the meaning of the phrase "Son of Man" in Christ's mouth, will be found in Mr. R. H. Charles's *Book of Enoch,* Appendix B (*cf.* the notes to that book *passim*).

My own view is more in agreement with that of Schulze than with any other, though I do not believe, as does Schulze, that Christ ever used the expression "Son of Man" of himself. I imagine him to have adopted it from Daniel vii. 13 as a definite designation of the Messiah, and never to use it except as meaning the Messiah. Whether Daniel so used it is another question with which I am not here concerned. In other passages of Daniel, as also always in Ezekiel and elsewhere, the words seem always to be merely a synonym for prophet. Or perhaps I should rather say that Ezekiel is addressed by "the Word of the Lord" as "Son of Man" primarily owing to the fact that he is, when so addressed, in heaven, or a vision of heaven. But while the designation thus primarily contrasts him with the angels, it at the same time emphasizes the fact that Ezekiel is *man in a supernatural situation;* is a prophet mediating between the creator and the creature. From this usage the words would very naturally come to designate any supernat-

urally gifted person, and it may be in this sense (and not in that of Messias) that Daniel employs them even at vii. 13. But what is certain is, not that Daniel meant by "Son of Man" Messias, but that he was understood to do so in our Lord's time, and indeed a century earlier. Our best evidence as to the sense in which our Lord understood the words is, as Renan has observed, the Book of Enoch. That book is the key to the Gospels, in so far as they are apocalyptic, and even further (*cf.* Appendix A). Twice in Enoch the words seem to mean (as in Ezekiel) "prophet," *e.g.*, lx. 10, lxxi. 14. But both these passages are recognized to be interpolations. In the other parts of the book the words are always and consistently used to designate the Messiah. The most notable passage is Enoch xlvi. 3:—"This is the Son of Man who hath righteousness, with whom dwelleth righteousness, and who reveals all the treasures of that which is hidden, because the Lord of Spirits hath chosen him, and his lot before the Lord of Spirits hath surpassed everything in uprightness forever. And this Son of Man whom thou hast seen will arouse the kings and mighty ones from their thrones, and will loosen the reins of the strong, and grind to powder the teeth of the sinners. And he will put down the kings from their kingdoms and thrones, because they do not extol and praise him, nor thankfully acknowledge whence the kingdom was bestowed upon them. And he will put down the countenance of the strong and shame will

cover them: darkness will be their dwelling and worms their bed, and they will have no hope of rising from their beds because they do not extol the name of the Lord of Spirits." [1]

How the Book of Enoch generally colors the New Testament (both with regard to thought and language) may be seen by anyone who will consult Mr. Charles's *General Introduction,* p. xi. This book and the Book of Daniel form the basis of the Messianic ideas of Christ. *Cf.* the whole of chh. xxxvii.-lxxi.

In 4 Ezra xiii. 3, *ille homo* is undoubtedly used as a translation of the Danielic " Son of Man," and is evidence of the general Messianic interpretation of Dan. vii. 13.

APPENDIX C

THE RELATION OF THE ESSENES TO OUR LORD

In the late Dean Farrar's edition of the Gospel of St. Luke, Excursus vi. p. 380, I find this:

"The Essenes are not mentioned in the Gospels, nor is there any indication that Jesus ever came into contact with them. They were a small, exclusive, ascetic, isolated community with whose discouragement of marriage and withdrawal from all the active duties of life our Lord could have had no sympathy."

Of this paragraph the first eight words are true, but into the rest of it this eminent and able ecclesiastic

[1] I quote Mr. Charles's translation.

(who was also a liberal clergyman) has packed more falsehood than one would (*a priori*) have judged it possible to do.

The Essenes differed from Christ and his disciples in the exaggerated reverence which they paid to the Mosaic Law: in this they exceeded all the Jews. But in everything else, so far as we can judge, they stood in their principles and habits of life so near to Christianity as delivered by Christ that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Christ himself was deeply indebted to them and frankly borrowed many of their institutions. Dean Farrar is quite right in saying that they are not mentioned in the Gospels. But why? Why are Herodians, Pharisees, Sadducees mentioned, and yet not this important sect of Essenes? Obviously, because they never came into conflict with our Lord. *They never came into conflict with our Lord because our Lord was in so many things their disciple.*

The *locus classicus* upon the Essenes is Josephus's *Wars of the Jews*, ii. viii. Since only the saints of the learned world look up references, I will transcribe a few sentences of Josephus in the version of Whiston. "They seem to have a greater affection for one another than other sects have. . . . These Essenes reject pleasure as an evil. . . . They do not *absolutely* deny the fitness of marriage. . . . These men are despisers of riches. . . . Nor is there any one to be found among them richer than another; for it is a law

among them that those who come to them must let what they have be common to the whole order . . . they also have stewards appointed to take care of their common things. . . . They have no certain city, but many of them dwell in every city. . . . They carry nothing with them when they travel into remote parts . . . nor do they allow of the change of garments nor of shoes till they be first entirely torn to pieces or worn out. . . . Every one gives what he hath to him that wanteth it. . . . They meet every one together in an apartment of their own. . . . they go into the dining-room as into a holy temple . . . a priest says grace before meat. . . . Only these two things are done among them at every one's free will, which are, to assist those that want it and to show mercy. ["Blessed are the merciful."] They are eminent for fidelity, and are ministers of peace. ["Blessed are the peacemakers."] Whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury. ["But I say unto you, Swear not at all."] "

This description, as I have given it in excerpt, might stand very well for a description of the community round Christ. When the Sermon on the Mount was spoken, when the Seventy were sent out, when the twelve and their Master sat down to meat, the thought of the Essene life was not, I think, far from the mind of Christ. The whole passage should be read as it stands in Josephus,

since I have omitted a few discrepancies, as well as one or two similarities, between Essenism and Christianity. The resemblance of the two teachings is noticed even by Whiston, though Dean Farrar finds only contrasts. Dean Farrar, indeed, says that the account of Josephus is not to be depended on. I do not know what this means. Josephus met Essenes every day of his life. His account of them is detailed: and what is more remarkable, though he belonged to a rival sect (he was a Pharisee) he eulogizes them, and speaks in glowing terms of their great moral elevation which was admired even by the Romans. How then can we doubt either the excellence of his information or his honesty?

In this sect, therefore, we have to recognize a body of men possessed of a lofty philosophy and pursuing a "way of life" as pure and holy as men have ever lived upon the earth: a body of men who did much to mold the creed of the followers of Christ, and to whom, therefore, the world must ever be deeply indebted.

I have noticed this, which ought to escape no fair and open-eyed student of Christianity, because notes of the order of that which I cited from Dean Farrar are common. Dean Farrar's note occurs in a work intended for use as a school text-book, and a book in many ways admirable. But such a note, proceeding from a distinguished Churchman and scholar, is lamentable. As long as this sort of teaching is given in our schools, theology can make no progress.

APPENDIX D

THE AUTHORITY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

It will have been observed that in the preceding pages I have not employed the Fourth Gospel as an authority for the life of Christ. As the "self-assertion" of Christ —that is, his proclamation of his own divine mission and character—is more prominent in this Gosepl than in any other, I seem obliged to say a few words as to the opinion which I have formed of its value. This is the more necessary because there are, I fancy, a great many persons who would "believe in" Christ, in a way that, as it is, they do not, if they believed in the authenticity of "St. John."

Of the purpose with which the Fourth Gospel—or at least the opening portion of it—was composed, and by which it is largely dominated throughout, I have already spoken. I am glad to find that I am, to a great extent, in agreement here with Baldensperger, though there are between us important elements of difference in detail. The view I have taken of its purpose inclines me to place its composition in the last years of the first century—though any precision in the matter is impossible. The question of its value as history cannot be separated from the question of its authorship. To the discussion of this question I do not feel myself competent to add anything new: but I feel none the less

obliged in few words to present, and defend, the attitude which I have been led to take up.

The evidences for a Johannine authorship are commonly distinguished into the two classes of external and internal. Maintaining this distinction, I feel bound in candor to say that I feel profoundly the strength of the external evidence in support of the claim of the gospel to have been writen by the apostle John. I confess freely—I might wish from my own point of view that the matter stood otherwise—I confess that I regard the merely external testimony in favor of a Johannine authorship as being quite as strong as that which we possess for the authenticity of the majority of ancient writings. Few works of classical antiquity have better credentials. It is true that the Gospel is first cited as John's by Theophilus of Antioch: true also that he speaks of John and not of John the apostle. It is true that the first tradition of the origin of the Gospel is found as late as Clement of Alexandria—unless we accept as of earlier date the tradition of the Muratorian Canon. It is true that it is only when we get to Irenæus that we have a clear and undoubted testimony in favor of the orthodox view. None the less I think the evidences for "St. John" externally very cogent. Even the silence of the first two centuries of our era may be construed in favor of the ordinary tradition. But the real strength of the defenders of the Gospel consists in Irenæus. It is to my mind impossible to doubt either

that Irenæus was acquainted with Polycarp, or that Polycarp was acquainted with St. John. That being so, if St. John did not write the Fourth Gospel, could Irenæus fail to know this?

This line of reasoning does, as I say, appear to me very powerful. It may be said, of course, that Polycarp, though a hearer of St. John, can yet have been little more than a boy when the apostle died. But it must be remembered that Polycarp stands not only for himself, but for the body of tradition in which he was brought up. If he knew John ever so little he must yet have been familiar with the tradition of the Johannine circle. Irenæus is supposed to have been actually a pupil of Polycarp. Could Polycarp have failed to speak to him of the Fourth Gospel? If Polycarp did not know of the existence of the Gospel, he could, of course, have said nothing of it to Irenæus. In that case the question is: Would Irenæus have accepted the Gospel as genuine without having behind him the authority of Polycarp? Would not the fact that Polycarp had never mentioned so interesting and important a document have weighed with him very greatly? I do not know that we are in a position to answer such a question. We know little of Irenæus. The second century was not an age of criticism. And in such a matter *a priori* arguments are not of great value. I think it must also be admitted that Irenæus, despite his relation to Polycarp, was but ill-acquainted with the tradition of the Churches of

Ephesus and Smyrna. He speaks of Polycarp as having been consecrated bishop of Smyrna ὑπὸ ἀποστόλων (iii. 4). By that he can be referring only, I think, to John. He is employing the same tradition as meets us again in Tertullian, who definitely states (*Præscr. Heret.* 32) that John created Polycarp bishop. The statement is hardly credible. In 100 A. D. Polycarp was only thirty: and even at that date we can scarcely suppose that St. John was still alive. That being so, it must be allowed that Irenæus was but ill-acquainted with reliable Asiatic, or Johannine, tradition. If, therefore, he had no information from Polycarp himself with regard to the Fourth Gospel, we have no reason to suppose that his other sources of information were reliable. Polycarp stands for himself *plus* a good tradition. Irenæus, except so far as we can connect him with Polycarp, stands only for himself. If Polycarp knew the Fourth Gospel, and knew it not to be by John, it is, I think, not possible that Irenæus should have received it as Johannine. But that Polycarp knew of the Gospel at all cannot be proved: his supposed citation from the first Johannine Epistle, even granting it to be a citation, establishes nothing.

The real question, then, with regard to external evidence, is this: Would Irenæus have accepted the Fourth Gospel if he had heard nothing of it from Polycarp? I feel that, had he lived in the twentieth century, he would not have done so. But he lived in the second: a

century of the critical methods of which we know nothing.

The evidence of Irenæus, nevertheless, remains very strong, and I candidly admit its strength. At the same time it cannot by anyone be thought conclusive. The battle between the defenders and the impugners of the authenticity of "St. John," so far as it is fought upon the field of external evidence, is a drawn battle. But I feel obliged to add that the "draw" appears to me to be somewhat in favor of the defenders.

When we turn to the internal evidence I think that there ensues a very different result. In this department the impugners of St. John have gone a great deal further than I am prepared to follow them. I am not prepared, for example, to dispute the accuracy of the geographical information of the Fourth Evangelist. I think its author had a good knowledge of the geography of Palestine. I am sure that he had seen the Temple before its destruction. Nor do I call in question his knowledge of Jewish literature and institutions. I do not, for instance, imagine that he thought the High Priesthood to have been an annual office. I conjecture that he called Caiaphas "the high priest of that year" because the year in question was 36 A. D., the year, that is, in which Caiaphas was superseded in his office.[1] On

[1] This would bring our Lord's age to forty. When Pilate appeared in Rome to answer, before Tiberius a charge of maladministration of the affairs of Judæa he found Tiberius just dead (*Jos. Ant.* xviii. 4). Tiberius died in March 37 A.D.

the other hand I do find it impossible to believe that St. John was "an acquaintance of the High Priest": he was the son of a fisherman, and, however prosperous in his trade, and however little derogatory such a trade may have been thought by Jews, he was "unlettered and ignorant" (Acts iv. 13): and such persons are not natural, or possible, acquaintances of a High Priest. To say, with Dr. Sanday, that by such an acquaintanceship is meant merely acquaintanceship with the High Priest's servants' hall is merely to juggle with the words of a text which should be, so far at least, sacred. For my own part, I feel very strongly that this single text is sufficient of itself to overthrow the whole hypothesis of Johannine authorship.[2]

But still more fatal to this hypothesis is the general character of the Gospel. Even if we allow that the work is not actually unhistorical, it is yet a record which *could* not have been written by a personal disciple. If it be said that this is to decide the question on the ground of a subjective impression, I rejoin that we cannot get

If we suppose our Lord to have suffered in the April of 36 A.D. this would leave nearly a year between his crucifixion and the recall of Pilate. It is clear that Pilate's position was already very insecure at the time of his condemnation of Christ. That condemnation was a *desperate* expedient to allay complaints. In a word, the situation was such that the hypothesis of the recall of Pilate within a year not only presents no difficulties, but appears extremely probable.

[2] It shows clearly, to my mind, not only that the author was not St. John, but that he could never have known St. John.

away from subjective impressions. We must submit these impressions, of course, to rigorous criticism; but if after such criticism they remain, we are obliged to take account of them. I feel, then, that the Christ of the Fourth Gospel could never have been known really and intimately, but only ideally and in vision, to the author of that Gospel. To adduce, as against such a view, the parallel of the Platonic Socrates is sophistic. Plato came to Socrates as a philosopher to a philosopher. St. John came to Christ in poverty of spirit and in simpleness of faith: to learn not to think but to live: a Galilean fisherman and not an Athenian idealist. Even if the Christ of the Fourth Gospel had been the real Christ, we may well doubt whether in a genuine Gospel according to St. John he would not have emerged as the Christ of the Synoptics.

The Christ of the Fourth Gospel is not a Person, but an Idea. The whole work is philosophical, literary to a degree, Greek to the point of absurdity: every page is redolent of the schools of Alexandria. I am not denying that the Johannine Logos is largely an original Jewish conception: nor that it presents some points of contrast with the Philonian conception.[3] I am

[3] Both these points have, however, been much exaggerated. It is urged, for example, that the Philonian Logos is never incarnate; the Johannine is. The obvious answer is that for the Philonian Logos no worthy flesh, wherein to incarnate it, could be found. The Johannine Logos is incarnate for the reason that Christ came "in the flesh."

not even concerned to deny that the author of the Fourth Gospel was a Jew. Indeed I am inclined to see in him a Jewish convert of the school of John Mark. St. Mark was Bishop of Alexandria, and we know from Eusebius (ii. 16-17)—who may fairly be presumed at this point to be quoting either Papias or Clement of Alexandria[4]—that his Church was brought into direct contact with the school of Philo. What a new life and meaning is imported into the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel if we imagine it read, by a disciple of Mark, to an audience largely composed of hearers of Philo! How apt the opening words, mystical yet full of "point"—"In the beginning was the Logos"! And, assuming such an origin for our Gospel, I would notice how naturally it might come, in a later age, to be attributed to John the apostle. Imagine it to have come from a disciple of St. Mark: recollect that Mark also bore the name of John—a Jewish name which he would naturally employ among the Jews of Alexandria. The Gospel would thus be, in a true sense, a Gospel *according to,* although not written by, "John." Dionysius of Alexandria—who never, as he tells us, theorized on his own account—calls attention to confusions which he suspects to have arisen in the history of early Christian literature between John the apostle and others of the same name. *πολλοὺς δὲ ὁμωνύμους Ἰωάννῃ τῷ ἀποστόλῳ νομίζω*

[4] He has just cited this authority for another statement concerning Mark.

γεγονέναι, he says; and he goes on to suggest that, in the case of the Apocalypse, the John (Mark) of whom we are speaking may have been confused with his greater namesake.[5]

However this may be, the "unlettered and unlearned" John, son of Zebedee, must not only have improved his mind, but have changed his very nature or ever he came to write the Fourth Gospel. We are always being asked, on this Johannine question, not to demand proofs, but to weigh probabilities.[6] Let us weigh them, in all conscience. *Is* it probable that the apostle John ever became, if not a disciple of Philo, yet a disciple of whom Philo might well have been proud? If we put in one scale the probability that he did and in the other the probability that he did *not*, I fear that the former will prove so light and airy that it will fly up and "kick the beam." Dr. Sanday suggests that St. John may have familiarized himself with Philonism and the Logos while disputing with learned opponents, etc. But I ask: How, granting this, did he come to make the Logos doctrine, not merely a part of, but so central and fundamental in, his theology? I can just believe that he might, if I may so speak, have "dabbled" in the doctrine. I can believe that he might, in passing, have

[5] Eusebius, *H. E.*, vii. 25.

[6] *Cf.* Sanday, Fourth Gospel, ch. iv. *fin.* A good deal of what I have here said I have excerpted from a review by me of Dr. Sanday's book, which I printed in the *Oxford Magazine* of October 23, 1905.

vaguely hinted at a union of Christ with the Logos, in order to appeal to, and convert, Greek intellectualism. But more than that I cannot believe.

Who, then, wrote "St. John's" Gospel I do not know. That it was the work of a great and holy spirit who can doubt? Whether it is also the product of a genuine historical spirit is a different question. There can be no doubt, however, that its historical value falls greatly if we are unable to regard it as the work of the apostle John. I will content myself with saying here that my view of it, so far as its historical detail is concerned, is in agreement with that put forward by Dr. Drummond in his recent work—"*The Authorship and Character of the Fourth Gospel.*" I regard it, that is to say, as belonging not so much to historical, or biogrophical, literature as to a species of *haggada.* Its *haggadistic* character is well brought out by Dr. Drummond,[7] though I am wholly unable to understand how Dr. Drummond can think this character consistent with Johannine authorship. Regarding it as a species of *haggada,* I feel all attempts to reconcile it with the Synoptic Gospels to be useless and sophistical. It gives us not only a different life of Christ, but a different Christ. "A Jesus," as Jülicher says, "who preached alternately in the manner of the Sermon on the Mount and of John xiv.-xvi. is a psychological impossibility . . . and it is impossible to separate the form from the matter—to

[7] Ch. iii. iv. pp. 21-32 (1903).

ascribe the form to the later writer and the matter to Jesus. No! *sint ut sunt aut non sint!*"

I ought to add a few words on a very perplexing problem which directly arises out of the view here taken of this Gospel. Did its author intend to pass himself off as the apostle John? I am personally loath to believe that such was his intention. But, without any such intention, he might, I think, as a *haggadistic* writer, assume the character of John, just as the writer of the Book of Daniel assumes that prophet's character and the writer of the Book of Enoch that patriarch's character. He does not thereby become a common forger. But for my own part I prefer to think that the author of the Gospel is not responsible for its two last verses—in which alone the writer and the "beloved disciple" are identified. By the "beloved disciple" I understand St. John to be meant throughout. But his identification with the author of the book may well be due to a later hand. The persons who added the verses which contain it I suppose to have acted in perfect good faith. They may have found the Fourth Gospel with the title "Gospel according to John"—by which would be meant merely a Gospel proceeding from the "school" of John Mark: and they may very well, without the least idea of fraud, have rashly ascribed it to the apostle. One is unwilling to believe that any persons could be so wantonly sacrilegious as to employ deliberate deceit in respect of a work of literature so noble, of such power, so truly, beyond all works of literature, sacred.

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